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Abstract
Medical workforce planning is a key element of any health care system, however
factors influencing medical career choice are poorly understood. This thesis contains
three essays on the influence of doctors’ socio-demographic characteristics on their
medical specialty in both the UK and Spain. This thesis aims at understanding the
drivers of the occupational segregation between socio-demographic groups, with the
objective of helping regulators and policy makers in the design of interventions aimed
at reducing the undesired consequences associated with the occupational segregation.
Chapter 2 constitutes a descriptive exercise of the socio-demographic composition
of the new cohorts of junior doctors in the UK by analysing their distribution across
specialties. The findings show large disparities in that distribution. This chapter
provides a discussion of the possible sources of the observed disparities and relates
the occupational segregation with the literature on statistical discrimination.
Chapter 3 seeks to disentangle the origins of the outcomes observed in Chapter 2. It
develops a conceptual framework that acknowledges the sequential, two-sided nature
of the process and that serves as a base for the empirical analysis. The focus of the
latter is the estimation of how doctors’ socio-demographic characteristics affect their
application strategies and specialty choices and selectors’ valuations of candidates.
Chapter 4 focuses on the Spanish resident market and explores two of the possible
causes leading to the persistent gender gap in surgical specialties. The first focus
is on the role of social interactions in shaping doctors’ decisions to specialize, more
specifically whether female role models constitute an attractor factor for female
doctors. The second analyses the functioning of the specialty allocation system and
tests whether a policy change has had the unintended consequence of reducing the
probability of female doctors accessing highly demanded specialties, including surgical
specialties.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis contains three essays on the influence of doctors’ socio-demographic charac-
teristics on their medical specialty. The work contained in this thesis contributes to the
literature by offering analysis of how the different demographic and socioeconomic
groups of junior doctors are sorted across specialties in the UK, and by connecting
those differences with statistical discrimination literature (Chapter 2). Having estab-
lished the existence of large differences between groups, Chapters 3 and 4 seek to
disentangle the channels through which those differences arise and are transmitted.
Chapter 3 is a sequential analysis of the speciality allocation process in the UK, where
we explore how doctors’ socio-demographic characteristics can affect their application
behaviour and selectors’ assessments. Using data from Spain, Chapter 4 examines how
social interactions affect decisions to specialise and whether a change in the design of
the specialty allocation system can affect female and male doctors differently.
Medical workforce planning is a key element of any health care system. This is
largely driven by the time lag existing between the demand and supply of doctors
that creates uncertainty and risk. Instructing a doctor is a long and costly process,
whereas changes in demand are more sudden (Bloor et al. 2006). Estimates for the
average total training cost of a consultant in the UK are over half a million pounds
(Netten and Curtis 2016) and these costs are funded out of taxation. Nonetheless, the
medical profession is considered elite (Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission
2014), probably due to the large private human capital investments required and high
opportunity costs associated with the long process of becoming a fully trained doctor.
The profession shows long run disequilibrium as demand persistently exceeds supply
and medical professionals persistently receive rents (Elliott 2003), even when in both
Spain and the UK the government is the single largest employer.
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The gap between demand and supply in the medical workforce is growing in the
UK, one of the main reasons for that being the recent major changes in the compos-
ition of the medical workforce (Cleland et al. 2016). Examples of the latter are the
feminization of the profession, the increase of the representation of ethnic minority
doctors and from those coming from deprived socioeconomic backgrounds, and the
large dependence on foreign qualified doctors. Results from Chapter 2 show that, des-
pite the increased representation of these groups, their distribution across specialties
and locations is highly unequal. In the case of doctors who graduated overseas this
unequal distribution relates to their limited access to specialties, since they can only
opt for the training posts that have not been taken in the first round of the specialty
allocation process. According to Richards (1994) and Welsh (2000) this differential
treatment comes at the risk of creating an underclass of doctors within the NHS. For
the other demographic and socioeconomic groups those restrictions do not apply,
however factors influencing career choice are poorly understood. Nicholson (2008)
defines the three-key elements that determine specialty choice: monetary attributes,
non-monetary attributes and doctors’ personal characteristics. The monetary and
non-monetary attributes of the different specialties are fairly constant over time, which
makes it difficult to estimate the impact of those elements on specialty choices using
observational data.1 However, the socio-demographic changes in the composition of
the medical workforce and the differential attainment of the new members in the
specialty allocation process make further understanding of how doctors’ personal
characteristics affect their specialty outcomes necessary.
This thesis aims at understanding the drivers of the occupational segregation
between socio-demographic groups, and to go beyond the intrinsic preferences jus-
tification for those differences. The main objective is to inform policy makers and
regulators, and to help them design targeted interventions to aid in the achievement of
a balanced distribution of doctors across specialties. From the regulators’ perspective,
there is a desire to ensure that the medical profession reflects not only appropriate
skills but a balance of social, economic, gender and ethnic groups, by promoting a
1Trade-off between monetary and non-monetary attributes can be explored through the use of discrete
choice experiments as in Sivey et al. (2012) for Australian doctors and Cleland et al. (2016) for the
UK, or through the use of surveys as in Spooner et al. (2017).
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fair, transparent and effective specialty recruitment process with the objective of being
representative of the society it serves (General Medical Council 2010). Moreover,
there are several undesired consequences associated with occupational segregation.
These include earnings disparities, differences in productivity and in the number of
hours worked, shortages of specialists, lower quality of care, and a lower quality of
working experience. Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2005) show that the large gender
gap in doctors’ earnings in the US is connected with their specialty choices. According
to Greenaway (2013) difficulties in recruiting for some specialties has resulted in an
overdependence on existing or locum doctors to fill rota gaps and, in some cases, has
raised patient safety concerns. Blumenthal et al. (2017) compare patient outcomes
of locum and non-locum internal medicine doctors finding no differences in 30-days
mortality rates between the two groups. However, they find that locums deliver
more expensive impatient care and their patients have longer lengths of stay. The
authors suggest that locums may struggle to efficiently and effectively deliver care as
they lack of institution-specific experience. Regarding doctors’ place of qualification
Tsugawa, Jena, Orav et al. (2017) show that Medicare patients treated by interna-
tional graduates had lower risk-adjusted mortality compared with those treated by US
graduates. Authors conjecture that better outcomes might be explained by the fact
that international doctors are more likely to underwent specialty training twice or that
the international group results from a selection of some of the best physicians in their
country of origin.
With respect to gender, Bloor et al. (2008) find that male doctors have significantly
higher activity rates than females, even after accounting for case mix, and according to
Simoens and Hurst (2006) the gap in the number of hours worked between men and
women is larger in the UK than in other OECD countries with universal health care
systems such as Spain or France. By contrast, Tsugawa, Jena, Figueroa et al. (2017)
find that Medicare patients treated by female internists in the US have lower read-
mission and mortality rates and Wallis et al. (2017) find similar mortality results on
elective procedures performed by female surgeons in Canada. In addition, Baumha¨kel
et al. (2009) find that females are more likely to adhere to clinical guidelines, and
Lurie et al. (1993) that they provide preventive care more often. Cooper-Patrick et al.
(1999) analyse patients’ ratings of their physicians participatory decision making styles
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and they find that female doctors had more participatory visits with their patients
than male doctors, irrespective of their patients’ gender. The authors also find that
ethnic differences between physicians and patients are often barriers to partnership
and effective communication.2 These findings suggest that a more even distribution of
doctors, at least for gender, across specialties could lead to gains in the efficiency of
the healthcare system as a whole.
The focus of this thesis is on the supply side of the medical specialty market, more
specifically on the causes of the heterogeneous distribution of doctors across specialties.
The demand side of the specialty market, i.e. the number of training posts available
for each specialty, is fixed and given by the Royal Colleges and Local Education and
Training Boards (LETBs) in the UK and by the Ministry of Health in Spain. The analysis
of how those quotas are set and how the socio-demographic composition of the new
cohorts of doctors may affect them is not considered here. Similarly, and despite
geographical location potentially being a relevant element in doctors’ decisions to
specialise, it only plays a limited role in our analysis due to data and methodological
limitations.
Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the specialty allocation process in the UK, whilst Chapter
4 does so for Spain. Both countries have national health systems, although the spe-
cialty allocation systems work differently; in the UK the allocation system is two-sided,
i.e. doctors apply to specialties, and specialties select doctors from the pool of applic-
ants, whilst in Spain it is one-sided and specialties play a passive role. Nevertheless,
both countries present similar problems regarding occupational segregation and the
differential attainment of the different socio-demographic groups.
Chapter 2 provides the analysis of the distribution of training doctors across spe-
cialties and locations in the UK by means of the National Training Survey (NTS) to
quantify evidence of systematic relationships between doctors’ socio-demographic
characteristics and the specialty and location3 they are training for. This analysis is
innovative in:
• Analysing the NTS that has a very high response rate, hence being a represent-
2Authors observe that patients in race-concordant relationships with their physicians rated them as
significantly more participatory than patients in race-discordant relationship.
3The results for doctors’ geographical distribution can be found in the Appendix, see Section 6.1.
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ative snapshot of the cohort of doctors in training in the year 2013 who will
constitute the medical workforce for many years to come;
• Analysing the role of doctors’ socioeconomic backgrounds, that we proxy with
the type of secondary school attended, in their specialty allocation outcomes;
• In contrast to previous work in this area, examining imbalances across specialties
and locations in both demographic and socioeconomic characteristics simultan-
eously, and accounting for unobserved heterogeneity by means of a Mixed Logit
Model (McFadden and Train 2000);
• Going beyond the differences in preferences between socio-demographic groups
and relating the occupational segregation with the literature on statistical dis-
crimination.
The results show substantial differences across specialties. Doctors training in the
most demanded specialties are more likely to be male, white, younger, from a better-off
socioeconomic background, and to have attended a UK university. What is not clear
is whether those differences result from doctors’ preferences or are the result of any
form of differential attainment in any of the stages of the specialty allocation process.
The findings from Chapter 2 open up research questions that are addressed in later
chapters of this thesis.
Chapter 3 seeks to understand and disentangle the origins of the outcomes observed
in Chapter 2, recognising that the allocation of individuals to specialties is a sequential
process. Doctors make decisions as to which specialties to apply for and their applic-
ations are then assessed to determine their suitability. At each stage of this process
there is selection, either by the doctors themselves or by the selectors reviewing their
applications, that might result in specialties becoming unbalanced in terms of social,
economic, gender and ethnic characteristics. Thus, the principal objective is to under-
stand how demographic and socioeconomic characteristics impact the different stages
of that process. For that purpose, we develop a conceptual framework that serves as a
base for the empirical analysis. The data used in this study come from the UK Medical
Education Database (UKMED), which collates data on the performance and career
progression of the universe of doctors who started their medical studies in the UK in
the years 2007 and 2008. This chapter contributes to the literature by:
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• Being the first study to comprehensively look at the doctors’ application choices
and selection outcomes in the context of the multi-stage allocation process and
the first to consider comprehensive administrative data for the UK;
• Developing a conceptual framework that describes the functioning of the spe-
cialty allocation process in the UK and introduces the element of perceived
probability of getting access to a specialty as a decisive element in both applica-
tion and selection stages;
• Analysing the relationship between an individual’s characteristics and their
propensity to apply for training in different specialties. We group specialties
according to their different attributes: high-income vs. low-income, surgical vs.
non-surgical, primary care vs. non-primary care and run-through vs. uncoupled
and we estimate by means of a set of Probit regressions how doctors’ character-
istics can influence their application strategies, controlling for their educational
background and previous academic attainment;
• Analysing how doctors’ characteristics influence the number of applications that
they make. We treat the latter as an indicator of a doctor’s own perception of
success and also use it as a proxy for doctors’ effort in preparing their applica-
tion(s). That effort is perceived by selectors in the selection stage and allowed
to affect specialty selection outcomes;
• Analysing the role of gender and ethnicity in determining interview scores, that
is the key element determining selection into specialties, controlling for previous
educational attainment by means of a linear regression. We also apply the
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to the mean interview score to determine what
percentage of the observed differences between groups remain unexplained and
may be associated with discrimination.
The results for the application stage show that the evidence with respect to selection
by doctors in regard to their applications is very strong. The regression results for
interview score show that BME doctors and men experience differential attainment
in the selection process for specialty training. The results of the Oaxaca-Binder
decomposition show that part of the differences in interview score can be explained
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by the different distribution of observable characteristics between groups, though
part of the difference remains unexplained and may be attributable to some form of
discrimination. The results regarding the number of applications submitted suggest
that, on average, older and ethnic minority doctors are more likely to make more than
one application, even after controlling for specialty fixed effects. The results for the
selection stage, where the number of applications is used as a proxy for effort, show
that the impact of an extra application reduces the interview score, other things being
equal.
Chapter 4 focuses on the determinants of gender occupational segregation in the
Spanish medical workforce. First, we explore the role of social interactions in shaping
doctors’ decisions to specialise and we analyse whether being exposed to female role
models in male-dominated surgical specialties can affect the specialty choices of female
doctors. Second, we analyse the functioning of the specialty allocation system and test
whether a policy change in its design has had the unintended consequence of reducing
the probability of female doctors accessing highly demanded specialties – a group that
encompasses most of the male dominated specialties. Two different data sources are
used: a cross-sectional survey that provides doctors’ stated preferences regarding their
specialty choices and a cross-sectional data set that comes from doctors’ administrative
records that it is used to identify the doctors who act as role-models and to empirically
analyse the consequences of the policy change in the allocation system. This analysis
innovates by:
• Being the first study to empirically estimate the effect of informational role
models as a determinant of specialty choice, using a survey that provides stated
preferences as distinct from revealed specialty choices. This is an advantage
as the latter are conditioned by the available choice set at the moment of the
specialty choice decision;
• Developing a role model treatment variable that captures the exposure of indi-
viduals to female role models in male-dominated specialties;
• Analysing the unintended consequences of a policy change in the specialty alloc-
ation process. The change resulted in an increase in the competitiveness of the
process and, based on the literature on differential responses to competitiveness
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between men and women, we test whether female doctors are worse off after
the implementation of the policy.
The findings from Chapter 4 confirm that the observed gender gap in surgical special-
ties is not only due to differences in intrinsic preferences between men and women.
The findings suggest that an increased presence of females in those specialties is an
attractor factor for both male and female doctors. Nonetheless, the estimation of
social effects is challenging and the existence of other elements that might be correl-
ated with the role model variable and also influencing specialty choices cannot be
discarded. With regard to the policy change, the findings suggest that the increase in
competitiveness of the process has made female doctors, on average, worse off and, as
a consequence, has reduced their probability of accessing the most popular specialties.
Chapter 5 establishes a nexus between the findings of each chapter, drawing policy
implications and identifying avenues for future research.
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Chapter 2
Getting the right balance? A mixed logit analysis
of the relationship between UK training doctors’
characteristics and their specialties using the
2013 National Training Survey
2.1 Introduction
The medical profession, with its high rates of return and the associated social prestige,
is included in the list of elite or top professions in the UK. Becoming a medical practi-
tioner is a competitive process and represents a substantial investment of time and
financial resources, much of that funded through taxation. The profession has been
successful in improving access to it for females and ethnic minorities (Milburn 2012),
however less so in terms of fostering social mobility as the profession remains domin-
ated by those from better-off socioeconomic backgrounds and little has changed over
time (Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission 2014).
The outcome of the specialty allocation process determines the composition of the
medical profession. There is growing concern that the profession should reflect not
only appropriate skills but also a balance of social, economic, gender and ethnicity
(General Medical Council 2010), to be representative of the society they serve. Achiev-
ing a greater balance could improve patient outcomes (Tsugawa, Jena, Figueroa et al.
2017) and foster public health policies targeted at deprived and minority groups
(Cohen et al. 2002).
In this chapter, we analyse the distribution of doctors in training in the UK by means
of the National Training Survey (NTS) 2013 to quantify evidence of systematic rela-
tionships between doctors’ socio-demographic characteristics and the specialty they
are training for. The NTS is a comprehensive data set that covers all doctors in training
and contains information on doctors’ socio-demographic characteristics, as well as the
specialty and location they are training for. The NTS is a snapshot of the cohort of
doctors in training in the year 2013, who will constitute the medical workforce for
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many years to come. Through the analysis of the outcomes of the specialty allocation
process the NTS allows for the identification of disparities and inequities that are
present in the current cohorts of doctors in training and, therefore, it can inform policy
makers. We consider whether there are imbalances with regard to any one of the
demographic or socioeconomic covariates, holding the other characteristics constant,
by means of a Mixed Logit model (McFadden and Train 2000). In addition, to the
empirical identification of disparities across specialties, we discuss the most probable
causes and connect the observed differential attainment to the relevant statistical
discrimination literature. The findings of this chapter inform and motivate the analysis
in Chapters 3 and 4.
Evidence has been accumulating regarding imbalance in one or more of gender,
ethnicity and socioeconomic background across specialties. For example, despite the
increase in the number of women entering the medical profession in the last three
decades (McKinstry 2008), there exists a large gender difference in the distribution of
doctors across specialties (McKinstry 2008; McNally 2008; Lambert et al. 2006; Gol-
dacre et al. 2010) and as a result, women now predominate in paediatrics, obstetrics
or general practice, but are the minority in surgery or radiology. Whilst there is no
direct evidence regarding the distributions of ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds
across specialties in the UK, studies such as Arulampalam et al. (2005) and McManus
et al. (1998) have shown that applicants from disadvantaged and (or) from non-white
ethnic backgrounds have less probability of receiving offers from some medical schools,
which is an important determinant of specialty allocation (Goldacre et al. 2004). There
is also evidence that national and overseas educated doctors have different application
patterns (Fazel and Ebmeier 2009) and that overseas educated doctors have restricted
access (British Medical Association 2017) to the most popular specialty training posts.
This restriction may create an underclass within the NHS (Richards 1994; Welsh
2000).
There is thus a patchwork of evidence indicating that specialties may be unbalanced
with regard to the gender, ethnicity and socioeconomic background of their constituent
doctors, but no overall view of how these imbalances relate to each other. A funda-
mental problem is that characteristics such as gender and ethnicity may be correlated,
so that an apparent gender imbalance can, in part or in whole, be accounted for by an
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ethnic imbalance or vice versa.
We find that there are systematic and substantial differences between specialties
with respect to training doctors’ gender, ethnicity, age, socioeconomic background
and country of study. Doctors training in the most demanded specialties,i.e. those
specialties with the highest number of applications per training post, are more likely
to be male, white, younger, have attended an independent or grammar school, have a
parent with tertiary education and have attended a UK university. Our study provides
an evidence base for stimulating debate and discussion regarding the possible need to
intervene in doctors’ training in the UK to redress these imbalances across specialties.
A better understanding of how individuals are assigned to specialties is a necessary
precondition for the formulation of effective strategies to ensure greater represent-
ativeness across medical specialities. In the last two decades, the composition of
the medical workforce has changed and now with the feminisation of the medical
workforce, the larger dependence on overseas educated doctors, and the desire to
widen access to those coming from deprived backgrounds, the need for that knowledge
is urgent.
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2.2 describes the data
and the variables used in the analysis. Section 2.3 describes the econometric model
and the empirical implementation. Section 2.4 shows the results from the descriptive
statistics and the regression estimates and, finally, Section 2.5 discusses the findings
and concludes this chapter. Tables can be found in Section 2.6.
2.2 Data and variables
The General Medical Council (GMC) National Training Survey (NTS) is a cross-
sectional survey carried out each year. The survey covers all doctors in training4
at any one of the UK deaneries or the corresponding Local Education and Training
Boards (LETB). From 2013 it has included questions about doctors’ socioeconomic
background (General Medical Council 2013b). The survey has a high response rate,
97.7% for 2013, which translates to a total of 52,797 responding individuals out of
4The General Medical Council (GMC) defines as doctors in training as those who: are in foundation
year two; are in a GMC approved LETB/deanery training programme or post; have a fixed term
specialty training appointment or have a locum appointment for training.
21
Figure 2.1: NTS data sampling strategy
National Training Survey 
Eligible Population → All 
doctors in training (incl. 
foundation trainees) 
54,055
Our Sample =  
All NTS Respondents (52,797)  
– Individuals excluded by 
GMC confidentiality 
agreement (15,092) –
Foundation trainees (13,359) =
27,530
General Sample → All 
doctors in specialty 
training  
N= 27,530
UK Sample  → Subsample 
of doctors who received 
secondary and university 
education in the UK 
N= 18,588
54,055 who were eligible for the survey (General Medical Council 2013a). Due to the
commitment to confidentiality of the GMC, our study is restricted to individuals who
are not unique with respect to the combination of their characteristics and is focused
on 40,889 doctors. To establish whether there is probable bias from the omission of
some individuals we compared the descriptive statistics for the main demographic
and socioeconomic characteristics of the complete survey (General Medical Council
2013b; General Medical Council 2013a) and our sample, finding that differences
between our sample and population mean values are all smaller than three percentage
points (see Table 2.1). The 13,359 doctors carrying out foundation training were
excluded from the analysis since they had not selected their specialty, resulting in
27,530 doctors being included in the analysis sample. These were divided into two
groups for analysis, a General sample containing all doctors in specialty training and a
UK sample comprised of 18,588 who received both secondary and university education
in the UK. Figure 2.1 illustrates the construction process of the General sample and UK
sample.
2.2.1 Independent variables
Table 2.2 sets out the variables from the NTS. For each individual there is information
on their demographic and socioeconomic characteristics which we encoded as categor-
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ical or binary dummy variables: variable Man was assigned the value one if the doctor
is a man; BME has the value one for black and minority ethnic doctors; age was given
in four bands < 30, 30− 39, 40− 49 and 50+ which we merged into two groups and
defined the variable Mature to take the value one if the individual if 40 years-old or
older, and variable UK University is equal to one if a doctor completed their medical
undergraduate studies in the UK.
For the UK sample, there is additional information concerning parental education
and socioeconomic proxies. The variable Parent uni takes the value one if at least one
parent has tertiary education. The variables State, Grammar and Independent take
the value one according to the type of secondary school attended. State school is the
omitted category in the multivariate analysis. Following Milburn (2014) school type is
used as a proxy for socioeconomic background. In the United Kingdom approximately
7% of pupils attend independent schools, of which only 1% receive means-tested
scholarships.5 The estimates from the School variable can also be informative of the
degree of success of state schools in fostering their student population to enter the
elite professions.
2.2.2 Dependent variables
Each doctor could be assigned to one of thirteen categories of training according to
their specialty. We reduced this categorisation to six groups of specialties that have
the same core training or that can be regarded as close substitutes (Health Careers
2017b). The resulting specialties analysed are:
• Acute care, emergency medicine and anaesthetics (ACEM)
• General Practice (GP)
• Surgical (SUR)
• Hospital based specialties including medical specialties, paediatrics and childcare,
medical-surgical specializations (i.e obstetrics, gynaecology and ophthalmology)
and occupational medicine (HBS)
• Psychiatry (PSY)
5Independent school fees in the UK are on average £15,500 per academic year (Independent 2016).
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• Others including pathology, radiology and public health (OTH)
The NTS also includes the variable trust name that informs about the Location where
doctors carry out their specialty training. We associate each trust to the corresponding
LETB and group those into six categories taking into account those LETBs that are
close enough and might be perceived as substitutes by doctors. The resulting locations
are:
• East of England, East and West Middlands (MID)
• London (LON)
• Thames Valley and Kent Surrey and Sussex (TVKSS)
• South West Peninsula, South West Severn and Wessex (SOU)
• North East, North West Mersey, North West North Western and Yorkshire and
the Humber (NOR)
• North Ireland, Scotland, Wales and Military (OTH)
For interpretation purposes, we classify Specialty and Location into high-demand and
low-demand as Table 2.3 sets out. The classification is based on average competition
ratios, given by the number of applications divided by the number of training posts,
from the different specialties/locations for the years 2012-2015. Each year on average
the number of applications submitted by doctors is double the number of training posts.
Therefore, we define alternatives with historical competition ratios lower than two as
low-demand and those with a competition ratio greater than two as high-demand.
2.2.3 Limitations
As with any survey there are missing data and our study is further limited by confiden-
tiality requirements that reduced the sample we were able to analyse. Since covariates
with missing observations only account for 0.5% and 5.7% of our General sample and
UK sample respectively, we proceeded as if data were missing completely at random
(MCAR) and based our analysis on a sample of complete observations. Comparing
our sample to the full survey population did not reveal any differences greater than
three percentage points in the means of the variables of interest. Nevertheless, there
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is always a possibility that our sample is biased in ways that cannot be detected by
simple comparison of means.
Although we analyse the allocation of doctors across Specialties and Locations sep-
arately, these two elements are interdependent as often doctors face trade-offs when
choosing between their desired location and their desired specialty. For example, doc-
tors may consider as alternatives training posts, i.e. the combination of specialty and
location, instead of Specialties and Locations separately. Notwithstanding, the empirical
analysis of the distribution of doctors across training posts entails the consideration of
a large set of alternatives that will complicate the interpretation of results and will
render the Mixed Logit estimation almost impracticable. Our simpler approach is
still very informative in highlighting major disparities across specialties and locations.
Moreover, as the thesis focuses on specialty determinants, we draw attention to the
estimation of results and discussion of the findings for Specialty in the main body of
the chapter and place the results for Location in the Appendix.
2.3 Econometric model and empirical implementation
The NTS 2013 is a data set on actual outcomes, this is the final allocation of an
individual i to a specific specialty/location j and there is no information on other
alternatives to those chosen. Those outcomes are the product of a complex allocation
process that results from the combination of doctors’ application outcomes and the
selection outcomes that arise from selectors’ preferences over the set of candidates.
Despite only observing the final outcome of the process, we seek to examine whether
the process operates so as to sort doctors according to their demographic or socioeco-
nomic characteristics. In Chapter 3, we describe the functioning of the specialty
allocation process in detail, we set out a conceptual framework and an empirical
approach that acknowledges the two-sided nature of the process with the goal of
disentangling whether doctors’ socioeconomic characteristics affect application and
selection decisions differently.
We observe a dichotomous variable Yij that takes value one if we observe a doctor,
i, training in specialty j and zero otherwise as shown by expression (2.1). The same
25
relationship holds between doctors and locations.
Yij =
 1 if Yi = j0 if Yi 6= j (2.1)
We define Yij to depend on the socio-demographic characteristics of the doctors
represented by the vector Zij and that include the variables Man, BME, Mature and
UK University for the General sample and for the UK sample it also includes School and
Parent Uni. Ideally, we would include two other sets of covariates: one representing the
value of the individual to the specialty, e.g. specific investments made by individuals,
measures of ability, etc. and the other representing the attributes of the specialty in
relation to the individual, e.g. distance from the training hospital to doctor’s residence,
expected earnings, etc. However, this is not possible as the NTS does not contain
any of the information required to identify these covariates and therefore we need
to assume that the omitted variables are orthogonal to the vector Zij and that our
estimates do not suffer from omitted variable bias. We considered the inclusion of
alternative specific information that is freely available, such as the length of training
or the estimated income from the different specialties, however we do not include
those as they are constant for all doctors in the sample and therefore we are not able
to identify their effects individually in the estimation process.
Yij = γ0j + Zijγj + µij (2.2)
Expression (2.2) shows the relationship between the outcome variable and doc-
tors’ socio-demographic characteristics, where µij represents the error term. Since
specialties/locations are defined as mutually exclusive categories a Multinomial Logit
approach (McFadden 1974) gives a natural means of establishing the effect of doc-
tors’ characteristics on the probability of observing them in one specialty/location,
conditional on fixing their other characteristics. Each specialty/location is treated
as an alternative and we compute the probability Pij of an individual i to be in
specialty/location j as given by expression (2.3).
Pij = Pr(Yi = j|zi) = Fj(ziγ1, , ziγm) =
eziγj∑m
l=1 e
ziγl
(2.3)
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The Multinomial Logit ensures that 0 < Pij < 1 and that
m∑
j=1
Pij = 1
The alternatives are mutually exclusive, exhaustive and represent a finite set. A normal-
ization of parameters is needed as a consequence of the restriction that probabilities
sum to one. The coefficients of one of the alternatives are normalised to zero, and the
interpretation of the results are relative to the reference category.
The Multinomial Logit Model assumes the error term to be iid type II extreme
value6 distributed and also implies proportional substitution across alternatives, i.e.
the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), given the analyst’s
specification. This is a very restrictive assumption that can be easily violated if the
alternatives are perceived to be substitutes or if some variables in common to two or
more alternatives are omitted. Violating the IIA will lead to inconsistent estimations.
In order to eliminate the risk of violating the IIA we implement an alternative approach
that does not require the IIA. Following Hole (2007), we fit our the Multinomial Logit
model with unobserved heterogeneity to the Mixed Logit Model (McFadden and Train
2000), also known as Random-Parameters Logit. We capture the heterogeneity by
allowing the constant term in the model to vary across individuals following a normal
distribution, γ0ji = γ0j + vji where vji ∼ N (0,Σ) and allowing the random estimates
from the different alternatives to be correlated. This relaxation of the IIA comes at the
expense of a more computational cumbersome procedure, especially as we increase
the number of alternatives and covariates.
Empirical implementation
In the regression tables we report the maximum likelihood coefficient estimates (MLE),
their associated z-scores and the implied odds ratios (OR). Odds ratios permit an easy
interpretation of the effect of dummy variables in the probability of observing the
outcome variable. The odds ratio is defined as the ratio of probabilities and given by
the expression (2.4) where if eγk > 1 then having Zk = 1 augments the probability of
6 When assuming that the errors µij are iid type II extreme value, the density function will be:
f(µij) = exp
−µij exp(−expµij ). An important property of this distribution is that the difference of
two alternatives, e.g. µij − µikwhenj 6= k, follows a multinomial distribution.
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observing Yi = j whilst when eγk < 1 then having Zk = 1 decreases the probability of
observing Yi = j.
[
Pj
1− Pj
]
Zk=1[
Pj
1− Pj
]
Zk=0
= eγk (2.4)
We set general practice, GP, as the omitted category; it is the single largest category
and recurrent problems in recruitment to general practice make it a relevant object of
comparison. For location, the MID is the omitted category as it is located in the centre
of the UK and, after London, comprises the largest number of doctors in training.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show the distributions of individuals’ characteristics by specialty
for the General sample (N=27,516) and the UK sample (N=18,588), respectively. If
the allocation process is unaffected by doctors’ demographic and socioeconomic char-
acteristics we would expect a similar distribution of characteristics in every specialty.
In the latter case each specialty would appear as a random sample from the overall
population of doctors in training. The descriptive statistics show a different picture.
The results for the General sample show that 45.49% of the total sample consists
of Men, however their distribution across specialties is highly unequal as in SUR men
make up 78.38% of the total whilst in GP they constitute only 30.72%. The specialties
ACEM and OTH also show an over-representation of male doctors. In terms of ethnicity,
the greatest deviations from the overall percentage of BME (41.05%) are observed for
ACEM (22.85%) and for PSY (56.21%). The overall percentage of Mature doctors in
the General sample is 5.1%, the lowest value being found for ACEM (2.02%) and the
largest in PSY (17.14%). Similar differences emerge for the variable UK university.
The percentage of Overseas students is equal to 29.44%, however their distribution
across specialties is highly unequal, the largest representation being observed in PSY
(54.19%) and the smallest in ACEM (18.25%) and SUR (24.7%), respectively.
Table 2.5, concerns the UK sample that includes the additional socioeconomic vari-
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ables. In this group the percentage of Men (41.6%) is smaller than in the General
sample, however their distribution across specialties remains unequal as only 26.66%
of Men are in GP whilst 75.86% are training in SUR. The percentage of BME doctors
is substantially smaller (25.27%) and their distribution across specialties is more
balanced. The largest representation can be found in OTH (31.16%) and the smallest
in ACEM (12.53%). Similarly, the percentage of Mature doctors is smaller (1.35%),
the largest disparities being found for ACEM (0.3%) and PSY (5.42%) as in the General
sample.
The UK sample also includes information on socioeconomic variables. Overall, doc-
tors have attended an Independent school in a larger proportion (35.31%) than the
general UK population (approximately 7%). There is again an uneven distribution
across specialties; SUR being the group with the largest representation (42.19%)
and GP the smallest (29.93%). We observe the opposite for State school with the
largest representation of doctors in GP (44.57%) and the smallest in SUR (32.43%).
The other socioeconomic variable present in the data is Parent uni, the percentage of
doctors with at least one parent with tertiary education being equal to 65.83%. There
is relatively little variability across specialties, the smallest value being found for GP
(65.83%) and the largest for HBS (68.7%).
2.4.2 Regression results
2.4.2.1 Estimation results: General sample
Table 2.6 and Figure 2.2 show the results for the General sample. In terms of gender,
we observe a positive effect of the variable Man for all of the specialties relative to GP,
confirming the relationships observed in the descriptive statistics. The greatest effects
are associated with SUR and ACEM where male doctors are 12.12 and 4.35 times
more likely to be allocated relative to the GP. Both effects are statistically significant
at the 99% confidence level. No significant effects are found for PSY. The variable
BME shows negative estimates for all the categories with respect to the base outcome.
In this case, the largest effect is found in the ACEM category, with an odds ratio of
0.29, implying that an ethnic minority doctor is approximately 70% less likely to be
based in ACEM with respect to GP. The estimates for SUR and HBS are also statistically
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significant and the odds ratios are 0.76 and 0.88, respectively. The regression estimates
for the variable Mature coincide with the results observed in the descriptive statistics.
The greatest positive effect, statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, was
found for PSY with an odds ratio of 2.92. The rest of the categories show negative
coefficients and odds ratios smaller than one, implying that being 40 or older reduces
the probability of being based in any of these specialties relative to GP. The largest
negative effect is found for OTH and equal to 0.27. Finally, the estimates for the
variable UK University show a positive and significant effect for SUR, such that a
UK-educated doctor is 2.07 times more likely to be training in that specialty with
respect to GP. The results for ACEM are also positive and statistically significant. The
greatest negative effects, statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, are found
for PSY and OTH where the odds ratios associated are 0.21 and 0.52, implying that
overseas graduated doctors are approximately 70% and 50% more likely to be training
for PSY and OTH, with respect to GP.
2.4.2.2 Estimation results: UK sample
Table 2.7 and Figure 2.3 show the results for the UK sample, those doctors who
completed both secondary school and undergraduate studies in the United Kingdom.
The estimated coefficients and odds ratios for the variables Man, BME and Mature are
of the same sign and similar but slightly smaller magnitude to those shown in Table
2.6. With respect to schooling variables (State school is omitted category), which we
use to proxy socioeconomic background, we observe positive and significant estimates
and odds ratios greater than one for all specialties with respect to GP. The largest
effects are found for SUR and OTH where doctors who attended an Independent school
are 1.79 and 1.57 times more likely to be training for those specialties than those who
attended a State school relative to GP. The smallest positive effect is associated with
PSY with an associated odds ratio of 1.30. All the estimates are statistically significant
at the 99% confidence level. Overall, having attended an Independent or Grammar
school reduces the probability of being in training for general practice with respect
to any other specialty. The estimates for Parent uni are positive, however modest
compared to the schooling estimates. The greatest effect in magnitude is related
to HBS and PSY with associated odds ratios of 1.31 and 1.32 respectively, both are
30
Figure 2.2: Estimated Odds Ratios for the General Sample
(a) Variable Men (b) Variable BME
(c) Variable Mature (d) Variable UK University
ACEM: acute care, emergency medicine and anaesthetics; SUR: surgical specializations; HBS: hospital based specialities;
PSY: psychiatric specialties; OTH: pathology, radiology and public health; GP: general practice (omitted category)
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 and ∗p < 0.1
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.
2.5 Discussion
Our analysis shows that with respect to doctors’ socio-demographic characteristics
there are substantial differences across specialties. Doctors training in the most de-
manded specialties, i.e. specialties with the greater competition ratios, are more likely
to be male, white, younger, have attended an independent or grammar school, have a
parent with tertiary education, and have attended a UK university. By contrast, doctors
training in general practice and psychiatry, the two least demanded specialties, are
more likely to be from an ethnic minority and to be older. Moreover, being a female
doctor increases the probability of being in general practice, and having graduated
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Figure 2.3: Estimated Odds Ratios for the UK Sample
(a) Variable Men (b) Variable BME
(c) Variable Mature (d) Variable Parent Uni
(e) Variable School
ACEM: acute care, emergency medicine and anaesthetics; SUR: surgical specializations; HBS: hospital based specialities;
PSY: psychiatric specialties; OTH: pathology, radiology and public health; GP: general practice (omitted category)
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 and ∗p < 0.1
from an overseas university increases the probability of training in psychiatry.
There are many attributes that are different between high-demand and low-demand
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specialties, one of the most evident being the differences in income.7 The differences
are not only associated with NHS income, but also to private income where primary
care specialties such as general practice have associated the lowest income estimates
and surgical specialties the highest (Morris et al. 2008). Despite the feminization
of the medical workforce, their unequal distribution across specialties makes female
doctors more likely to be training in low-demand specialties, a situation that will feed
into the perpetuation of the gender wage gap in the medical profession.
We find that doctors from better-off socioeconomic backgrounds are more likely
to be training in a high-demand specialty than those who come from less privileged
backgrounds. This result could be due to doctors’ different application behaviour, as
doctors from privileged backgrounds might have different valuations of the monetary
and non-monetary attributes associated with high-demand specialties. Alternatively,
the underrepresentation of doctors from deprived backgrounds in high-demand spe-
cialties might be driven by the selectors side. It is quite likely that higher skills8
investments are needed to guarantee access to high-demand specialties as they present
higher competition ratios and the opportunity costs associated with those investments
are most likely lower for doctors who come from better-off backgrounds. This situation
is likely to perpetuate inequities in the distribution of wealth among socioeconomic
groups and it is especially concerning as specialty training is funded with general
taxation. Policy interventions should, therefore, aim to subsidise the acquisition of the
skills required to access high-demand specialties for those individuals from worse-off
backgrounds.
Our results highlight another potential cause for concern. Approximately 30% of
doctors in the training scheme are graduates from an overseas medical school and
they are very unequally distributed, being largely overrepresented in low-demand
specialties. From an international perspective importing doctors from low-income
countries might be seen as brain drain and in conflict with what has been termed
Ethical Recruitment (Lowell and Findlay 2001). Additionally, Richards (1994) and
Welsh (2000) suggest that the allocation of overseas educated doctors to less desirable
7Morris et al. (2008) provide estimates the mean NHS and private incomes associated with each
specialty.
8The required skills vary from specialty to specialty, but in general the skills can be obtained through
extracurricular training courses or through extracurricular unpaid clinical training.
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training positions might be creating an underclass within the NHS. This is a concern
for both policymakers and the profession. Future research might usefully focus on the
quality of the training experience and satisfaction of those overseas doctors and on
whether a possible worse training satisfaction can influence patient outcomes.
Our results describe the outcome of a complex process of specialty allocation in
which doctors apply, are selected, and subsequently choose from the offers that are
made to them. We have established that the outcome of this process is highly unbal-
anced and that some specialties exhibit a dearth of doctors with some characteristics,
and we have highlighted some of the many potential causes for such an imbalance.
Alternatively, we conjecture that another determinant of the observed differences
between sociodemographic groups in their sorting across specialties might be due
to the existence of some form of statistical discrimination phenomena. Fang and
Moro (2010) describe the latter as a theory of inequality between groups that is
based on stereotypes that do not arise from prejudice or racial and gender bias. The
phenomenon can affect both sides of the specialty allocation process: the selectors
and the applicants (doctors). Regarding the former, Phelps (1972) establishes that
the differential treatment comes from a setting where decision-makers have imperfect
information about individuals, and group identity serves as a proxy for unobserved
variables. Differential treatment will be observed if groups are believed to have a
different distribution of skills at population level, or even if the unconditional distribu-
tion of skills is the same, the groups present a different variance of the error term of
the information signal that decision-makers receive. The differential treatment can be
aggravated with selectors’ risk aversion, as in Aigner and Cain (1977) model. As an
example, given two doctors with identical distribution of skills but one belonging to
the UK graduate sample and the other to the overseas graduate sample, if we assume
the latter type of doctor to have a higher variance in her information sign, due to
language difficulties or cultural differences as in Lang (1986), she will be perceived
as a riskier choice by selectors with respect to the UK candidate. The differential
treatment described above might also exist between white and ethnic minority doctors,
or between doctors from privileged and deprived socioeconomic backgrounds.
Regarding doctors’ behaviour, Arrow (1973) proposes a model where the differences
in outcomes between groups that are identical ex-ante, are derived in equilibrium and
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are based on a self-fulfilling prophecy. In the UK specialty allocation context, the latter
means that if for some reason one of the groups, e.g. female doctors or doctors from
deprived socioeconomic backgrounds, believes that their chances of obtaining the high-
demand training posts are smaller than the dominant group, i.e. male or privileged
doctors, the minority group would have less incentives to invest in the necessary skills
to obtain those training posts, being skill acquisition endogenous in Arrow’s model.
The minority group will invest less and they will be believed to be qualified with lower
probability. Fang and Moro (2010) claim that Arrow’s insight depends on unobserved
human capital investments and that it is worth testing whether returns to observable
human capital investments, such as education, should be different or higher for the
dominant group. One of the proposed measures to tackle the self-fulfilling prophecy is
the introduction of affirmative-action policies that will maximise doctors’ quality for
any level of diversity as Chan and Eyster (2003) do for student admission to college.
By contrast, Coate and Loury (1993) found mixed results for the implementation of
affirmative action and suggest that those might lead to a patronising equilibria where
the standards for the minority group are lowered, whilst the standards for the majority
group must be raised, therefore lowering the incentives for skill investment in the
minority group. Future research could focus on the evaluation of the suitability of
affirmative action policies to tackle the disparities across specialties.
The statistical discrimination literature also tries to explain occupational gender
segregation. Altonji and Blank (1999) link the fact that women are more likely to
work part-time to their lower presence in technical occupations, as those occupations
exhibit higher depreciation rates. In the medical context, the fact that depreciation
rates and technical change are larger for surgical specialties than for primary care
specialties might lead female doctors to be disproportionately attracted to the second
group. Johnson and Stafford (1995) suggest that the consequences of institutional
constraints, social norms, or employer discrimination might crowd a group into par-
ticular occupations. Finally, Manski (1993a) highlights the informational value of
close role models in the decision-making process. In the medical context, according
to Fitzgerald et al. (2013) the lack of female role models it has been considered a
detractor in recruiting more women to the field of surgery. Chapter 4 analyses the
impact of informational role models in doctors’ specialty choices.
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In contrast to previous work in this area, we have been able to examine imbalances
in both demographic and socioeconomic characteristics simultaneously using a survey
that contains rich information on individuals and has a very high response rate. Our
results are therefore both novel and more comprehensive than previously it has been
possible to generate. However they are necessarily specific to the particular sample
of doctors studied. A limitation is that there are characteristics of individuals that
are relevant to understanding their specialty allocation that are not reported in this
survey. In particular, the educational background of doctors in training, with respect
to the medical school they attended and their academic records, could potentially be
confounders of the estimates of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The
analysis in Chapter 3 addresses this limitation.
Identifying the causes of the imbalances we have documented has considerable
importance for policymakers who are concerned to redress them. Medical education is
costly and in the UK relies upon a substantial injection of public funds. It is therefore
natural that policymakers will be concerned that the outcome of medical education
reflects societal values, and a key task for future research is to find the means of
discriminating between competing explanations for the reflection it does provide.
Therein lies the means to intervene successfully. In the remainder of this thesis we
explore some of the competing explanations.
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2.6 Tables
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of the NTS population vs. Our sample
All NTS
Respondentsa
Our Sample
(incl. founda-
tion trainees)
General
Sample
N=52,797 N=40,889 N=27,530
Man 45.00% 43.76% 45.50%
% of Foundation
trainees
27.70% 32.70%
Socioeconomic Variables
N=38,933 N=31,138 N=19,425
Parent uni 65.00% 66.01% 68.10%
School: State 38.80% 38.93% 39.90%
School: Independent 33.70% 33.82% 36.60%
School: Grammar 23.70% 24.06% 23.50%
Income Support 11.50% 11.34% 11.30%
a Descriptive statistics for the NTS 2013 population can be found in the GMC webpage (General
Medical Council 2013b; General Medical Council 2013a)
37
Table 2.2: Variables in the National Training Survey
Independent Variables
Man 1 if the individual is a male, 0 otherwise.
BME 1 if the individual is Black and minority ethnic, 0 otherwise.
Mature 1 if the individual is 40 years-old or older, 0 otherwise.
UK university 1 if the individual attended both secondary school and med-
ical studies in the UK, 0 otherwise.
Only for the UK sample
School: State 1 if the individual attended a state non selective school, 0
otherwise.
School: Grammar 1 if the individual attended a state selective school, 0 other-
wise.
School: Independent 1 if the individual attended a fee paying/independent school,
0 otherwise.
Parent uni 1 if any of the individual’s parent(s) or guardian(s) com-
pleted a University degree course of equivalent, 0 otherwise
Dependent Variables
Specialty Categorical variable indicating the specialty the individual is
training for. Six Categories see Section 2.2.2.
Location Categorical variable indicating the region where the indi-
vidual is undertaking the specialty training. Six Categories
see Section 2.2.2.
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Table 2.3: Classification of specialties and locations into low and high-demand accord-
ing to 2012-15 competition ratios
Low-Demand High-Demand
Specialty
ACEM x
HBS x
GP x
SUR x
PSY x
OTH x
Location
MID x
LON x
TVKSS x
SOU x∗
NOR x∗
OTH x
a Source: NHS Health Education England
b The classification is based on average competition ratios, given by the number
of applications divided by the number of training posts. Each year on average
the number of applications submitted by doctors is double the number of training
posts. We define alternatives with historical competition ratios lower than two as
low-demand and those with a competition ratio greater than two as high-demand.
c ACEM: acute care, emergency medicine and anaesthetics; GP: general practice;
SUR: surgical specializations; HBS: hospital based specialities; PSY: psychiatric
specialties; OTH: pathology, radiology and public health.
d MID: East of England, East and West Midlands; LON: London; TVKSS: Thames
Valley and Kent Surrey and Sussex; SOU: South West Peninsula, South West Severn
and Wessex; NOR:North East, North West Mersey, North West North Western and
Yorkshire and the Humber; OTH: North Ireland, Scotland, Wales and Military.
e ∗ With the exception of Severn; ∗∗ With the exception of Mersey
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Table 2.4: Characteristics of the doctors in the General sample
ALL ACEM GP SUR HBS PSY OTH
N % N % N % N % N % N % N %
Gender
Man 12,524 45.49 1761 53.22 2,134 30.72 3,104 78.38 4,030 40.2 914 42.81 581 50.26
Woman 15,006 54.51 1548 46.78 4,812 69.28 856 21.62 5,994 59.8 1,221 57.19 575 49.74
Ethnicity
BME 11,301 41.05 756 22.85 2,890 41.61 1,628 41.11 4,322 43.12 1,200 56.21 505 43.69
White 16,215 58.9 2553 77.15 4,056 58.39 2,328 58.79 5,692 56.78 935 43.79 651 56.31
Missing 14 0.05 4 0.1 10 0.1
Age
40 years old or more 1,404 5.1 67 2.02 344 4.95 184 4.65 426 4.25 366 17.14 17 1.47
Less than 40 years old 26,126 94.9 3,242 97.98 6,602 95.05 3,776 95.35 9598 95.75 1,769 82.86 1,139 98.53
Place of studies
UK 19,425 70.56 2,705 81.75 5,226 75.24 2,982 75.3 6,767 67.51 978 45.81 767 66.35
Overseas 8,105 29.44 604 18.25 1,720 24.76 978 24.7 3,257 32.49 1,157 54.19 389 33.65
a ACEM: acute care, emergency medicine and anaesthetics; GP: general practice; SUR: surgical specializations; HBS: hospital based specialities; PSY:
psychiatric specialties; OTH: pathology, radiology and public health.
b BME: Black and minority ethnic
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Table 2.5: Characteristics of the doctors in the UK sample
ALL ACEM GP SUR HBS PSY OTH
N % N % N % N % N % N % N %
Gender
Man 8,081 41.6 1,369 50.61 1,393 26.66 2,262 75.86 2,334 34.49 361 36.91 362 47.2
Woman 11,344 58.4 1,336 49.39 3,833 73.34 720 24.14 4,433 65.51 617 63.09 405 52.8
Ethnicity
BME 4,909 25.27 339 12.53 1,432 27.4 926 31.05 1,709 25.25 264 26.99 239 31.16
White 14,504 74.67 2,366 87.47 3,794 72.6 2,052 68.81 5,050 74.63 714 73.01 528 68.84
Missing 12 0.06 4 0.13 8 0.12
Age
40 years old or older 261 1.34 8 0.3 71 1.36 56 1.88 63 0.93 53 5.42 10 1.3
Less than 40 years old 19,164 98.66 2,697 99.7 5,155 98.64 2,926 98.12 6,704 99.07 925 94.58 757 98.7
School type
State 7,490 38.56 1,030 38.08 2,329 44.57 967 32.43 2,522 37.27 370 37.83 272 35.46
Grammar 4,414 22.72 610 22.55 1,166 22.31 610 20.46 1,627 24.04 236 24.13 165 21.5
Independent 6,859 35.31 962 35.56 ,564 29.93 1,258 42.19 2,430 35.91 340 34.76 305 39.77
Missing 662 3.41 103 3.81 167 3.19 147 4.93 188 2.78 32 3.27 25 3.26
Parental University
Yes 12,788 65.83 1,747 64.58 3,237 61.94 1,978 66.33 4,649 68.7 669 68.4 508 66.23
No 6,000 30.89 855 31.61 1,827 34.96 859 28.81 1,943 28.71 282 28.83 234 30.51
Missing 637 3.28 103 3.8 162 3.1 145 4.87 175 2.49 27 2.76 25 3.26
Income Support
Yes 1,988 10.23 282 10.43 581 11.12 297 9.96 627 9.27 101 10.33 100 13.04
No 15,609 80.36 2,157 79.74 4,146 79.33 2,377 79.71 5,541 81.88 795 81.29 593 77.31
Missing 1,828 9.41 266 9.83 499 9.55 308 10.33 599 8.85 82 8.38 74 9.65
a ACEM: acute care, emergency medicine and anaesthetics; GP: general practice; SUR: surgical specializations; HBS: hospital based specialities;
PSY: psychiatric specialties; OTH: pathology, radiology and public health.
b BME: Black and minority ethnic
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Table 2.6: Mixed Logit regression estimates for the General sample
ACEM SUR HBS PSY OTH
Man 1.471 4.354 2.495 12.121 0.507 1.660 0.061 1.063 0.626 1.869
(5.63)*** (15.2)*** (4.43)*** (-0.68) (6.18)***
BME -1.240 0.289 -0.271 0.763 -0.131 0.878 -0.071 0.932 -0.050 0.951
(-9.18)*** (-2.44)** (-1.73)* (-0.86) (-0.56)
Mature -1.021 0.360 -0.380 0.684 -0.496 0.609 1.071 2.918 -1.309 0.270
(-4.97)*** (-2.58)*** (-3.89)*** (5.23)*** (-4.18)***
UK University 0.221 1.247 0.728 2.072 -0.235 0.790 -1.567 0.209 -0.655 0.520
(1.67)* (7.02)*** (-2.87)*** (-7.31)*** (-2.98)***
Constant -1.684 0.186 -2.600 0.074 0.446 1.562 -1.384 0.251 -2.962 0.052
(-4.66)*** (-12.14)*** (5.03)*** (-3.26)*** (-6.83)***
N 27,516
Log-likelihood -41153.377
a ACEM: acute care, emergency medicine and anaesthetics; SUR: surgical specializations; HBS: hospital based specialities; PSY:
psychiatric specialties; OTH: pathology, radiology and public health.
b MLE (mixlogit estimate); OR (odd ratio);
c Man vs. woman; BME vs. non-BME (BME: Black and minority ethnic); Mature vs. non-mature (> 40 vs. < 40 years old); UK
university vs. overseas educated student.
d Z-scores in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 and ∗p < 0.1;
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Table 2.7: Mixed Logit regression estimates for the UK sample
ACEM SUR HBS PSY OTH
MLE OR MLE OR MLE OR MLE OR MLE OR
Man 1.140 3.127 2.165 8.714 0.405 1.499 0.491 1.634 0.924 2.520
(21.73)*** (34.57)*** (6.78)*** (5.94)*** (10.43)***
BME -1.145 0.318 -0.120 0.887 -0.181 0.834 -0.092 0.912 0.061 1.063
(-16.27)*** (-2.1)** (-3.9)*** (-1.08) (0.68)
Mature -1.648 0.193 0.005 1.005 -0.545 0.580 1.488 4.428 -0.133 0.876
(-4.35)*** (0.03) (-2.75)*** (6.75)*** (-0.38)
Parent Uni 0.139 1.149 0.235 1.265 0.271 1.311 0.278 1.321 0.149 1.161
(2.6)*** (4.23)*** (6.1)*** (3.38)*** (1.69)*
Independent School 0.373 1.452 0.582 1.789 0.346 1.413 0.263 1.301 0.448 1.566
(6.42)*** (9.75)*** (7.14)*** (2.99)*** (4.76)***
Grammar School 0.179 1.196 0.221 1.247 0.254 1.289 0.241 1.272 0.170 1.186
(2.78)*** (3.27)*** (4.85)*** (2.52)** (1.58)
Constant -1.141 0.320 -2.062 0.127 -0.212 0.809 -2.514 0.081 -2.824 0.059
(-16.19)*** (-25.15)*** (-3.29)*** (-12.99)*** (-16.04)***
N 18,588
Log-likelihood -27595.305
a ACEM: acute care, emergency medicine and anaesthetics; SUR: surgical specializations; HBS: hospital based specialities; PSY: psychiatric
specialties; OTH: pathology, radiology and public health.
b MLE (mixlogit estimate); OR (odd ratio); CI -OR ( OR confidence interval)
c Man vs. woman; BME vs. non-BME (BME: Black and minority ethnic); Mature vs. non-mature (> 40 vs. < 40 years old); UK university vs.
overseas educated student.
d Z-scores in parentheses:∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 and ∗p < 0.1;
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Chapter 3
A sequential analysis of the specialty allocation
process in the UK. Empirical evidence from the
UKMED database
3.1 Introduction
There is a strong interest in ensuring that the medical profession is representative of
the society it serves (General Medical Council 2010). The achievement of a greater
balance, in terms of gender, ethnicity and socioeconomic background, could improve
patient outcomes (Tsugawa, Jena, Figueroa et al. 2017) and foster policies targeted at
improving the health outcomes of deprived populations and ethnic minorities (Cohen
et al. 2002). However, the results from Chapter 2 are evidence of the existence of
large disparities in the distribution of doctors across specialties with respect to doctor’s
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics in the UK.
The research reported in this chapter seeks to understand and disentangle the origins
of the differential outcomes, recognising that the allocation of individuals to specialties
is a sequential process. Doctors make decisions as to which specialties to apply for
and their applications are then assessed to determine their suitability. At each stage
of this process there is selection, either by the doctors themselves or by the selectors
reviewing their applications, that might result in specialties becoming unbalanced
in terms of social, economic, gender and ethnic characteristics. Thus, our principal
objective is to understand how demographic and socioeconomic characteristics impact
this process; how do an individual’s characteristics correspond to their decision to
apply and to their subsequent assessment by selectors from the different specialties.
Such an understanding is necessary for the formulation of effective strategies to ensure
greater representativeness across specialties.
For that purpose, we develop a conceptual framework that acknowledges the two-
sided nature of the specialty allocation process: the application and selection stages.
This framework also serves as the basis of the empirical analysis we perform. First, we
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focus on the application stage and estimate by means of a set of Probit regressions
the relationship between an individual’s characteristics and their propensity to apply
for training in different specialties, controlling for their educational background and
attainment. Answering this question establishes whether specific groups are either
discouraged from or have preference against applying for specialties. It can therefore
inform policies specifically targeting doctors at the application stage, in order to en-
sure greater balance in the pool of applications. Moreover, we estimate how doctors’
personal characteristics can influence their application strategies, i.e. whether doctors
concentrate their efforts into a single application or engage in more than one. This
analysis can be informative regarding individuals’ perception of success and how that
perception affects their specialty allocation outcomes.
Second, we focus on the selection that takes place after doctors have made their
specialty application choices. The interview is a crucial element of this selection stage.
We analyse the role of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics in determining
interview scores, controlling for previous educational attainment and other relevant
characteristics by means of a linear regression. We also apply the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition of the mean interview score by gender and ethnicity, with the purpose
of disentangling the sources of the differences between demographic groups. Our
analysis of the interview score provides evidence regarding the functioning of the
selection system and whether specific groups experience differential attainment in
the selection process. It will thus serve as the basis for further study of the causes of
differential attainment and the identification of any necessary policy intervention.
The data used in this study come from the UK Medical Education Database (UKMED),
which collates data on the performance and career progression of UK medical students
and training doctors. Our data belong to the pilot phase of UKMED and include the
universe of individuals who entered a UK medical school in the years 2007 and 2008.
The data are unique and more comprehensive than previously available, as they link
several sources of data, allowing for an empirical estimation of the sequential specialty
allocation process in the UK.
The results show strong evidence with respect to selection by women, ethnic minor-
ities and doctors from better-off socioeconomic backgrounds with regard to their
application patterns. In respect of the selection stage, the results suggest the existence
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of unexplained interview score differences in favour of white and female doctors, with
respect to ethnic minority and male doctors.
The reminder of this chapter is organised as follows: in Section 3.2 we describe in
detail the functioning of the specialty allocation process in the UK. Section 3.3 sets out
the conceptual framework. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 set out the background, econometric
model and results from the application and selection stages, respectively. Section 3.6
concludes the chapter. Tables can be found in Section 3.7.
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Figure 3.1: Specialties in the NHS
Foundation Programme 
(F1 and F2)
Higher Specialty 
Training
Uncoupled Specialties
Acute Care Common 
Stem
Emergency medicine, 
Anaesthesia and Intensive 
Medical Care
Core Surgical Training
General Surgery, Neurosurgery, Oral and 
Maxillofacial Surgery, Otolaryngology, 
Paediatric Surgery, Plastic Surgery, Trauma 
and Orthopaedic Surgery, Urology, Vascular 
Surgery
Core Psychiatry                               
Training
Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, Forensic Psychiatry, 
General Adult Psychiatry, Liaison Psychiatry, 
Medical Psychotherapy, Old Age Psychiatry and 
Psychiatry of Learning Disability
Core Medical Training
Acute Internal Medicine, Allergy, Audiovestibular Medicine, Cardiology, 
Clinical Genetics, Clinical Neurophysiology, Clinical Pharmacology and 
Therapeutics, Dermatology, Endocrinology and Diabetes, General Internal 
Medicine, Gastroenterology, Genitourinary Medicine, Geriatric Medicine, 
Immunology, Infectious Diseases, Medical Oncology, Medical 
Ophthalmology, Neurology, Nuclear Medicine, Palliative Medicine, 
Pharmaceutical Medicine, Rehabilitation Medicine, Renal Medicine, 
Respiratory Medicine, Rheumatology, Sport and Exercise Medicine and 
Tropical Medicine
Broad Based Training(*)
Core Medical Training (CT2), 
General Practice (ST2), 
Pediatrics (ST2) and Core 
Psychiatry Training (CT2)
Run-through Specialties
Pathology, GP, Obstetrics & 
Gynaecology, Ophthalmology, 
Paediatrics, Public Health and 
Neurosurgery.
CT1 – CT3 ST3 – ST8
CT#: Core Training year #; ST#: Specialty Training year #. 
(*) Broad Based Training is two year core training programme that give trainees six month of experience in four specialties: Core Medical Training, General Practice, Paediatrics and Psychiatry. At the end of the programme, 
trainees will be able to choose, without further competition, one of the four specialties to enter at  CT2 or ST2.
ST1 – ST8
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Figure 3.2: Stages in the specialty allocation process
3.2 The functioning of the specialty allocation process in
the UK
In order to establish a conceptual and empirical framework we consider the key stages
of the specialty allocation process as it operates in the UK. Postgraduate training is
divided in two main parts: the Foundation Programme (FP) and, the object of our
analysis, the Postgraduate Specialty Training.
The FP lasts two years and is common for all medical career paths. Newly graduated
doctors receive general medical training by rotating through different specialties within
a university hospital. During the second year of the FP doctors need to choose a career
path and prepare their applications to gain access to higher specialty training. Doctors
can submit as many applications as they wish, as long as they meet the eligibility
criteria. Figure 3.1 shows all the specialties available in the NHS. Specialties are
divided into run-through and uncoupled, the main difference being that the latter type
of training is delivered in separate core and higher specialty training programmes and
requires doctors to go through the specialty allocation process twice. The length of the
training also varies, it can take from a minimum of three years, to become a general
practitioner, up to eight years in some specialties as, for example, in all the surgical
sub-specialties (Health Careers 2017a).
The recruitment to specialty training is a two-sided process, mainly administered
nationally and led by Royal Colleges or a Local Education and Training Board9 (LETB)
on behalf of all LETBs. Figure 3.2 shows the sequence of different stages that constitute
the specialty allocation process.
The process starts with the application stage where the junior doctors can state their
9LETBs correspond to England’s former deaneries.
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preferences by making as many applications as they want, as long as they meet the
required criteria set by each specialty. Nonetheless, the process of applying is costly
in terms of time (and resources) and the Royal Colleges encourage junior doctors to
take into account past information and to apply wisely by restricting the number of
applications and by being aware of their competitiveness in relation to the rest of
candidates (Royal College of Physicians 2013). The number of vacancies and past
competition ratios for each specialty is public information.
Once the application period is over, the selection stage takes place. This is divided
into three sub-steps: shortlisting, interview and offers. Initially, the corresponding
Royal College or LETB reviews all applications and discards those that do not meet the
application criteria. Then the shortlisting process starts and all applications are scored
and ranked. Names and other sensitive information are concealed from selectors.
Not all specialties use shortlisting, either because selection rests on an alternative
assessment, as in general practice or public health, or because the interview capacity
is sufficient so that all eligible applicants can be invited to the selection centre (Health
Education England 2016). Top scoring candidates progress to the interview stage.
Panel members have access to doctors’ anonymised application forms and portfolios
before the interview takes place. The interview is divided into at least two different
stations and in each the candidate is independently evaluated by two interviewers.
The aggregate score from all interviewers constitutes the final score. Appointments
to training positions are offered in rank order, based on a combination of interview
and shortlisting scores. Interviewing panels do not have access to doctors’ location
preferences within a specialty/core training programme. Doctors are asked to submit
those preferences in the period between the application submission and the offers
stage. A lower interview score translates to a lower probability of obtaining the desired
training post, i.e. desired specialty and location, or in failing to be offered a position
at all.
The acceptance stage finalises the process. A doctor receiving an offer has 48 hours
to accept, reject or hold (until a set date) the offer. Holding an offer still allows doctors
to receive upgrades10 at any point and candidates who have accepted an offer can still
10Applicants can opt in for upgrades. This means that should a higher ranked preference become
available and the applicant who has opted in for upgrades is next in line to receive the offer, the
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apply to posts in subsequent recruitment rounds.
3.3 Conceptual framework
3.3.1 Application stage
We utilise a standard economics framework to establish the channels by which doctors’
characteristics may influence their choices regarding which specialties to apply to. In
this framework decisions are made to balance benefits and costs subject to various
constraints.
We suppose that doctors are indexed by i and specialties by j and we define
M = {i ∈ N : 1 ≤ i ≤ N} as the set that contains all doctors, S = {j ∈ N : 1 ≤ j ≤ T}
as the set that contains all specialties and Q = {q1, ..., qj , ..., qT } as the capacity vector
where qj indicates the number of training posts available in specialty j.
Each doctor i associates a net benefit Bji to each specialty j. The net benefit
results from the difference between the gross benefit, which is a function of taste
and preferences, and the cost the individual associates with the training and practice
of specialty j. We assume that Bji = f(Zi), where Zi is a vector of individual
characteristics. Moreover, each doctor i associates a probability of being accepted to
specialty j, and this is represented by Pji. The probability is subjective and reflects
doctors’ own perceptions and beliefs of how likely they are to be accepted to specialty
j. We assume that Pji is a function of the vector of individual characteristics, Zi, and
the number of training posts available, qj . Hence we have Pji = f(Zi, qj).
According to our framework individual i will consider applying to specialty j if the
net benefit, Bji, is not negative. We define Aji as the probability weighted net benefit
individual i assigns to specialty j, Aji = PjiBji, which results from the product of the
net benefit and the perceived probability associated with specialty j. Individual i ranks
specialties according to their weighted net benefit Aji from highest to lowest. The
ranking does not necessarily coincide with the specialty order that would result from
ranking specialties according to the net benefit Bji solely. Therefore, the perceived
probability Pji has an important influence in doctors’ decisions to specialize and we
applicant will be automatically upgraded to this offer with no option to revert to the original offer
(Health Education England 2016).
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assume it determines the number of applications a doctor makes.
In the UK doctors can make as many applications as they wish as long they meet
the eligibility criteria. However, data suggest that a typical student makes one or
two applications. We can interpret this as doctors having a fixed endowment of
effort that can be devoted to the preparation of applications and we assume that the
endowment is fixed and equal to E for all individuals. We assume that the division of
the effort endowment E depends on Pji. We define probability thresholds P¯j for each
specialty and assume those are known and equal for all individuals. The threshold is a
function of the past competition ratio , cj , associated with each specialty j, P¯j = f(cj)
; where cj is defined as the number of total applications received by each specialty
j, aj , divided by its capacity, qj . Individual i would make a unique application to the
specialty with the highest Aji only if Pji ≥ P¯j . If, on the contrary, Pji < P¯j individual i
will still apply to the specialty with highest Aji but also will split her effort endowment
into two or more applications until for one of the options the perceived probability
is larger than the correspondent threshold. The perceived probability Pji does not
depend on effort, is subjective and non-observed by the selectors, however the effort
devoted to each application, Eji, is objective and can be extrapolated from the quality
of the application by selectors.
3.3.2 Selection stage
In the second stage, selectors from the different specialties, contained in the set S,
decide which candidates, from the set M , are suitable to be offered a post from the set
of training posts available Q. Each j ∈ S receives a number of applications aj which
is a function of the weighted net benefit that each medical student associates with
specialty j at the moment of applying, aj = f(Aji).
The panel of selectors of specialty j will receive a total of aj applications. From all
of those applications, only the candidates that fulfil all the admissions criteria will
be assigned a shortlisting score11 SCji that is a function of student qualifications,
experience and other elements. Those candidates whose SCji is above a certain
11Not every specialty follows exactly the same scheme: some skip the shortlisting score step whilst some
have a pre-interview assessment instead. Nonetheless, all the specialties in our sample carry out
interviews and provide interview scores.
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threshold S¯Cj , set by each specialty, will be invited to be interviewed. Then, during
the interview process selectors assign each candidate an interview score ISji.
The interview score, ISji = f(SCji, Zi, Eji, uji), is a function of doctor’s qualifica-
tions that are captured by SCji, the effort exerted in preparing the application and
the interview process Eji, a vector of individual observable characteristics such as age,
sex, medical school, etc., represented by Zi, and a component uji that analysts do not
observe and captures a set of elements that may affect the interview score, such as
candidates’ nervousness, communication problems, selectors’ unconscious biases, etc.
Each specialty has a limited number of training posts qj and generally qj < aj . Each
doctor who has completed the selection process has a total score that is a function of
shortlisting and interview scores, TSji = f(SCji, ISji). Selectors will rank candidates
according to their TSji, from highest to lowest, and will offer training positions fol-
lowing this order until the capacity is met. Specialties usually set a bottom threshold
for T¯ Sj and even if there is enough capacity, candidates with a TSji < T¯Sj will not
be offered a training position.
The relationship between the application and selection stage is made through the
effort exerted by the doctors. If two doctors i and i+ 1 are both participating in the
selection process of specialty j and are similar in every aspect except in the distribution
of effort endowment and Eji > Ej,i+1 then TSji > TSj,i+1.
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3.4 Application stage
3.4.1 Background
According to Nicholson (2008) doctors choose a specialty taking into account three
domains: the monetary aspect, the non-monetary attributes and doctors’ personal
characteristics. The first studies addressing the determinants of specialty choice can be
found for the United States and mainly focus on the estimation of the rates of return
from the different specialties, like the pioneering work from Sloan (1970), and on how
those rates affect specialty choice, as in Hurley (1991) or in Nicholson (2002). The
latter also introduced the role of rationing and uncertainty to weigh the net present
value of the returns of each specialty. Also for the US, Bazzoli (1985) analysed the
impact of educational debt on specialty decisions. The cited studies provide different
estimates of income elasticity of supply, close to zero in Sloan (1970) and Bazzoli
(1985), to almost 1.5 in Nicholson (2002), however the latter measures the impact
of income on the desired specialty, rather than the actual specialty choices which are
restricted by rationing. Gagne´ and Le´ger (2005) find a positive effect of income on
specialty choice for Canada and Sivey et al. (2012) for Australia.
Other studies have analysed the role of non-pecuniary aspects of the specialties.
Thornton and Esposto (2003) studied the trade-off between income and leisure for
the different specialties in the US, finding a positive impact on specialty selection for
earnings, for more annual vacation time and for more certain work schedules. Bhat-
tacharya (2005) included non-pecuniary aspects of the specialties in the estimation of
earnings, finding that years of training, schedules, reputation and skill mix required
are likely to affect life time earnings and therefore will have a significant influence in
the specialty choice decision.
International literature has focused on the pecuniary aspects of specialties and the
trade-off between those and non-pecuniary elements, and has viewed this trade-off as
the main driver of specialty choice. For the UK, Wilson (1987) estimates the rate of re-
turn of the medical profession as a whole and compares it with the returns from other
similar professions finding no significant differences. Morris et al. (2008) provide es-
timates for NHS and private income for consultants by specialty and region. However,
there are no studies analysing how income impacts specialty choice. The monetary
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aspect is likely to be less important in the UK than in countries that rely on market
mechanisms for services provision (e.g. US), as the NHS allows for little variation of
payment between specialties. Harris et al. (2014) found for Spain, which also has a
national health system, that private practice earnings, prestige and favourable lifestyle
are most the important elements in the specialty choice.
The contributions to literature in the UK have focused on the role of personal
characteristics in the decisions to specialise. Goldacre et al. (2004), using a postal
questionnaire, asked medical graduates for their desired specialty and found significant
differences between medical schools in the career choices made by their graduates.
The most significant were found for the Oxbridge graduates who were less likely than
other doctors to choose general practice as a career, whilst Birmingham and Leicester
graduates showed the reverse. Lambert et al. (2006) compared the specialty choice
of the graduates over time by means of descriptive statistics. They found that some
specialties like general practice, obstetrics or gynaecology permanently attract women
whilst others like surgery attract men. In addition, the authors found that the gender
gap in general practice is further widening with the new cohort of doctors. Fazel and
Ebmeier (2009) analysed the number of applications per vacancies for ten different
specialties, finding that surgery and radiology were the most desirable specialties
whilst paediatrics and psychiatry were the least for the UK graduates. Goldacre et al.
(2010) compared the eventual career destinations with early specialty choices, finding
a large mismatch. The differences were especially large for general practice, meaning
that only a small percentage of doctors had it as first choice at an early stage in their
career. Failure to get a post and disillusion with the specialty originally chosen were
listed as the main drivers of the mismatches. Soethout et al. (2004) present a literature
review of European studies analysing factors associated with specialty choice, finding
that personal characteristics, such as enthusiasm, self-appraisal of skills or human
interest, and domestic circumstances were the two main drivers.
All the cited studies analyse the effect of personal characteristics in isolation and
do not account for correlation between the different elements. Moreover, their res-
ults come from surveys that, despite having good response rates, might not be fully
representative of the medical workforce. In this section of Chapter 3, we focus on
estimating the role of personal characteristics in UK doctors’ application patterns. This
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is the first study to comprehensively look at the doctors’ application choices in the
context of the multi-stage allocation process. Our analysis is more exhaustive than
has been previously possible as it is the first to consider comprehensive administrative
data and to apply multivariate econometric methods that allow the estimation of the
relationship between socio-demographic characteristics and decisions to specialise
controlling for doctors’ academic backgrounds and previous educational attainment.
3.4.2 Data and variables
The cross-sectional data used in this study come from the UK Medical Education
Database (UKMED), which collates data on the performance and career progression
of UK medical students and training doctors. Our data belong to the pilot phase of
UKMED and include all individuals who entered a UK medical school in the years 2007
and 2008 and participated in the specialty allocation process in the period between
2012 and 2015.
3.4.2.1 Independent variables
Table 3.1 describes all the variables included in the analysis. The dataset includes
information on demographic characteristics such as gender, ethnicity and age repres-
ented by the variables Woman, BME and Age Process, respectively. We also control
for the variable Time Elapsed that measures the number of years in between medical
qualification and the specialty allocation process.
We include measures of socioeconomic background such as POLAR3, that stands
for Participation Of Local Areas and is an indicator of neighbourhood deprivation
and classifies neighbourhoods in three groups: low-participation, non-UK and other
neighbourhood, the latter includes all UK non-deprived areas. The classification
groups areas across the UK and it is based on the proportion of the young population
that participates in higher education. Secondary school attended, variable School is
another measure of socioeconomic background as we consider those having attended
an independent school as a proxy for coming from a high-income family (Milburn
2014). As it is well known that medical students come frequently from families with
medical practitioners (Sutton et al. 2014), we include a dummy variable, Parent Doctor,
which identifies individuals for whom at least one parent is also a medical doctor.
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The objective is to estimate how belonging to a family of doctors affects individuals’
application behaviour.
UKMED includes a set of academic covariates such as the results from the UK Clinical
Aptitude Tests (UKCAT), variable UKCAT Score, that is an admission test used by UK
universities. UKCAT does not contain any curriculum or science content and tests
students’ mental abilities, attitudes and professional behaviours. Moreover, UKCAT
results constitute a reasonable proxy for A-level results (James et al. 2010). The
variable Graduate indicates whether a doctor had already graduated from a different
degree at the point of entrance to medical school. We further control for place of
medical qualification, variable Medical School, and the Foundation School where the
doctor did the foundation training. There are 30 medical schools and 28 foundation
schools and for both, we set Birmingham as the base outcome. Birmingham has been
situated in the central position of medical school rankings for the years 2013-2015
(The Guardian 2017) and therefore constitutes a good representation of an average
medical school. We use the same medical school ranking to construct the dummy
variable Top 5 Uni that takes the value one for the medical schools that have been
ranked in the first five positions12 in the period 2013-2015 and zero otherwise.
3.4.2.2 Dependent variables
After the completion of the Foundation Programme, doctors in the UK can apply to any
of the sixteen specialties from Table 3.2. The specialty allocation process is made up of
at least two recruitment rounds, however we limit the analysis to the first recruitment
round. In further rounds, doctors’ choice set is restricted to the training positions that
have not been taken in the first round and therefore doctors’ specialty choices are
conditioned on the choice set available.
Ideally, we would report the effects of sorting and selection for each of the specialties
in Table 3.2 individually; however we discard this option due to the limited sample
size for some of the specialties. Instead we group specialties according to potentially
important characteristics. We refer to the different possible groupings as domains and
we consider three; the allocation of specialties to categories within these domains is
12Top 5 Medical Schools in the period 2013-2015 according to the Guardian Ranking: Cambridge,
Oxford, Edinburgh, University College London and Dundee.
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also set out in Table 3.2.
Domains of specialty
Using the domains, we are able to estimate how personal characteristics influence
doctors’ application patterns regarding: specialties monetary aspects, through the
income domain, and specialties non-pecuniary attributes through the pathway domain
and practice domains.
In the first domain, the income domain, we distinguish between specialties that have
traditionally been associated with higher or lower earnings by doctors. Sorting of
doctors according to their characteristics within this domain will have the effect of
establishing an income gradient across socio-demographic characteristics. Thus, for
example if female doctors are sorted and selected into low income specialties, we will
subsequently observe that the earnings of female doctors are lower than their male
counterparts. Morris et al. (2008) provide data on NHS and private income from
consultants in England. We use that information to classify specialties in the top 25%
in the distribution of total income as high income. Hence the dependent variable
TopInc takes value one if the individual i applies to a top income specialty and zero
otherwise. Similarly, specialties in the bottom 25% in the distribution of total income
are classified as bottom income and the dependent variable BottomInc takes value one
if the doctor i applies to a bottom income specialty and zero otherwise. This analysis
connects with the traditional literature on specialty choice as we study the sorting of
doctors with respect to the returns associated the different specialties.
We next distinguish between run-through and uncoupled specialties, which we
refer to as the pathway domain. This distinction captures the potential for differential
application behaviour between more or less certain career paths. Sorting and selection
is this domain may be informative of the attitudes to career uncertainty on the part
of doctors, with those wishing for, or being more suited to, a more pre-determined
outcome opting into or being selected for run-through specialties. The variable
RunThro takes value one if the individual applies to a run-through specialty and zero
otherwise.
Third, we focus on practice domain as specialties can be classified along several
axes regarding the type of doctor-patient interaction and the nature of interventions.
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We group specialties into (i) surgical and non-surgical following Gagne´ and Le´ger
(2005) and (ii) into primary care and non-primary care following Bazzoli (1985). The
practice domain is multi-faceted, as there are also elements of professional prestige,
competitiveness, that distinguish those groups of specialties. We do not make any
judgments about these differences but note that it is likely to be of on-going concern
if observable characteristics are correlated with a clear sorting or selection into this
practice domain. In this case, the variables Surgical and PrimaryC take value one if
the doctor has applied to a surgical or primary care specialty, respectively, and value
zero otherwise.
Number of applications
As described in the conceptual framework, the number of applications made can be
informative regarding doctor’s perceptions of success and can affect the outcomes of
the specialty allocation process. We define the variable AppliMore to take value one
if the doctor has made more than one application, and zero if the total number of
applications equals one. We conjecture that individuals who make a unique application
might be reflecting a higher degree of self-confidence and as result devote more time
and effort into its preparation, which in turn might lead them to better shortlisting
and interview outcomes and hence a higher probability of receiving an offer.
Limitations
UKMED data does not include doctors who completed their medical studies outside
the United Kingdom and therefore we cannot observe non-UK qualified doctor’s
recruitment outcomes. According to the General Medical Council (2013b), a quarter
of the doctors in specialty training graduated from a foreign university. Nonetheless,
the importance of omitting these doctors is partially offset by the secondary role non-
European qualified doctors play in the specialty recruitment process. Non-European
doctors only have access to training posts that have not been taken previously by UK
graduates in the first recruitment round (British Medical Association 2017).
Due to UKMED data being a combination of administrative records and survey
responses, missing data are common. A complete consideration of missing data issues
is beyond the scope of this chapter. We approach the potential problems pragmatically
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and as a first step we explored the potential patterns of missing data and found little
evidence that the probability of missing data on a specific variable depended on its
own values or on the values of other variables in the data set. Hence we proceed as if
data is missing completely at random (MCAR) and base our analysis on a sample of
complete observations.
3.4.3 Econometric model and empirical implementation
Following the conceptual framework described in Section 3.3, doctors will apply to
the specialty(ies) that yield the maximum net benefit Bji weighted by the perceived
probability of obtaining a training post in specialty j, Pji.13 The weighted net benefit
is represented by Aji that we define as a latent continuous variable that satisfies
equation (3.1).
Aji = Z
′
iβj + µji (3.1)
Where Z
′
i is a vector of doctor’s characteristics affecting the specialty choices, βj is
the vector of parameters that we want to estimate and µji is the error term. However,
the latent variable Aji is unobservable and instead for each specialty j and doctor
i we only observe whether an individual has applied or not to the specialty j. That
relationship is captured by variable yji that takes value one if the doctor i has applied
to specialty j and zero otherwise. Expression (3.2) shows this relationship.
yji =
 1 if Aji ≥ 00 if Aji < 0 (3.2)
We estimate the probability of doctor i applying to specialty j controlling for the
vector of individual characteristics Z
′
i by means of a Probit Regression as shown by
the following expression:
P (yji = 1) = P (Z
′
iβj + µji ≥ 0) = P (−µji ≤ Z
′
iβj) = Φ(Z
′
iβj) (3.3)
13Although the Pji is defined in the conceptual framework as a function of doctors’ characteristics and
the capacity associated with each specialty, we do not include the latter in our empirical analysis.
Capacity is constant for all doctors applying in a given year and although we have specialty allocation
outcomes for more than one year, the variation is minimal and therefore its effect cannot be identified.
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Where Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the error term that we assume
is independently and identically distributed and follows a standard normal distribution.
However, as the variance of the error term µji might suffer from heteroscedasticity we
relax the identical distribution assumption and estimate robust standard errors.
The estimated parameters from the Probit model do not have a straightforward
interpretation as, unlike the linear probability regression model, its estimates are
not equivalent to the marginal effect of a covariate in the estimated probability. The
marginal effect of a covariate k in the Probit model is given by (3.4) where φi(Z
′
iβ) is
the probability distribution function associated with Φ(.). As the marginal effect of
one covariate depends on all the parameters and on the actual values of the vector
of covariates we compute instead the average marginal effect (AME). The AME is
computed for the average value of all the explanatory variables (Z¯i) including Zk.
∂P [yji|Zi]
∂Zki
=
∂Φ(Z ′iβ)
∂Zki
= φi(Z
′
iβ) ∗ βk (3.4)
Empirical implementation
We analyse six different outcome variables, yj , that result from grouping the specialties
according to the domains described in Section 3.4.2.2: (i) run-through vs. uncoupled
specialties, (ii) 25% top income specialties vs. others, (iii) 25% bottom income
specialties vs. others , (iv) surgical vs. non-surgical specialties, (v) primary care vs.
non-primary care and (vi) multiple applications vs. single application.
We estimate three different specifications of equation (3.3), the main difference
between these being the number of covariates included in the analysis. We face
a trade-off between the number of covariates we can include and the number of
observations available; a complete case analysis leads to a reduced sample size since
there are variables with a large number of missing values. Table 3.3 sets out the
variables included in each specification. Specification (1) includes the demographic,
socioeconomic, part of the academic covariates and the year fixed effects, in order to
assess the effect of medical and foundation school, Specification (2) includes them
as covariates. Specification (3) adds the variable UKCAT Score to control for previous
educational attainment. In addition, as a robustness check we perform an identical
analysis to that described above to the reduced sample of doctors who only applied
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to one specialty (i.e. those for whom AppliMore equals zero). The objective is to
disentangle whether socio-demographic characteristics affect differently the sample of
doctors who made a single application.
In Table 3.3, specifications marked with an asterisk only apply to the dependent
variable AppliMore. Specification (1*) includes the same covariates as specification (2)
whilst specifications (2*)-(6*) control for specialty fixed effects.
3.4.4 Results: application stage
3.4.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.4 shows the descriptive statistics for three groups: UKMED population, the
sample of doctors who participate in the application stage (Sample 1- All doctors)
and the reduced sample of doctors who only apply to one specialty (Sample 2- Single
application). The UKMED population size is 13,745 and includes all doctors who
started medical school in UK during 2007 and 2008. Nonetheless, the size of Sample 1
is 7,630 as we cannot include the doctors who have not participated in the specialty
allocation process yet. We conjecture that the large discrepancy between the UKMED
population and Sample 1 size is due to differences in the duration of medical under-
graduate14 studies as different programmes have different lengths or can be done
on a part-time basis.15 In addition, medical students who have taken the option of
intercalating16 a course from a different subject would have extended the duration
of studies at least one year. We observe that 66.6% of doctors in Sample 1 started
medical studies in 2007 whilst the share is 50.7% in the UKMED population. The latter
is to be expected as in 2015, last year of data in our sample, many of the individuals
who started medical school in 2008 may have not reached the stage of starting the
specialty allocation process yet.
The descriptive statistics for the demographic variables (Sample 1) show that 58.1%
14There are two main types of undergraduate medical programs: regular, which last for five or six years,
and graduate entry programmes, which last for four years and are designed for students who have
already graduated from a different university degree.
15Foundation Training can be also done on a part-time basis and therefore doctors who did it part-time
will take more than two years to complete it.
16As part the medical studies, individuals have the option to do an intercalating degree, which is time
out of their regular medical degree to study a specific area of interest. In some cases intercalating
could lead to medical students receiving an additional degree, on top of their undergraduate medical
degree, and getting extra points in their application to a Foundation Training programme.
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of doctors in the sample are Woman, 32.2% are BME and that the average age at which
a doctor chooses their specialty is 27.7 years. The socioeconomic covariates show
that 4.1% of the doctors grew up in a low-participation neighbourhood and 9.8% in
a non-UK neighbourhood. Descriptive statistics for School, also a proxy for doctor’s
socioeconomic background, show that 21.3% of doctors attended an independent
school, 63.9% a state school and 14.8% an unknown school type. The descriptive stats
for the UKMED population show a slightly larger percentage of doctors attending an
independent school, 24.3%. However, the percentage of doctors attending independ-
ent schools is considerably smaller than that reported in Chapter 2 for the NTS 2013
cohort. We conjecture that a large proportion of the responses associated with the
category unknown school must correspond to doctors who attended an independent
school. The variable Parent Doctor shows that 11.3% of the doctors have a parent who
is also a medical doctor and 12.7% for the UKMED population.
The descriptive statistics for the academic variables show that 26.6% of doctors
were Graduate upon entry. This group is over-represented in Sample 1, there are 18.3%
in the UKMED population, reflecting that most of the graduated upon entry doctors
have participated in the shorter medical undergraduate programme. The descriptive
statistics for UKCAT Score show that on average the results for the UKMED population
are slightly better than for the individuals in our sample, those are 25.2 vs. 25.1.
Descriptive statistics for the variable Top 5 Uni show that 12.3% of individuals in
Sample 1 went to a top 5 university whilst it is 13.5% for the UKMED population.
Regarding the outcome variables from the application stage, 58.9% of the doctors
apply to a run-through specialty, 10.9% to a top income, 14.3% to a bottom income,
53.0% to a primary care and 20.4% to a surgical specialty. The descriptive statistics
from the interaction terms suggest that women apply in a higher proportion than
men to RunThro, PrimaryC and BottomInc specialties. By contrast, BME doctors apply
in a higher proportion than white doctors to TopInc and Surgical specialties. The
descriptive for the variable AppliMore shows that 29.4% of doctors make more than
one application. The interaction term for ethnicity show that 11.1% of BME doctors
and 18.3% white doctors make more than one application. BME doctors make on
average more applications than white doctors; if application patterns were similar
for both groups we were to observe that only 9.4% BME would make more than one
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application. AppliMore seems to be evenly distributed with respect to doctor’s gender.
The descriptive statistics for Sample 2 - Single application show little variation with
respect to the observed for Sample 1 All doctors.
3.4.4.2 Estimation results
We present six tables with estimation results one for each of the six dependent variables
we analyse. Each table reports the estimated coefficient (βˆ), the robust standard error
(SE) and the average marginal effect (AME) for the three specifications analysed.
We report and comment on the estimation results from specification (2), unless the
variable of interest comes from a different specification. Moreover, in each table we
present the results for the sample with all doctors who participated in the application
process, i.e. Sample 1- All doctors, and the reduced sample that we use as robustness
check, i.e. Sample 2 - Single application. Moreover, Figure 3.3 offers a summary of the
estimation results for the dependent variables (i)-(v).
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Figure 3.3: Summary of estimation results: application stage
Run-Through Top-Income Bottom-Income Surgical Primary Care
(Yi = 1) (Yi = 1) (Yi = 1) (Yi = 1) (Yi = 1)
Woman + - + - +
Age Process + - +
Time Elapsed - + -
BME + + - + +
Parent Doctor - + + +
POLAR3: Low Participation
POLAR3: Non-UK - + -
School: Independent
School: Unknown
Graduate +
UKCAT Score∗ - + -
Top 5 University∗ - -
+/- indicates that the estimated effect is positive/negative and statistically significant at least at the 90% confidence level
The sign and significance reported correspond to the Probit estimates from Sample (1)- Specification (2)
Estimates for the variables marked with ∗ come from a different specification (see Table 3.3)
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Run-through vs. uncoupled specialties
The results displayed in Table 3.5 refer to the pathway domain where the dependent
variable RunThro takes value one if the individual applies to a run-through specialty
and zero if the individual applies to an uncoupled specialty.
Results for the demographic variables show that the variable Woman has a posit-
ive and statistically significant effect on the probability of choosing a run-through
specialty. The average marginal effect indicates that being a female doctor increases
the probability of choosing a run-through specialty by 0.148. The latter is consistent
with the findings from Nicholson (2002). BME doctors seem to have a preference for
run-through specialties, and the magnitude of the average marginal effect is 0.084.
Similarly, the estimates for Age Process present a positive sign and the marginal effect
indicates that being one year older increases the probability of choosing a run-through
specialty by 0.010. All three effects are statistically significant at the 99% confidence
level.
From the socioeconomic variables, we observe a negative and statistically signific-
ant effect of the category Non-UK neighbourhood, from the variable POLAR3, with
respect to the base outcome (which is any other non-deprived neighbourhood) and
the marginal effect is -0.060. The variable Parent Doctor also presents a negative effect
with the average marginal effect of 0.038, significant at the 95% confidence level. No
significant effects were found for the School variable.
Regarding academic variables (see specification (3)), the variable UKCAT Score
shows a negative and statistically significant effect at the 99% confidence level. This
implies that the larger the score is the lower the probability of choosing a run-through
specialty. The average marginal effect suggest that an increase of one standard de-
viation in UKCAT Score, 2.23, reduces the probability of applying to a run-through
specialty by approximately 0.029. The variable Top 5 Uni is also negative and statist-
ically significant at the 99% confidence level; therefore doctors who have attended
a top ranked medical school are less likely to apply to a run-through specialty, being
the marginal effect -0.047. The breakdown of the effect of Medical School shows that
doctors graduating from Hull-York, Leicester, Manchester or Peninsula are more likely
to apply to RunThro than those who graduated from Birmingham which is the base
outcome.
65
The estimates from Sample 2 present the same signs and significance as those from
Sample 1. By contrast, the magnitudes of those effects are slightly different for the
variables Woman and BME that present a larger and smaller effect, respectively.
Top income specialties vs. all others
Table 3.6 shows the estimation results for the dependent variable TopInc that takes
value one if the individual applies to a top income specialty, i.e. those in the top 25%
in distribution of total income, and zero otherwise.
Estimation results show that female doctors are less likely to apply to a high-income
specialty and the effect is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. The
average marginal effect suggests that the magnitude of the reduction in the probability
of applying is 0.094, other things equal. The variables Age Process and Time Elapsed
are also negative and statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. The AME
suggests that every year older a doctor is reduces the probability of applying to a
top income specialty by 0.003, whilst incrementing by one year the time elapsed
between obtaining the primary medical qualification and participating in the specialty
allocation process reduces the probability of applying to a top income specialty by
approximately 0.035. The effect of BME is positive as minority ethnic doctors are more
likely to apply to a top income specialty with an AME equal to 0.025.
Regarding socioeconomic variables, we find a positive and significant effect at the
95% confidence level for the variable Parent Doctor. On average having a parent who
is also a doctor increases the probability of choosing a top income specialty by 0.025.
The effect of attending an independent school seems to contribute to the selection of
a highly income specialty but the effect is not significant in every specification. No
significant effects were found for the neighbourhood deprivation variable POLAR3.
The estimation results for the academic covariates show that being a Graduate upon
entry has a positive effect on the probability of choosing a TopInc specialty, with an
AME equal to 0.023. No effects were found for the variable Top 5 Uni. Doctors who
graduated from Barts, Hull-York, Norwich, Oxford and Peninsula are less likely than
graduates from Birmingham to apply to a top income specialty.
The estimates from Sample 2 present the same signs and significance as those
from Sample 1. By contrast, the magnitudes of those effects are slightly larger for
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the variables Woman, BME, Parent Doctor and School:Independent. The latter is now
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
Bottom income specialties vs. all others
Table 3.7 shows the estimation results for the dependent variable BottomInc that takes
value one if the individual applies to a bottom income specialty, which are those that
lay in the bottom 25% of the distribution of total income, and zero otherwise.
We find a positive effect in the probability of applying to a BottomInc specialty
for the variable Woman and a negative effect for BME, both effects are statistically
significant at the 99% confidence level. Being a female doctor increases the probability
of applying to a bottom income specialty by 0.053 whilst being a minority ethnic doctor
decreases the probability by approximately 0.031. These estimates present opposite
signs to the estimates for TopInc, however these are of a smaller magnitude. Our
findings for gender and ethnicity are consistent with the analysis done by Nicholson
(2002) who found that female and white doctors were less likely to report relative
income as the attribute that had major influence on their specialty choices.
None of the socioeconomic covariates is statistically significantly different from zero.
Regarding academic variables, the estimate for UKCAT Score is positive and statistically
significant at the 99% confidence level. The effect of an increase of one standard
deviation (2.23) augments the probability of choosing a bottom income specialty by
approximately 0.013. Medical school dummy variables, apart from Peninsula that has
a negative significant estimate, do not show statistically significant effects.
Surgical specialties vs. non surgical
Table 3.8 shows the estimation results for the dependent variable Surgical that takes
value one if the individual applies to a surgical specialty, and zero otherwise.
The estimates show that female doctors are less likely to apply to surgical special-
ties, the average marginal effect being 0.070 and statistically significant at the 99%
confidence level. Doctors’ age has a negative effect, the AME indicates that each year
older a doctor is reduces the probability of of applying to a surgical specialty by -0.004
and the efffect is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level in specification
(3). The variable Time Elapsed is also negative and statistically significant at the 99%
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confidence level. The latter indicates that doctors who take an extra year to complete
Foundation Training reduce their probability of choosing a surgical specialty by 0.059.
Results for age and gender are consistent with the estimates from Gagne´ and Le´ger
(2005) and Bhattacharya (2005). Lambert et al. (2006) also found that UK female
doctors were less likely to choose a career in surgery. Gagne´ and Le´ger (2005) suggest
that negative estimates for age are linked to the fact that older doctors have a shorter
professional life and therefore have less time to recover the expenses from the long
training period associated with surgical specialties. This is likely to be the case in
the UK as well where surgical specialties take on average eight years of specialty
training, the maximum length of training. The remaining demographic covariate,
BME, presents a positive and significant effect at the 99% confidence level and has an
average marginal effect associated equal to 0.063.
Regarding the socioeconomic covariates, the only positive and statistically significant
effects are found for the variables Parent Doctor and POLAR3:Non-UK neighbourhood.
The effect of having a parent who is also a doctor increases the probability of apply-
ing to a Surgical specialty by 0.032, whilst growing up in a non-UK neighbourhood
increases that probability by approximately 0.075.
The estimates for the academic variables are statistically significant for Graduate
and UKCAT Score, but only at the 90% confidence level. Estimates from specification
(3) indicate that the associated AMEs are 0.026 for Graduate and -0.004 for UKCAT
Score. With regard to Medical School, where Birmingham is the omitted category, the
only statistically significant results are found for Hull-York, which presents a negative
AME equal to -0.077, and for Imperial that presents a positive AME equal to 0.071.
The results for Sample 2 are similar to the results from the complete sample. The
main differences are that the variable Age Process becomes statistically significant in
every specification whilst the estimates for Time Elapsed reduce their significance to a
90% confidence level. The effect associated with the variable BME is still statistically
significant, however the AME is of a smaller magnitude. Finally, the socioeconomic
variable School:Independent becomes statistically significant, with an AME of 0.029.
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Primary care vs. non-primary care specialties
Table 3.9 shows the estimation results for the dependent variable PrimaryC that takes
value one if the individual applies to a primary care specialty, and zero otherwise.
We find a positive effect in the probability of choosing a primary care specialty for
both Woman and BME doctors, both effects are statistically significant at the 99%
confidence level. The AME for Woman is 0.178 and 0.055 for BME. The magnitude of
the effect of being a female doctor is considerable and our estimate is consistent with
the findings from Lambert et al. (2006), Nicholson (2002) and Bhattacharya (2005).
The two latter papers find opposite results to ours for ethnicity, however both studies
compare black vs. white doctors in the US specialty market. In UKMED, BME variable
includes other minority ethnic groups, Asian doctors being the largest category. The
latter linked to the fact that the two countries have very different medical systems
which make the results for ethnicity not directly comparable. By contrast, Bazzoli
(1985) did not find a significant effect for Woman nor for BME. The variable Age
Process has a positive sign and it is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.
Every year older a doctor is augments the probability of applying to PrimaryC by 0.011.
This is consistent with the estimates reported by Hurley (1991).
With respect to the socioeconomic covariates, we find that having a parent who is
also a doctor reduces the probability of applying to a PrimaryC specialty by 0.052,
being the effect statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. This result concurs
with Bazzoli (1985) who found that doctors whose parents have tertiary education
are less likely to choose a primary care specialty. Those doctors who grew up in a
non-UK neighbourhood are also less likely to choose a primary care specialty. The
AME is equal to -0.113 and significant at the 99% confidence level.
The estimation results for the academic variables suggest that doctors who attended
a Top 5 Uni medical school are less likely to apply to a primary care specialty, the
AME is -0.068 and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level (specification
(1)). The variable UKCAT Score has a negative coefficient estimate and is statistically
significant at the 99% confidence level (specification (3)). The effect of an increase
of one standard deviation (2.23) reduces the probability of choosing a primary care
specialty by approximately 0.033. Nicholson (2002) found similar results for MCAT,
the medical college admission test in the US. For Medical School, we find that doctors
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who graduate from Barts, Hull-York, Leicester, Newcastle, Peninsula and Sheffield are
more likely to apply to a primary care specialty with respect to those who graduated
from Birmingham. In contrast, the estimated effect associated with graduates from
Cambridge is negative. The latter is consistent with the negative relationship between
Oxbridge medical graduates and their propensity to apply to primary care specialties
found by Goldacre et al. (2004).
Finally, the results for the Sample 2 are similar in sign and magnitude to the
described above for the complete sample.
Number of applications
Table 3.10 shows the estimation results for the dependent variable AppliMore that
takes value one if the individual applies to two or more specialties, and zero if only
applies to one.
The estimates for the variables BME and Age Process are positive and statistically
significant in every specification. Ethnic minority and older doctors are more likely
to make more than one application, even after controlling for specialty fixed effects.
The AMEs from specification (1) are 0.059 for BME and 0.006 for Age Process both
significant at the 99% confidence level. With respect to gender, we find that female
doctors who apply to a RunThro (AME -0.028) or PrimaryC (AME -0.028) are less
likely to make more than one application whilst those females applying to Surgical
(AME 0.019) are more likely to make more than one application, with respect to male
doctors applying to same options. The effect of the variable POLAR3: Non-UK is also
positive and statistically significant in every specification. No other significant effects
were found for the other socioeconomic covariates.
3.4.5 Discussion
Evidence in respect of selection by doctors in regard to their applications is very
strong. The estimation results for the income domain show that female doctors select
into low-income specialties and avoid high-income specialties, a situation that may
contribute to the perpetuation of the gender wage gap in the medical profession.17 On
17According to Rimmer (2017) the gender pay gap has grown over the past decade. In 2006, female
doctors working full tuime earned 24% less than their male colleagues whilst female doctors in 2016
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the contrary, ethnic minority doctors select into applying for high-income specialties
and away from low-income ones. The fact that BME doctors in our sample come from
wealthier backgrounds than the typical doctor might explain their inclination for top
income specialties (see Table 3.14). Evidence regarding socioeconomic variables is
weak, but we establish that having a parent who is also a doctor is associated with a
higher probability of applying to high-income specialties. The latter might be reflecting
the advantage in terms of knowledge of having a parent who is also a doctor. It may
also indicate some degree of nepotism, as in Lentz and Laband (1989) who, after
controlling for intergenerational transfers of human capital and other confounders,
found that children of doctors were 14% more likely to be admitted to medical schools
in the US.
Nonetheless, the percentage of doctors who attended an independent school in the
UKMED sample is considerably smaller than the figures reported in Chapter 2 for the
NTS 2013 cohort. We conjecture that a large proportion of the responses associated
with the category School:unknown should correspond to doctors who attended an
independent school instead. Moreover, doctors who attended an independent school
are also underrepresented in our sample of analysis (Sample 1) with respect to the
UKMED population. The latter suggest that socioeconomic privileged doctors are more
likely to have done a longer medical undergraduate programme, have done extra
clinical training or have intercalated another degree as they are more likely to be able
to afford the opportunity costs of delaying their entry to the job market. All those
extracurricular activities are very likely to increase their chances of being admitted to
the most demanded specialties.
The results regarding the pathway domain show that women, older doctors and
bottom achievers are more likely to choose a run-through specialty. We conjecture
that choosing a run-through specialty can be interpreted as a less risky and more
stable choice since doctors only need to take part in the specialty allocation once for
the whole period of training. Moreover, most run-through specialties present shorter
training periods and might be easier to combine with part-time work and therefore be
preferred by those doctors looking for a better work-leisure-family balance.
earn 34% less.
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The estimation results for the practice domain show that females and older doctors
are less likely to choose a surgical specialty whilst BME doctors and those who have
a parent who is also a doctor present a higher probability. Results for primary care
specialties are the opposite as female doctors, older doctors and also BME doctors are
more likely to apply to a primary care specialty. On the contrary, having a parent who
is also a doctor, having attended an independent school or a top ranked university
reduce the probability of applying to a primary care specialty. In general, these findings
suggest that the allocation of doctors with respect to their socioeconomic background
observed in Chapter 2 is largely driven by their application behaviour as doctors from
privileged socioeconomic backgrounds are more likely to apply to a surgical specialty
and less likely to a primary care specialty than doctors coming from non-privileged
backgrounds. That behaviour might be reflecting the fact that socioeconomic priv-
ileged doctors might place a higher value into the specialties’ monetary attributes than
doctors from worse-off backgrounds. Then, policy interventions aimed at widening
the access to the medical profession to individuals from more deprived socioeconomic
backgrounds could to some extend reduce the shortages in primary care specialties.
In this section of Chapter 3, we also explore the impact of doctors’ socio-demographic
characteristics on the number of applications a doctor makes. This analysis is novel
and suggests that the number of applications a doctor makes depends on the special-
ties the doctor applies to. However, the main finding is that BME doctors present a
different application strategy to white doctors. They make more applications and that
effect remains significant even after controlling for medical school effects, other previ-
ous educational attainment and specialty fixed effects. According to our conceptual
framework, other things being equal, that behaviour might be detrimental for BME in
the selection stage. Section 3.5 analyses the determinants of interview score and will
shed light on the effect of application behaviour on selection outcomes.
Our analysis is based on the observed outcomes from the medical specialty applic-
ation stage in the UK. According to our conceptual framework application decisions
are determined by a combination of the net benefit associated with specialties and the
perceived probability of getting access to them. With the data available we cannot
disentangle the effect of doctors’ sociodemographic characteristics in each of these
elements separately. Future research should have access to stated preferences by
72
asking doctors for their preferred specialties, irrespective of their probability of getting
access to them, and to find how different those are from the observed choices from the
application process. We would be able to achieve a better understanding of the role of
perceived probability in determining doctors’ application patterns and we would be
able to examine whether it affects the different sociodemographic groups differently.
Another avenue for future research could be to carry out a discrete choice experiment,
similar to the work of Sivey et al. (2012) for Australia, to explore the trade-offs doctors
are willing to make between specialties’ monetary and non-monetary attributes. The
latter becomes particularly relevant with the feminisation of the medical workforce in
order to understand whether female doctors value those trade-offs differently.
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3.5 Selection stage
3.5.1 Background
There is a desire for ensuring the equality, diversity and opportunity in the medical
profession by promoting a fair, transparent and effective specialty recruitment process
(General Medical Council 2010). In this section, we focus attention on the selection
process that takes place after doctors have made their specialty application choices.
The interview is the most decisive element of the selection stage. We analyse the role
of doctors’ ethnicity and gender in determining interview scores using the UKMED
dataset and we test whether, other things being equal, ethnicity and gender do have a
statistically significant impact on interview scores.
Previous research found evidence of ethnic biases and differential attainment of
ethnic minorities in the British medical profession during the 1980s and 1990s. At the
point of admission to medical school, McManus et al. (1995), McManus et al. (1998)
and Arulampalam et al. (2005) found that ethnic minority candidates receive less entry
offers than white candidates after controlling for previous educational attainment and
other relevant characteristics. Several studies have analysed the relationship between
ethnicity, gender and academic performance. Dillner (1995), McManus et al. (1996),
Wass et al. (2003), Woolf et al. (2011) in undergraduate examinations and Dewhurst
et al. (2007) and Woolf et al. (2011) in postgraduate clinical skill examinations found
that the differential attainment of ethnic minorities is negative and statistically sig-
nificant on both types of assessments and cannot be explained in terms of previous
educational performance. Dewhurst et al. (2007) and Woolf et al. (2011) also tested
the effect of gender in clinical skill examinations, finding that women were more
likely to outperform men. Nonetheless, McManus et al. (2013) did not find evidence
of ethnic or gender biases in examiners from postgraduate clinical skill assessments.
The authors exploited the fact that examiners were always in pairs and compared the
assessments of each examiner against a ‘basket’ of all co-examiners. Wass et al. (2003)
associate the differential attainment to differences in styles of communication, values
and ways of learning of ethnic minority doctors.
After qualification from medical school the observed differential attainment con-
tinues. McKeigue et al. (1990) showed that ethnic minority doctors reported lower
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success rates in obtaining specialty posts18 with respect to white British doctors. Sim-
ilarly, Esmail and Everington (1993) in a small experiment, consisting of sending
identical curriculum vitae, found that candidates with white sounding names were
twice as likely to be shortlisted than those with foreign names. The cited studies
analysed the outcomes of doctors in the 1980s when the process of selection into
specialties was arranged locally, sometimes informally and subject to personal ar-
rangements (McKeigue et al. 1990). In the mid-2000s there was a reorganization
of the delivery of postgraduate medical training19 with the objective of improving
the quality of training, reducing uncertainty and minimizing the time to completion
(Lewington 2012). The recruitment into specialties is now organized nationally, by
the correspondent Royal College or a by a Local Educational Training Board (LETB)
on behalf of all the other LETBs, and with the purpose of ensuring a fair, transparent
and effective selection process (General Medical Council 2010). Currently, the typical
interview of the specialty recruitment process is divided in a minimum of two inter-
viewing stations and in each of these the candidate is evaluated by two interviewers
independently. This style of interview, known as a multiple-mini interview, is more
reliable and more consistent than the conventional interview methods (Knorr and
Hissbach 2014; Patterson et al. 2016) and therefore it should have eliminated the
ethnic biases observed in specialty recruitment in the UK in the past.
In this section, we analyse the interview scores of the doctors who started medical
school in 2007 and 2008 and therefore we test whether the differential outcomes
observed in the past for ethnic minority doctors faded with the reorganization and
standardization of the processes that give access to postgraduate specialty training.
We also test whether doctors’ gender has any impact on the interview scores. We
observe the interview score for 16 different specialties, which we transform to make
comparable and perform a pooled analysis. First, we apply Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) linear regression where we control for demographic and socioeconomic covari-
ates, measures of academic attainment and performance, medical school fixed effects,
and other relevant characteristics. We find a significant and negative effect of being
18Before the modernization of medical careers in 2007, after medical school newly graduated doctors
had to find a house officer post, so a few years later they could apply to specialty registrar posts.
19The plan is known as Modernising Medical Careers (MMC).
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Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) and positive and significant effect of being female.
Then, we apply a Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) (Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973) decomposition
of differences in the mean interview score between groups. The OB decomposition
indicates how much of the gap in interview scores can be explained by differences in
the explanatory covariates between groups and how much cannot and may be, there-
fore, associated with discrimination. Our findings show that a statistically significant
percentage of the observed differences remain unexplained.
Our study provides evidence regarding the functioning of the selection system and
shows that BME doctors and men experience differential attainment in the selection
process for specialty training. Our findings serve as the basis for further study of
the causes of differential attainment and the identification of any necessary policy
intervention.
3.5.2 Data and variables
The cross-sectional data used in this section are the same as those used to analyse the
outcomes from the application stage. See Section 3.4.2 for a full description of the
data. Similarly, Table 3.1 sets out all the demographic, socioeconomic and academic
variables that we use as controls in the selection stage.
Dependent variables
Interview scores for different specialties use different scales and therefore are not
comparable (see Table 3.11). Ideally, we would carry out a case-by-case analysis, but
as in the application process, the small sample size associated with each specialty
impedes this practice. In this case, instead of grouping similar specialties together
as we do in the application process, we transform interview scores to make them
comparable across specialties and carry out a joint analysis. We apply two different
transformations represented by IST1ji and IS
T2
ji where i represents the individual and
j the specialty.
Expression (3.5) gives the first transformation we apply:
IST1ji =
ISji − ISMinj
ISMaxj − ISMinj
∈ [0, 1] (3.5)
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The transformed interview score IST1ji ranges from 0 to 1, a feature that facilitates its
interpretation. In equation (3.5), ISji denotes the observed interview score of doctor i
in specialty j. ISMaxj and IS
Min
j indicate the maximum and minimum interview score
observed in specialty j.
The second transformation consists of the standardization of the interview score
as shown by (3.6), where µISj indicates the mean interview score in specialty j and
σISj is the associated standard deviation. IS
T2 follows a standard normal distribution
and therefore scores under the mean become negative and over the mean positive. It
should be noted that both transformations are also applied to the shortlisting score.20
IST2ji =
ISji − µISj
σISj
∼ N (0, 1) (3.6)
A limitation of the first transformation is that the maximum and minimum interview
score come from the data observed in our sample and they might not necessarily
correspond to the global maximum and minimum interview score from the actual
interview processes. We do not observe the interview scores of doctors who started
medical school before year 2007 or after 2008 and might have participated in the
selection processes that we analyse. Moreover, as described in Section 3.4.2, we do
not observe specialty allocation outcomes for doctors who qualified outside of the UK.
The same limitation applies to the mean and standard deviation used in (3.6).
We introduce Specialty dummy variables, one for each of the specialties on Table
3.11, to control for specialty-interview panel effects. Despite the standardisation of
scores, it could be the case that the interview panel of one specialty may be granting
upward biased scores whilst another specialty may be doing the opposite. The vector
of Specialty dummies aims at capturing those disparities if they exist.
We observe the interview scores of 3,552 individuals who took part in 4,117 inter-
views; however, we limit our analysis to the 3,053 individuals who participated in a
single interview process. As described in the conceptual framework, Section 3.3, effort
20
SCT1ji =
SCji − SCMinj
SCMaxj − SCMinj
∈ [0, 1]
SCT2ji =
SCji − µSCj
σSCj
∼ N (0, 1)
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and resources devoted to prepare an interview may vary with the perceived probability
of getting the position, the doctor’s personal preferences, and the number of interviews
the doctor will have, among other factors. Therefore, degrees of effort and preparation
of doctors who have done two or more interviews may be different from those who
only have done one. We conjecture that for the former group the analysis of each
interview outcome in isolation may not constitute a true representation of a doctor’s
capabilities as they are splitting their endowment of time and effort into more than
one option.
3.5.3 Econometric model and empirical implementation
Following the conceptual framework described in Section 3.3, selectors from specialty
j will offer a specialty training post to the doctors who have associated the maximum
values of the variable total score. The latter represented by TSji is a function of the
shortlisting and interview scores, as given by TSji = f(SCji, ISji), and the weight
given to each of those two elements varies from specialty to specialty. We follow a
different strategy to the one applied in the application stage. Rather than analysing
the likelihood of receiving an offer in a specific group of specialties, we focus on
understanding how doctors’ sociodemographic characteristics influence interview
scores and hence how those characteristics can affect the likelihood of being offered a
training post in any specialty.
OLS estimation
As a first step we regress the transformed interview scores, IST1, and IST2 against
a set of explanatory covariates by means of an Ordinary Least-Square (OLS) linear
regression. The choice of the OLS is natural as both interview score transformations are
continuous variables and most observations fall closer to the middle of the distribution
rather than closer to the bounds.21 Moreover, OLS estimates have a straightforward
interpretation as the marginal effect of the covariate in the outcome variable. The
21The latter is especially relevant in the case of IST1, that only ranges from zero to one. The OLS model
is more robust to misspecification than limited dependent variable models, such as Probit or Logit,
however its estimates present the unboundedness problem. Nonetheless, we are interested in the
direction of the effects and our objective is being able to directly compare the estimates from the two
transformations and not utilising OLS estimates for forecast analysis.
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relationship between interview score and the rest of covariates is represented by (3.7)
ISTNi = β
N
0 +DE
′
iβ
N
1 + SE
′
iβ
N
2 +AC
′
iβ
N
3 +OS
′
iβ
N
4 + µ
N
i , N = 1, 2 (3.7)
Explanatory variables are classified into demographic (DE
′
), socioeconomic (SE
′
)
and academic (AC
′
) as Table 3.1 sets out. We also control for the features of the
specialty allocation process, represented by the vector of variables OS
′
, that include
shortlisting score, the variable AppliMore that reflects doctors’ application strategies
and that we use as a proxy of doctors’ effort (see Section 3.3), year fixed effects (i.e.
Year Process and Year Start) and specialty-interview panel fixed effects.
The error term is represented by µi and by assumption its conditional mean should
be zero, E(µi|Xi) = 0, where Xi represents the joint vector of independent variables
from individual i. The assumption refers to the exogeneity of the regressors and it is
essential for consistent estimation of the vector β. The latter assumption together with
the assumptions of conditional homoscedasticity, E(µ2i |Xi) = σ2, and conditionally
uncorrelated observations, E(µiµk|Xi, Xk) = 0, i 6= k, ensure OLS estimators are
fully efficient. However, we relax the homoscedasticity assumption and estimate
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, following the method developed by White
(1980), and therefore allowing the independent variables and the error term to not be
necessarily identically distributed.
With respect to the empirical implementation, we face a trade-off between the
number of independent variables we can include and the number of observations
available to carry out a complete case analysis. We present the results for four different
specifications that differ from each other in the number of covariates included. Table
3.12 sets out the covariates included in each specification.
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
As described in Section 3.5.1 there is evidence of ethnic and gender biases and differ-
ential attainment of those groups in different settings from undergraduate medical
studies to postgraduate medical training. We apply Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) decomposi-
tion (Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973) to disentangle the sources of the ethnic and gender
gap observed in specialty recruitment interview scores. This method has been extens-
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ively applied to the decomposition of gender and racial wage gaps as in Reimers (1983)
and O’ Neill and O’ Neill (2006) but also in other settings like Ammermu¨ller (2004)
who used it to explain the gaps in PISA test scores between Finland and Germany.
Our objective is to measure how much of the overall gap in the mean interview
scores is attributable to (i) differences in the observed characteristics rather than
(ii) differences in the estimators (β). O’ Donnell et al. (2008) refers to (i) as the
explained component or differences in endowments whilst (ii) is commonly known as
the unexplained component or differences in coefficients. We estimate how much of the
differences in scores can be explained by group differences in academic performance,
socioeconomic background, medical school and so on. The basis of the decomposition
relies on the construction of a counterfactual outcome, that captures an hypothetical
average interview score of BME doctors if they would have the same distribution of
covariates characteristics as white doctors. The construction of the counterfactual
works in a similar fashion for female and male doctors.
Expression (3.8) is a simplified version of (3.7) where Yg represents the outcome
variable, Xg the vector of explanatory covariates and g ∈ {a, b} indicates the demo-
graphic group the doctor belongs to. In our analysis, a indicates white or male doctor,
whilst b refers to BME or female doctor. Subscripts for the individual (i) have been
dropped for ease of presentation. We are interested in the computation of the es-
timated mean outcome difference between groups a and b. That difference, D, is
represented in (3.9) where E(βg) = βg and E(µg) = 0.
Yg = Xgβg + µg (3.8)
D = E(Ya)− E(Yb) = E(Xa)′βa − E(Xb)′βb (3.9)
To identify the contribution of group differences in explanatory covariates to the
overall observed differences in interview score expression (3.9) can be rearranged as
follows (Jann 2008):
D = {E(Xa)− E(Xb)}′β∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
E
+ {E(Xa)′(βa − β∗)− E(Xb)′(βb − β∗)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
U
(3.10)
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This is a twofold decomposition where the first component E is the part of the
outcome differential that is explained by group differences in the predictors (i.e. the
explained effect) and the second U is the difference in the estimator or unexplained
effect. The latter can be interpreted as reflecting the existence of some form of
discrimination. However, this interpretation requires the non-existence of relevant
unobservable predictors affecting interview score. Moreover, even assuming the
validity of the latter, it is not clear whether discrimination affects only one or both
groups at the same time. The undervaluation of one group might come with the
overvaluation of the other and vice-versa. For this reason we utilise benchmark
coefficients β∗ = Ωβˆa + (I − Ω)βˆb, where Ω = (X ′aXa + X
′
bXb)
−1X ′aXa and I is the
identity matrix, that are equivalent to the coefficients from the pooled model and
would be the ones resulting from a non-discriminatory interview process (Neumark
1988; Oaxaca and Ransom 1994).
The Oaxaca-Binder decomposition of the mean assumes the interview score model
to be linear and separable in observable characteristics as represented in (3.8) and a
zero conditional mean E[µg|X] = 0 (Fortin et al. 2011). In addition, our groups of
analysis are mutually exclusive and the fact that the formation of groups is exogenous,
as sex and ethnicity are intrinsic to the individual, avoids problems of endogeneity
and self-selection into groups.
The decomposition in practice consists of inserting the sample means and the OLS
estimates of βg and β∗ in (3.10). We apply the procedure by means of the Oaxaca
command for Stata developed by Jann (2008). The estimation of OB decomposition
of the mean has some limitations in the presence of categorical variables. Those
variables do not have a natural zero point and a different choice of the omitted group
would yield different decomposition results. To address the issue, we transform the
model restricting the coefficients for the single categories to sum zero following the
solution proposed by Yun (2005). This solution comes at the expense of interpretability
of the coefficients from the categorical variables (Fortin et al. 2011). Nonetheless,
our main interest relies on the aggregate decomposition results that consists of the
separation of D into its two components E and U and that it is not affected by the
categorical variables interpretability issue. By contrast, the detailed decomposition
that involves subdividing E and U into the respective contribution of each explanatory
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covariate to the explained and unexplained component would be indeed affected by
the interpretability issue and for that reason not reported.
Robustness checks
We consider two types of robustness checks. First, we apply the OB decomposition
separately to Core Medical Training and Core Surgical Training which are the two
specialties with the larger number of observations for interview score (see Table 3.11).
We check if the differences in means between groups still hold and that they are not
the result of individuals self-selecting into the specialties, despite the inclusion of the
specialty interview fixed effects our pooled results might be capturing. The second
check we apply is the OB decomposition of the mean interview score of two artificially
created groups where individuals were randomly allocated. The objective is to ensure
that our findings are not the result of a statistical artefact.
3.5.4 Results: Selection stage
3.5.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.13 show the descriptive statistics for the sample of 3,053 doctors who had
a single interview between the years 2012 and 2015. We observe a predominance
of women 53.7% and white doctors 67.7%. It also shows the descriptive statistics
for the complete sample that includes the doctors who had more than one interview
(N=3,552). The descriptive statistics do not display large differences in the explanatory
variables between the two groups.
Table 3.14 shows the breakdown of descriptive statistics by gender and ethnicity. The
comparison of the mean values of IST1 highlights disparities between demographic
groups. White doctors have a mean interview score of 0.56 whilst the mean is 0.49
for BME doctors. In the case of gender there are also differences, but of a smaller
magnitude. The mean IST1 for women is 0.55 and 0.52 for men. Figure 3.4 shows
the kernel distribution of IST1 by ethnicity and gender. The distribution of interview
score IST1 is fairly similar for male and female doctors, however it shows that men
are over-represented in the left tail of distribution whilst women are over-represented
on the right tail of the distribution. In terms of ethnicity, interview scores associated
82
with BME doctors are concentrated in the lower values of the score distribution. The
comparison of the mean values of IST2, that follows a standard normal distribution
and shows a wider range than IST1, leads to differences between demographic groups
in the same direction and similar magnitudes to that described above.
Figure 3.4: Kernel distributions of transformed interview score (IST1) by ethnicity
and gender
(a) Ethnicity
(b) Gender
For shortlisting score (SCT1) we observe a clear difference between white and
BME doctors in the same direction as for IST1 , however of a smaller magnitude, the
associated means are 0.48 versus 0.44. No differences are observed for gender. Figure
3.5 shows that BME doctors are under-represented in the right tail of the shortlisting
score distribution.
The variable Age Process shows that BME doctors are on average younger than white
doctors, 27.5 versus 28.2, and that men are older than women, 28.1 vs. 27.8. The
distribution of the socioeconomic covariates seems unbalanced across the groups of
interest and suggests that on average BME doctors come from better-off backgrounds.
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The proportion of BME doctors who studied in an independent school is larger than the
proportion of white doctors, 20.5% versus 18.7%. Similarly, the percentage of white
doctors who come from a deprived neighbourhood is larger than the proportion of BME
doctors, 4.8% and 3.4%. The percentage of female doctors from a low-participation
neighbourhood is 4.0% whilst it is 4.7% for male doctors. In our sample, 15.3% of
BME doctors have a parent who is also doctor whilst it is 8.3% for white doctors.
BME doctors are less likely to hold another degree at the start of medical school
than white doctors, 24.7% versus 38.9% and they are also less likely to have attended
a Top 5 Uni, 11.1% versus 12.9%. The results for UKCAT test scores are fairly similar
across groups: BME doctors and women have the lowest average test scores at 24.71
and 24.97, respectively. In relation to doctors’ application behaviour, BME doctors
make on average more applications than white doctors, 1.47 versus 1.34. Women
in our sample also make more applications than men, 1.41 versus 1.34. Overall, we
observe clear differences in both interview scores and control variables.
3.5.4.2 Regression estimates
OLS
Table 3.15 shows the OLS estimates for the two transformations, IST1 ∈ [0, 1] and
IST2 ∼ N (0, 1), applied to interview score. Results for gender and ethnicity are
similar in sign and magnitude across specifications and yield very similar results for
both transformations. In regard to the overall associations between interview scores
and doctor’s characteristics we find evidence of women scoring more highly than
men and BME doctors scoring less highly than white doctors, other things equal.
Estimates for both effects are statistically significant at least at the 95% confidence
level in all specifications. The estimates of the first (second) transformation show a
negative effect associated with BME doctors that ranges from -0.059 to -0.038 (-0.175
to -0.211) and a positive effect associated with being a female doctor ranges from
0.032 to 0.039 (0.117 to 0.125). The magnitude of the effects is not inconsiderable
taking into account that IST1 ∈ [0, 1].
As expected, shortlisting score is a very good predictor of interview score. An
increase of a standard deviation (0.216 as calculated in the full sample, see Table 3.13)
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Figure 3.5: Kernel distributions of transformed shortlisting score (SCT1) by ethnicity
and gender
(a) Ethnicity
(b) Gender
in SCT1 increases IST1 by approximately 0.051. We find similar results for UKCAT
scores, however they are of a smaller magnitude as the increase of one standard
deviation (2.253) increments the interview score by 0.015. The variable AppliMore has
a negative sign, as expected. Making an additional application, and therefore dividing
the endowment of time and resources into another option, reduces the interview score
approximately by 0.03. However, the statistical significance of the effect diminishes
after controlling for shortlisting score, see specification (3) and (4). In terms of
socioeconomic covariates, we only find a negative statistically significant estimate
associated with being raised in a non-UK neighbourhood, variable POLAR3:Non-UK,
however the effect becomes not significant after controlling for shortlisting score. Simil-
arly, we observe a positive impact on interview scores associated with being a graduate
at the point of entry to medical school that becomes not significant with the inclusion
of the shortlisting score. Although the effect of the variable School:Independent, one of
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the proxies for socioeconomic background, is positive it is not statistically significant.
Having a parent who is also a doctor does not seem to affect the interview scores. The
estimate for the variable Top 5 Uni is positive but not statistically significant.
Entering medical school in 2008 has a negative effect and suggests that those indi-
viduals who started in 2007 are more likely to achieve higher interview scores. In our
sample, 73% of doctors started medical school in 2007. This result reflects the fact that
doctors from the 2007 cohort are more likely to have done the long undergraduate
medical degree, and also had an extra year during which they could have intercalated
a course from a different field, had more time for volunteering and for doing extra
clinical training, among other things. Therefore, we conjecture the combination of all
those elements is translating to better interview outcomes.
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
OB ethnicity
Table 3.16 shows the results for the aggregate OB decomposition by ethnicity for the
two transformations applied to interview score. Estimates are similar in sign and
magnitude across specifications and transformations. We find statistically signific-
ant differences of mean interview scores between white and BME doctors. Before
controlling for shortlisting score (see specification IST1(2)) the total difference is
0.073. The difference, given by E(YWhite)−E(YBME), is divided into explained and
unexplained, effects that account for 0.018 and 0.055, statistically significant at the
95% and 99% confidence level, respectively. Estimates from specification IST1 (3)
include the variable Shortlisting score at the expense of reducing the sample to 1,479
doctors and the estimated difference becomes larger and is equal to 0.082. The
breakdown of the difference indicates that the explained effect for this sample, after
controlling for interview score, is larger and equal to 0.036 whilst the unexplained
effect is slightly smaller and equal to 0.046. The latter accounts for more than half
of the total differences in mean score between white and ethnic minority doctors.
According to the estimates from specification IST2 (3) the unexplained effect accounts
for more than three quarters of the total difference.
Our results show that the different distribution of endowments between white and
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BME doctors partly explains differences in the mean interview scores. Nonetheless,
a considerable part remains unexplained, suggesting that not only the level of en-
dowments is different but that those endowments are also priced differently (i.e.
βWhite 6= βBME). The results for the detailed decomposition, not reported, suggest
that the main contributors to the unexplained differences are medical school fixed
effects, year effects and specialty panel fixed effects whilst the main contributors to the
explained part are the same three plus the variables Woman, AppliMore, Shortlisting
score and UKCAT score.
OB Gender
The results for gender in Table 3.17 confirm that the mean interview score for male
doctors is smaller than for female doctors. The differenceE(YMen)−E(YWomen) before
controlling for shortlisting score equals -0.026 (see specifications IST1(1) and (2)).
However, for specification (2) the unexplained effect is the only element statistically
significant at the 99% confidence level and is equal to -0.033. The explained effect,
although not statistically significant, is positive reflecting the fact that the differences
in endowments favour male doctors and offset part of the negative effect associated
with the unexplained component. The estimates in specification IST1(3) control for
shortlisting score and are fairly similar to those from specification IST1(2). The total
difference is -0.029 and significant at the 90% confidence level whilst the unexplained
effect equals 0.031 and it is significant at the 95% confidence level. The estimates for
IST2 show similar signs and magnitude to those described for IST1.
The results for the detailed decomposition, not reported, suggest that the main
contributors to the unexplained differences are medical school fixed effects, year
effects and specialty panel fixed effects whilst the main contributors to the explained
part are the same three plus the variables BME , AppliMore , Shortlisting score and
UKCAT score.
3.5.5 Robustness checks
Tables 3.18 and 3.19 show the decomposition results for (IST1) for the specialties core
medical training and core surgical training by gender and ethnicity. We find that the
aggregate difference in means between BME and white doctors, despite the reduction
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in sample size, remains statistically significant and it is of a similar magnitude to the
observed in the general OB decomposition. The results for gender present similar
signs to the estimates from the general OB for gender, however they are no longer
statistically significant.
The second check we apply is the OB decomposition of the mean interview score
of two artificially created groups where individuals were randomly allocated. Table
3.20 shows the results. No statistically significant differences in means were found
between the groups.
3.5.6 Discussion
We find strong evidence of BME doctors scoring less highly than white doctors in
the interview that is pivotal in giving access to a specialty training position. We also
find that female doctors score more highly than male doctors, however the effect is
of a smaller magnitude and not statistically significant in every specification. These
results remain after accounting for previous educational attainment and imply that,
other things being equal, female and white doctors are more likely to be accepted into
specialty training.
The results from the Oaxaca-Binder decomposition suggest that a large share of those
differences remains unexplained, since they cannot be explained by the differences
in the control variables between the demographic groups. Therefore, it seems that,
despite all the measures implemented to standardize and regulate the recruitment
into specializations, the interview process might be prone to some type of bias.
Since equality and gender are protected characteristics,22 we rule out the existence
of taste-based discrimination (Becker 1959) and conjecture that a large part of the
unexplained differences may be the result of statistical discrimination phenomena, as
described in Chapter 2. Interviewers may use observable characteristics from doctors
like gender and ethnicity as proxy for unobservable, but outcome relevant character-
istics.
Our sample descriptive statistics (Table 3.14) show that on average BME doctors
have a lower shortlisting score than white doctors. Following Phelps (1972), in a situ-
22Equality Act 2010.
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ation where interviewers are not able to observe a doctor’s true ability, but do observe
group identity, they could rely on group average signals of ability like shortlisting score
and as a result BME doctors would receive lower interview scores. Another possibility
is that the observed interview outcomes from BME doctors are the result of the self
fulfilling prophecy described in Arrow (1973). Arrow’s argument is that BME doctors
might have some initial beliefs about their chances of gaining a training post, based
on historical ratios, preconceptions, past taste-based discrimination, etc., and those
are different from the beliefs of white doctors. In our sample, we observe that BME
doctors make more applications than white doctors and, following Arrow’s theory, it
could be a way to ensure more options for obtaining a training post as they might have
more pessimistic beliefs than white doctors. According to the conceptual framework,
that behaviour implies the division of their endowment of time and resources into two
or more applications. Selectors might perceive their lower investment into a single
application, therefore giving BME doctors lower shortlisting and interview scores,
other things equal. Another reason, also extracted from statistical discrimination
literature, is related to cultural and language differences. According to Lang (1986),
differences in different aspects of verbal and non-verbal communication may make
assessments by mostly non-ethnic minority selectors of the performance BME doctors
less accurate.
In the case of gender, the differences in interview scores are of a smaller magnitude
compared to the differences found for BME and white doctors. The positive bias asso-
ciated with female doctors could be explained by dissimilarities in practice between
men and women. Tsugawa, Jena, Figueroa et al. (2017) and Wallis et al. (2017) show
evidence that patients treated by female doctors had lower mortality and readmission
rates than those treated by male doctors. Similarly, Baumha¨kel et al. (2009) found
that females are more likely to adhere to clinical guidelines, Cooper-Patrick et al.
(1999) found that they have more participatory visits with their patients and Lurie
et al. (1993) shows that female doctors provide preventive care more often than male
doctors. The positive bias could be explained by the fact that selectors are aware of the
positive outcomes described above and would grant women biased higher interview
scores, other things equal. By contrast, the unexplained positive bias associated with
female doctors might be reflecting a patronizing behaviour from selectors.
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Our aim is to provide useful indications of particular hypotheses to be explored in
more detail. We focus on the decomposition of differences in the mean of interview
scores, however it would be useful to test if the gap is different in other parts of the
distribution. For example, we could test if the gap in interview scores is larger in
the upper part of the distribution as Figure 3.4 suggests. Future work, should go
beyond the mean and apply a distributional method following the work of Firpo et al.
(2009) and Chernozhukov et al. (2013). Moreover, despite the richness in terms of
information of UKMED data, sample numbers for interview score are small, especially
for those specifications with the largest number of covariates and as consequence
that leads to less precise estimates. We had access to the Pilot UKMED dataset with
doctors who started medical school in 2007 and 2008. The next UKMED release will
include doctors from the 2007 cohort through 2014 and therefore a repetition of the
analysis with a larger sample can improve the precision of the analysis and confirm
the relations found in this paper.
Care should be taken not to conclude that the entire unexplained effect represents
discrimination since it may be also driven by unobserved characteristics affecting in-
terview scores. Nonetheless, our results suggest the necessity of a careful examination
of the selection process to identify the elements driving the unexplained part of the
differences in the interview score. This becomes especially important in a setting
where doctors receive postgraduate specialty training funded by taxation and are
subsequently employed by the National Health System, also funded by taxpayers. For
that reason, it is important to ensure that taxpayer’s contributions do not help the
perpetuation of the observed unbalances.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have developed a conceptual framework and an empirical analysis
of the sequential two-sided specialty allocation process in the UK. The focus has been
on how doctors’ socio-demographic characteristics affect their application decisions
and the selectors’ valuations of the candidates. The conceptual framework sets out the
relevant elements of the process acknowledging that application decisions not only
depend on the net benefit associated with each specialty but also on the perceived
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probability of getting access to each of them. The perceived probability determines
the number of applications a doctor makes, and the latter affects the interview score,
which is the key element from the selection stage.
The results from the empirical analysis show clear and significant effects that, after
controlling for previous academic attainment, medical school effects and other relevant
elements, doctors’ demographic and socioeconomic backgrounds have a significant
impact in determining their preferences in the application stage, the number of applic-
ations they submit and are also relevant in determining selectors’ judgements.
These results contain information that policy makers can use to ensure that policies
aim at addressing differential attainment in the specialty allocation process are cor-
rectly targeted. For instance, if the objective is to attract female doctors to surgical or
highly remunerated specializations the policy actions need to be concentrated before
(or during) the application stage. Examples of remedial actions can be the implement-
ation of mentoring schemes or the introduction of visible female role models from
the underrepresented specializations during medical studies and foundation training.
Chapter 4 expands upon the effect of role models in determining specialty choices
using data from Spanish doctors. In a survey of factors influencing careers choices,
Lambert et al. (2016) found that domestic circumstances and work hours increased in
importance from year one in medical school to year five more than any other factor.
For that reason, making available information and case studies on how to reconcile
work and domestic circumstances can be also an important remedial action to attract
females to those fields.
Alternatively, if the objective is to improve BME doctors’ attainment in the specialty
allocation process, a policy action could be to provide more guidance on how to tackle
the application stage. If making more applications in reality does imply producing
lower quality applications, BME doctors should be encouraged to apply wisely and
focus their efforts on one option. Moreover, the selection stage needs to be examined
carefully to identify the elements that are driving the unexplained differences in in-
terview scores. Those could be unobservable elements affecting interview outcomes
(and correlated with the doctor’s ethnicity) or information asymmetries leading to
statistical discrimination problems.
Finally regarding socioeconomic background, we find that doctors from privileged
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backgrounds are more likely to apply to highly remunerated specialties and less likely
to primary care specialties, that recurrently suffer from recruitment problems. There-
fore, interventions designed to attract more doctors to primary care specialties should
aim to make the medical workforce less elitist by ensuring a diversified intake of
medical students.
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Table 3.3: Variables included in each Specification of the application stage analysis
Specification (1) Woman, BME, Age Process,Time Elapsed, Parent Doctor, POLAR3, School, Graduate,
Top 5 Uni, Year Start and Year Process
Specification (2) (1) + Medical School and Foundation School
Specification (3) (2) + UKCAT Score
Specification (1*) Specification (2)
Specification (2*) (1*) + RunThro
Specification (3*) (1*) + BottomInc
Specification (4*) (1*) + PrimaryC
Specification (5*) (1*) + Surgical
Specification (6*) (1*) + TopInc
Specifications marked with an asterisk only apply to the dependent variable AppliMore
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Table 3.5: Probit estimation results variable RunThro
Sample 1: All Doctors Sample 2: Single Application Only
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME
Woman 0.393*** 0.148*** 0.397*** 0.148*** 0.397*** 0.148*** 0.439*** 0.169*** 0.445*** 0.168*** 0.450*** 0.169***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036) (0.039)
Age Process 0.029*** 0.011*** 0.028*** 0.010*** 0.033*** 0.012*** 0.032*** 0.012*** 0.031*** 0.012*** 0.039*** 0.015***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Time Elapsed -0.015 -0.006 -0.044 -0.016 -0.025 -0.009 0.032 0.012 -0.020 -0.007 0.012 0.005
(0.054) (0.056) (0.064) (0.062) (0.066) (0.076)
BME 0.247*** 0.093*** 0.226*** 0.084*** 0.218*** 0.081*** 0.166*** 0.064*** 0.149*** 0.056*** 0.161*** 0.060***
(0.034) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040) (0.043) (0.047)
Parent Doctor -0.108** -0.041** -0.103** -0.038** -0.087* -0.033* -0.113** -0.043** -0.108* -0.041* -0.102* -0.038*
(0.048) (0.048) (0.051) (0.055) (0.056) (0.059)
POLAR3: Low participation -0.070 -0.026 -0.069 -0.026 -0.080 -0.030 -0.055 -0.021 -0.060 -0.023 -0.049 -0.018
(0.074) (0.075) (0.083) (0.087) (0.089) (0.097)
POLAR3: Non-UK -0.167** -0.064** -0.159** -0.060** -0.122 -0.046 -0.412*** -0.156*** -0.410*** -0.153*** -0.393*** -0.146***
(0.070) (0.071) (0.083) (0.091) (0.093) (0.108)
School: Independent -0.045 -0.017 -0.015 -0.006 -0.021 -0.008 -0.054 -0.021 -0.029 -0.011 -0.039 -0.015
(0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.044) (0.045) (0.048)
School:Unknown -0.033 -0.012 -0.018 -0.007 -0.039 -0.014 -0.055 -0.021 -0.046 -0.017 -0.055 -0.021
(0.059) (0.060) (0.070) (0.072) (0.073) (0.086)
Graduate -0.025 -0.010 0.010 0.004 -0.034 -0.013 -0.072 -0.027 -0.009 -0.004 -0.081 -0.030
(0.051) (0.055) (0.063) (0.060) (0.065) (0.077)
Year Process: 2012 -0.067 -0.026 -0.169 -0.064 -1.308** -0.430** -0.160 -0.061 -0.314 -0.117 -1.132 -0.351
(0.186) (0.188) (0.665) (0.255) (0.255) (0.748)
Year Process: 2013 0.223*** 0.083*** 0.165** 0.061** 0.116 0.043 0.248*** 0.095*** 0.171* 0.065* 0.115 0.043
(0.072) (0.078) (0.108) (0.086) (0.093) (0.125)
Year Process: 2014 0.104*** 0.040*** 0.067* 0.025* 0.093** 0.035** 0.139*** 0.054*** 0.084* 0.032* 0.109** 0.041**
(0.037) (0.040) (0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.052)
Year Medical School: 2008 0.034 0.013 -0.008 -0.003 0.029 0.011 0.053 0.020 0.001 0.000 0.034 0.013
(0.036) (0.039) (0.044) (0.043) (0.046) (0.052)
Top5 Uni -0.126*** -0.047*** -0.130** -0.050**
(0.045) (0.054)
UKCAT Score -0.034*** -0.013*** -0.035*** -0.013***
(0.008) (0.010)
Aberdeen 0.179 0.067 0.038 0.014 0.160 0.061 0.009 0.004
(0.138) (0.146) (0.158) (0.168)
Barts 0.175* 0.066* 0.193* 0.072* 0.207* 0.079* 0.234* 0.088*
(0.102) (0.109) (0.123) (0.132)
Birmingham 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Brighton and Sussex 0.040 0.015 0.034 0.013 0.045 0.017 0.024 0.009
(0.132) (0.139) (0.154) (0.163)
Bristol 0.049 0.019 0.054 0.021 0.092 0.035 0.076 0.029
(0.119) (0.133) (0.138) (0.155)
Cambridge -0.019 -0.007 0.077 0.029 0.028 0.011 0.148 0.056
(0.139) (0.154) (0.168) (0.185)
Cardiff 0.101 0.038 0.089 0.033 0.144 0.055 0.132 0.050
(0.107) (0.126) (0.128) (0.150)
Dundee 0.070 0.026 -0.045 -0.017 0.066 0.025 -0.080 -0.030
(0.147) (0.154) (0.178) (0.186)
Edinburgh -0.134 -0.051 -0.127 -0.049 -0.160 -0.060 -0.155 -0.058
(0.131) (0.140) (0.158) (0.168)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5 – continued from previous page
Sample 1: All Doctors Sample 2: Single Application Only
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME
Glasgow -0.017 -0.006 -0.064 -0.025 -0.101 -0.038 -0.174 -0.065
(0.130) (0.141) (0.158) (0.171)
Hull York 0.317** 0.117** 0.323** 0.118** 0.305* 0.116* 0.308* 0.116*
(0.133) (0.140) (0.162) (0.171)
Imperial 0.012 0.004 0.058 0.022 -0.075 -0.028 0.000 0.000
(0.112) (0.121) (0.138) (0.149)
Keele -0.037 -0.014 -0.064 -0.025 0.049 0.019 0.011 0.004
(0.122) (0.128) (0.146) (0.153)
King’s -0.010 -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.045 -0.017 -0.011 -0.004
(0.108) (0.118) (0.129) (0.141)
Lancaster 0.008 0.003 -0.037 -0.014 0.014 0.005 -0.063 -0.024
(0.189) (0.210) (0.214) (0.240)
Leeds 0.107 0.040 0.105 0.040 0.143 0.054 0.166 0.063
(0.127) (0.138) (0.152) (0.166)
Leicester 0.274** 0.102** 0.246** 0.091** 0.235* 0.089* 0.203 0.076
(0.109) (0.116) (0.130) (0.138)
Liverpool 0.202* 0.075* 0.137 0.051 0.164 0.062 0.106 0.040
(0.112) (0.122) (0.133) (0.145)
Manchester 0.220** 0.082** 0.248** 0.092** 0.298** 0.113** 0.325** 0.122**
(0.106) (0.114) (0.127) (0.137)
Newcastle 0.254** 0.094** 0.293** 0.108** 0.239* 0.091* 0.271* 0.102*
(0.117) (0.124) (0.140) (0.149)
Norwich 0.037 0.014 0.013 0.005 0.090 0.034 0.072 0.027
(0.118) (0.125) (0.143) (0.153)
Nottingham 0.092 0.035 0.094 0.035 0.192 0.073 0.190 0.072
(0.102) (0.113) (0.118) (0.130)
Oxford -0.038 -0.015 0.129 0.049 -0.300 -0.110 -0.122 -0.046
(0.140) (0.150) (0.182) (0.193)
Peninsula 0.234* 0.087* 0.268** 0.099** 0.328** 0.124** 0.329** 0.123**
(0.122) (0.134) (0.143) (0.156)
Queen’s 0.140 0.053 0.029 0.011 0.206 0.078 0.168 0.063
(0.165) (0.182) (0.207) (0.225)
Sheffield 0.204 0.076 0.182 0.068 0.254 0.096 0.283* 0.107*
(0.133) (0.143) (0.156) (0.168)
Southampton 0.120 0.045 0.068 0.026 0.124 0.047 0.066 0.025
(0.109) (0.119) (0.131) (0.142)
St George’s 0.103 0.039 0.042 0.016 0.149 0.057 0.074 0.028
(0.106) (0.120) (0.124) (0.142)
UCL -0.054 -0.021 -0.014 -0.005 -0.069 -0.026 -0.052 -0.019
(0.117) (0.129) (0.140) (0.154)
Warwick 0.151 0.057 0.082 0.031 0.121 0.046 0.057 0.021
(0.119) (0.136) (0.143) (0.163)
N 7,553 7,553 6,441 5,335 5,335 4,576
Foundation School NO YES YES NO YES YES
R2 0.028 0.038 0.042 0.034 0.049 0.053
Log-likelihood -4972.881 -4921.312 -4186.153 -3570.768 -3516.249 -3003.024
Pr(y = 1) 0.588 0.588 0.586 0.501 0.501 0.502
a Base outcomes: Gender: Men, Ethnicity: White, School: State, POLAR3:Other neighbourhood, Year Medical School: 2007, Year Process: 2015, Medical School: Birmingham, Foundation School: Birmingham
b SE: Standard Errors; AME: Average Marginal Effect
c P-values: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.6: Probit estimation results variable TopInc
Sample 1: All Doctors Sample 2: Single Application Only
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME
Woman -0.525*** -0.094*** -0.538*** -0.094*** -0.545*** -0.094*** -0.543*** -0.112*** -0.560*** -0.112*** -0.584*** -0.115***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046) (0.050)
Age Process -0.017** -0.003** -0.019** -0.003** -0.023** -0.004** -0.016* -0.003* -0.015* -0.003* -0.024** -0.005**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Time Elapsed -0.222*** -0.040*** -0.200** -0.035** -0.222** -0.038** -0.168* -0.035* -0.144 -0.029 -0.133 -0.026
(0.082) (0.085) (0.096) (0.087) (0.091) (0.104)
BME 0.108** 0.019** 0.145*** 0.025*** 0.161*** 0.028*** 0.145*** 0.030*** 0.180*** 0.036*** 0.201*** 0.040***
(0.044) (0.048) (0.052) (0.049) (0.054) (0.058)
Parent Doctor 0.156*** 0.028*** 0.145** 0.025** 0.135** 0.023** 0.153** 0.031** 0.151** 0.030** 0.135* 0.027*
(0.060) (0.061) (0.064) (0.066) (0.067) (0.072)
POLAR3: Low participation 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.006 0.008 0.001 -0.072 -0.014 -0.033 -0.007 -0.024 -0.005
(0.101) (0.102) (0.114) (0.117) (0.118) (0.130)
POLAR3: Non-UK 0.137 0.026 0.112 0.021 0.137 0.025 0.209* 0.047* 0.172 0.037 0.244* 0.054*
(0.090) (0.092) (0.103) (0.109) (0.112) (0.125)
School: Independent 0.113** 0.021** 0.076 0.014 0.091* 0.016* 0.142*** 0.030*** 0.110** 0.022** 0.133** 0.027**
(0.049) (0.050) (0.053) (0.054) (0.056) (0.059)
School:Unknown 0.097 0.017 0.089 0.016 0.071 0.012 0.107 0.022 0.110 0.023 0.100 0.020
(0.076) (0.077) (0.091) (0.091) (0.092) (0.107)
Graduate 0.126* 0.023* 0.128* 0.023* 0.172** 0.031** 0.099 0.021 0.101 0.021 0.143 0.029
(0.069) (0.074) (0.085) (0.077) (0.083) (0.098)
Year Process: 2012 0.024 0.005 0.047 0.009 0.728 0.182 0.132 0.030 0.130 0.028 1.194* 0.361*
(0.231) (0.236) (0.769) (0.283) (0.292) (0.713)
Year Process: 2013 -0.096 -0.017 -0.054 -0.009 0.101 0.019 -0.072 -0.014 -0.048 -0.009 0.157 0.033
(0.096) (0.104) (0.139) (0.109) (0.119) (0.156)
Year Process: 2014 -0.062 -0.011 -0.019 -0.003 -0.046 -0.008 -0.029 -0.006 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.049) (0.053) (0.059) (0.056) (0.061) (0.067)
Year Medical School: 2008 -0.114** -0.020** -0.073 -0.013 -0.047 -0.008 -0.066 -0.013 -0.024 -0.005 0.029 0.006
(0.049) (0.052) (0.059) (0.055) (0.059) (0.066)
Top5 Uni -0.001 -0.000 -0.045 -0.009
(0.060) (0.069)
UKCAT Score -0.006 -0.001 -0.009 -0.002
(0.011) (0.012)
Aberdeen 0.070 0.015 0.163 0.035 -0.026 -0.006 0.085 0.021
(0.185) (0.194) (0.202) (0.211)
Barts -0.306** -0.053** -0.305** -0.051** -0.433*** -0.088*** -0.445*** -0.086***
(0.141) (0.150) (0.160) (0.170)
Brighton and Sussex -0.229 -0.042 -0.149 -0.027 -0.370* -0.078* -0.263 -0.056
(0.188) (0.195) (0.211) (0.221)
Bristol -0.106 -0.021 -0.158 -0.029 -0.160 -0.037 -0.195 -0.043
(0.157) (0.180) (0.171) (0.196)
Cambridge 0.053 0.011 0.133 0.028 -0.325 -0.070 -0.278 -0.058
(0.173) (0.191) (0.206) (0.228)
Cardiff -0.130 -0.025 -0.268 -0.046 -0.153 -0.036 -0.288 -0.060
(0.142) (0.168) (0.157) (0.185)
Dundee -0.138 -0.026 -0.059 -0.011 -0.247 -0.055 -0.124 -0.028
(0.210) (0.222) (0.244) (0.254)
Edinburgh -0.008 -0.002 0.068 0.014 -0.046 -0.011 0.022 0.005
(0.162) (0.174) (0.184) (0.196)
Glasgow -0.067 -0.013 0.063 0.013 -0.081 -0.019 0.043 0.010
(0.174) (0.186) (0.199) (0.212)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.6 – continued from previous page
Sample 1: All Doctors Sample 2: Single Application Only
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME
Hull York -0.495** -0.077** -0.405** -0.064** -0.741*** -0.128*** -0.648*** -0.112***
(0.192) (0.199) (0.222) (0.229)
Imperial -0.104 -0.020 -0.070 -0.013 -0.091 -0.022 -0.074 -0.017
(0.145) (0.157) (0.164) (0.178)
Keele -0.012 -0.002 -0.016 -0.003 -0.099 -0.024 -0.070 -0.016
(0.162) (0.172) (0.180) (0.190)
King’s -0.098 -0.019 -0.095 -0.018 -0.214 -0.048 -0.188 -0.041
(0.140) (0.154) (0.160) (0.174)
Lancaster -0.169 -0.032 -0.343 -0.056 -0.220 -0.050 -0.378 -0.075
(0.264) (0.304) (0.278) (0.321)
Leeds 0.007 0.001 0.035 0.007 -0.074 -0.018 -0.074 -0.017
(0.168) (0.186) (0.196) (0.218)
Leicester -0.258* -0.046* -0.308* -0.051* -0.294* -0.064* -0.357* -0.072*
(0.156) (0.168) (0.177) (0.190)
Liverpool -0.284* -0.050* -0.179 -0.032 -0.320* -0.069* -0.243 -0.052
(0.155) (0.168) (0.172) (0.185)
Manchester 0.034 0.007 0.074 0.015 0.054 0.014 0.101 0.025
(0.139) (0.149) (0.155) (0.166)
Newcastle -0.205 -0.038 -0.181 -0.032 -0.266 -0.059 -0.225 -0.048
(0.159) (0.169) (0.179) (0.192)
Norwich -0.438** -0.071** -0.517*** -0.076*** -0.717*** -0.126*** -0.743*** -0.122***
(0.181) (0.198) (0.230) (0.241)
Nottingham 0.041 0.009 0.084 0.017 -0.076 -0.018 -0.052 -0.012
(0.136) (0.150) (0.150) (0.165)
Oxford -0.456** -0.073** -0.465** -0.070** -0.542** -0.104** -0.509** -0.095**
(0.196) (0.212) (0.234) (0.250)
Peninsula -0.290* -0.051* -0.239 -0.041 -0.375** -0.078** -0.326* -0.067*
(0.160) (0.172) (0.178) (0.191)
Queen’s -0.097 -0.019 0.072 0.015 -0.177 -0.041 -0.031 -0.007
(0.252) (0.285) (0.289) (0.327)
Sheffield -0.368* -0.062* -0.344 -0.056 -0.442** -0.089** -0.423* -0.083*
(0.192) (0.213) (0.210) (0.234)
Southampton -0.055 -0.011 -0.068 -0.013 -0.165 -0.038 -0.179 -0.039
(0.146) (0.160) (0.166) (0.182)
St George’s -0.238 -0.043 -0.150 -0.027 -0.323** -0.069** -0.213 -0.046
(0.146) (0.165) (0.160) (0.181)
UCL -0.117 -0.023 -0.107 -0.020 -0.249 -0.055 -0.177 -0.039
(0.150) (0.164) (0.170) (0.183)
Warwick -0.415** -0.068** -0.419** -0.065** -0.533*** -0.103*** -0.568** -0.103**
(0.168) (0.194) (0.197) (0.226)
Constant -0.123 -0.285 0.021 -0.167 -0.382 0.032
(0.277) (0.318) (0.450) (0.307) (0.352) (0.504)
N 7,553 7,553 6,441 5,335 5,335 4,576
Foundation School NO YES YES NO YES YES
R2 0.047 0.064 0.068 0.051 0.071 0.078
Log-likelihood -2476.845 -2431.321 -2046.046 -1995.104 -1951.593 -1648.056
Pr(y = 1) 0.109 0.109 0.107 0.136 0.135 0.133
a Base outcomes: Gender: Man, Ethnicity:White, School: State, POLAR3:Other neighbourhood, Year Medical School: 2007, Year Process: 2015, Medical School: Birmingham, Foundation School: Birmingham
b SE: Standard Errors; AME: Average Marginal Effect
c P-values: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.7: Probit estimation results variable BottomInc
Sample 1: All Doctors Sample 2: Single Application Only
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME
Woman 0.234*** 0.052*** 0.241*** 0.053*** 0.245*** 0.053*** 0.238*** 0.042*** 0.236*** 0.041*** 0.252*** 0.042***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.041) (0.050) (0.050) (0.054)
Age Process 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.013 -0.002 -0.014 -0.002 -0.012 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Time Elapsed 0.122* 0.027* 0.129* 0.028* 0.143* 0.031* 0.153** 0.027** 0.139* 0.024* 0.143 0.024
(0.063) (0.066) (0.076) (0.078) (0.083) (0.095)
BME -0.094** -0.021** -0.140*** -0.031*** -0.140*** -0.030*** -0.217*** -0.038*** -0.271*** -0.047*** -0.257*** -0.043***
(0.041) (0.044) (0.049) (0.056) (0.060) (0.065)
Parent Doctor -0.087 -0.019 -0.086 -0.019 -0.087 -0.019 -0.092 -0.016 -0.088 -0.015 -0.114 -0.019
(0.061) (0.061) (0.065) (0.078) (0.079) (0.084)
POLAR3: Low participation -0.055 -0.012 -0.045 -0.010 -0.027 -0.006 0.027 0.005 0.046 0.008 0.097 0.017
(0.093) (0.094) (0.104) (0.118) (0.119) (0.130)
POLAR3: Non-UK 0.035 0.008 0.053 0.012 0.030 0.006 -0.033 -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 0.017 0.003
(0.081) (0.081) (0.096) (0.121) (0.124) (0.146)
School: Independent 0.029 0.006 0.023 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.029 0.005 0.018 0.003 -0.008 -0.001
(0.047) (0.048) (0.051) (0.060) (0.061) (0.065)
School:Unknown 0.115* 0.026* 0.122* 0.028* 0.140* 0.032* 0.084 0.015 0.076 0.014 0.081 0.014
(0.067) (0.068) (0.082) (0.094) (0.096) (0.117)
Graduate 0.061 0.014 0.031 0.007 0.010 0.002 0.069 0.012 0.083 0.015 -0.001 -0.000
(0.060) (0.063) (0.074) (0.080) (0.086) (0.101)
Year Process: 2012 0.030 0.007 0.060 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.219) (0.222) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Year Process: 2013 0.041 0.010 0.028 0.006 -0.203 -0.041 -0.024 -0.004 -0.072 -0.013 -0.168 -0.027
(0.083) (0.090) (0.129) (0.110) (0.120) (0.169)
Year Process: 2014 -0.065 -0.014 -0.062 -0.014 -0.078 -0.017 -0.141** -0.024** -0.142** -0.024** -0.173** -0.028**
(0.046) (0.049) (0.054) (0.061) (0.065) (0.074)
Year Medical School: 2008 0.006 0.001 0.008 0.002 -0.027 -0.006 -0.049 -0.009 -0.055 -0.010 -0.073 -0.012
(0.044) (0.047) (0.054) (0.058) (0.062) (0.071)
Top5 Uni 0.077 0.017 0.090 0.016
(0.054) (0.070)
UKCAT Score 0.030*** 0.006*** 0.033*** 0.006***
(0.010) (0.013)
Aberdeen -0.226 -0.047 -0.256 -0.053 -0.428* -0.061* -0.387 -0.056
(0.167) (0.182) (0.230) (0.247)
Barts -0.075 -0.017 -0.028 -0.007 -0.131 -0.023 -0.079 -0.014
(0.126) (0.134) (0.166) (0.180)
Brighton and Sussex -0.026 -0.006 -0.013 -0.003 -0.093 -0.016 -0.034 -0.006
(0.160) (0.168) (0.210) (0.222)
Bristol -0.060 -0.014 -0.119 -0.026 0.062 0.012 -0.012 -0.002
(0.141) (0.161) (0.171) (0.201)
Cambridge 0.202 0.052 0.046 0.011 0.170 0.035 0.037 0.007
(0.161) (0.184) (0.205) (0.236)
Cardiff -0.076 -0.017 -0.132 -0.029 -0.086 -0.015 -0.181 -0.030
(0.131) (0.158) (0.163) (0.200)
Dundee -0.202 -0.043 -0.249 -0.052 -0.143 -0.025 -0.168 -0.028
(0.176) (0.188) (0.230) (0.244)
Edinburgh -0.191 -0.041 -0.326* -0.065* -0.199 -0.033 -0.288 -0.044
(0.162) (0.175) (0.209) (0.224)
Glasgow -0.038 -0.009 -0.104 -0.023 -0.315 -0.048 -0.368 -0.054
(0.157) (0.168) (0.213) (0.229)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.7 – continued from previous page
Sample 1: All Doctors Sample 2: Single Application Only
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME
Hull York 0.025 0.006 0.024 0.006 -0.345 -0.052 -0.374 -0.054
(0.156) (0.165) (0.244) (0.267)
Imperial -0.132 -0.029 -0.213 -0.045 -0.153 -0.026 -0.222 -0.036
(0.144) (0.158) (0.191) (0.211)
Keele -0.019 -0.004 0.017 0.004 0.016 0.003 0.059 0.011
(0.146) (0.153) (0.182) (0.193)
King’s 0.118 0.029 0.035 0.008 0.033 0.006 0.018 0.003
(0.128) (0.143) (0.169) (0.189)
Lancaster -0.135 -0.030 -0.072 -0.016 -0.092 -0.016 -0.022 -0.004
(0.236) (0.262) (0.274) (0.312)
Leeds -0.191 -0.041 -0.135 -0.030 -0.016 -0.003 0.104 0.020
(0.161) (0.176) (0.204) (0.224)
Leicester -0.021 -0.005 0.049 0.012 -0.004 -0.001 0.093 0.018
(0.129) (0.137) (0.172) (0.184)
Liverpool -0.059 -0.014 -0.101 -0.023 -0.108 -0.019 -0.073 -0.013
(0.135) (0.148) (0.175) (0.191)
Manchester -0.193 -0.041 -0.217 -0.046 -0.145 -0.025 -0.146 -0.024
(0.131) (0.143) (0.161) (0.178)
Newcastle -0.152 -0.033 -0.192 -0.041 -0.061 -0.011 -0.157 -0.026
(0.140) (0.153) (0.168) (0.185)
Norwich -0.185 -0.039 -0.199 -0.042 -0.246 -0.040 -0.222 -0.035
(0.146) (0.156) (0.198) (0.213)
Nottingham 0.020 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.046 0.009 0.063 0.012
(0.118) (0.130) (0.142) (0.158)
Oxford 0.094 0.023 0.115 0.029 0.042 0.008 0.056 0.011
(0.164) (0.172) (0.221) (0.232)
Peninsula -0.399** -0.076** -0.422** -0.079** -0.414** -0.060** -0.453* -0.063*
(0.165) (0.189) (0.204) (0.239)
Queen’s -0.218 -0.046 -0.389 -0.075 0.278 0.061 0.135 0.027
(0.213) (0.240) (0.272) (0.303)
Sheffield -0.055 -0.013 -0.040 -0.009 -0.023 -0.004 -0.005 -0.001
(0.167) (0.177) (0.214) (0.231)
Southampton -0.036 -0.008 -0.068 -0.015 -0.039 -0.007 -0.069 -0.012
(0.133) (0.148) (0.173) (0.193)
St George’s 0.130 0.032 0.052 0.013 0.135 0.027 -0.009 -0.002
(0.123) (0.143) (0.154) (0.188)
UCL 0.126 0.031 0.135 0.034 0.229 0.049 0.246 0.052
(0.139) (0.152) (0.171) (0.190)
Warwick 0.022 0.005 0.119 0.030 -0.120 -0.021 0.123 0.024
(0.144) (0.162) (0.198) (0.217)
Constant -1.464*** -1.171*** -2.033*** -1.301*** -1.042*** -1.966***
(0.230) (0.255) (0.388) (0.320) (0.344) (0.517)
N 7,553 7,553 6,437 5,305 5,305 4,573
Foundation School NO YES YES NO YES YES
R2 0.012 0.021 0.023 0.018 0.032 0.038
Log-likelihood -3059.525 -3031.330 -2518.563 -1711.943 -1687.212 -1409.927
Pr(y = 1) 0.143 0.143 0.138 0.101 0.100 0.096
a Base outcomes: Gender: Men, Ethnicity:White, School: State, POLAR3:Other neighbourhood, Year Medical School: 2007, Year Process: 2015, Medical School: Birmingham, Foundation School: Birmingham
b SE: Standard Errors; AME: Average Marginal Effect
c P-values: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.8: Probit estimation results variable Surgical
Sample 1: All Doctors Sample 2: Single Application Only
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME
Woman -0.259*** -0.071*** -0.259*** -0.070*** -0.267*** -0.072*** -0.280*** -0.069*** -0.292*** -0.071*** -0.306*** -0.074***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.041) (0.042) (0.046)
Age Process -0.009 -0.002 -0.010 -0.003 -0.016** -0.004** -0.017** -0.004** -0.018** -0.004** -0.029*** -0.007***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Time Elapsed -0.246*** -0.068*** -0.219*** -0.059*** -0.192** -0.052** -0.172** -0.043** -0.141* -0.034* -0.149 -0.036
(0.067) (0.069) (0.078) (0.080) (0.085) (0.096)
BME 0.216*** 0.059*** 0.233*** 0.063*** 0.217*** 0.059*** 0.097** 0.024** 0.131*** 0.032*** 0.140*** 0.034***
(0.037) (0.040) (0.043) (0.046) (0.050) (0.054)
Parent Doctor 0.126** 0.035** 0.119** 0.032** 0.098* 0.026* 0.145** 0.036** 0.136** 0.033** 0.116* 0.028*
(0.053) (0.053) (0.056) (0.063) (0.063) (0.067)
POLAR3: Low participation 0.028 0.008 0.052 0.014 0.064 0.017 0.017 0.004 0.057 0.014 0.087 0.021
(0.085) (0.086) (0.095) (0.105) (0.106) (0.115)
POLAR3: Non-UK 0.275*** 0.082*** 0.257*** 0.075*** 0.338*** 0.101*** 0.228** 0.062** 0.197* 0.052* 0.271** 0.072**
(0.076) (0.077) (0.089) (0.101) (0.103) (0.117)
School: Independent 0.055 0.015 0.035 0.009 0.052 0.014 0.145*** 0.037*** 0.116** 0.029** 0.143*** 0.035***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.045) (0.051) (0.052) (0.055)
School:Unknown 0.077 0.021 0.077 0.021 0.043 0.012 0.137 0.035 0.133 0.033 0.111 0.027
(0.065) (0.066) (0.079) (0.084) (0.085) (0.100)
Graduate 0.093* 0.026* 0.093 0.026 0.128* 0.035* 0.056 0.014 0.060 0.015 0.149 0.037
(0.056) (0.060) (0.070) (0.072) (0.078) (0.092)
Year Process: 2012 0.039 0.011 0.059 0.017 0.948 0.332 0.245 0.069 0.244 0.067 0.830 0.269
(0.195) (0.203) (0.610) (0.254) (0.267) (0.716)
Year Process: 2013 -0.071 -0.020 -0.032 -0.009 0.048 0.014 -0.049 -0.012 -0.020 -0.005 0.047 0.012
(0.079) (0.086) (0.117) (0.102) (0.111) (0.147)
Year Process: 2014 -0.109*** -0.030*** -0.079* -0.021* -0.098** -0.026** -0.064 -0.016 -0.037 -0.009 -0.071 -0.017
(0.041) (0.044) (0.049) (0.052) (0.056) (0.062)
Year Medical School: 2008 -0.118*** -0.033*** -0.083* -0.022* -0.071 -0.019 -0.060 -0.015 -0.019 -0.005 0.006 0.001
(0.041) (0.043) (0.049) (0.051) (0.055) (0.062)
Top5 Uni -0.033 -0.009 -0.016 -0.004
(0.051) (0.063)
UKCAT Score -0.016* -0.004* -0.014 -0.003
(0.009) (0.011)
Aberdeen 0.114 0.032 0.097 0.027 0.072 0.020 0.091 0.025
(0.157) (0.168) (0.185) (0.196)
Barts -0.027 -0.007 -0.068 -0.017 -0.293** -0.069** -0.345** -0.079**
(0.115) (0.122) (0.147) (0.156)
Brighton and Sussex -0.064 -0.017 -0.080 -0.020 -0.294 -0.069 -0.270 -0.064
(0.157) (0.165) (0.194) (0.206)
Bristol 0.112 0.031 0.077 0.021 0.094 0.026 0.067 0.019
(0.133) (0.148) (0.154) (0.173)
Cambridge 0.011 0.003 0.072 0.020 -0.226 -0.055 -0.182 -0.045
(0.154) (0.169) (0.192) (0.210)
Cardiff 0.087 0.024 -0.127 -0.032 -0.016 -0.004 -0.244 -0.059
(0.121) (0.141) (0.149) (0.175)
Dundee 0.174 0.049 0.166 0.047 -0.122 -0.031 -0.087 -0.022
(0.171) (0.180) (0.223) (0.231)
Edinburgh 0.177 0.050 0.181 0.052 0.139 0.039 0.116 0.033
(0.147) (0.156) (0.178) (0.188)
Glasgow 0.149 0.042 0.147 0.041 0.049 0.013 0.074 0.021
(0.147) (0.158) (0.187) (0.199)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.8 – continued from previous page
Sample 1: All Doctors Sample 2: Single Application Only
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME
Hull York -0.336** -0.077** -0.298* -0.069* -0.517** -0.109** -0.453** -0.098**
(0.154) (0.160) (0.203) (0.210)
Imperial 0.243** 0.071** 0.263** 0.077** 0.018 0.005 0.019 0.005
(0.122) (0.132) (0.153) (0.165)
Keele 0.191 0.055 0.166 0.047 0.080 0.022 0.079 0.022
(0.137) (0.144) (0.166) (0.175)
King’s 0.105 0.029 0.078 0.021 -0.146 -0.037 -0.159 -0.040
(0.120) (0.131) (0.150) (0.163)
Lancaster -0.140 -0.035 -0.205 -0.050 -0.293 -0.069 -0.484 -0.104
(0.229) (0.256) (0.270) (0.318)
Leeds -0.009 -0.002 0.004 0.001 -0.062 -0.016 -0.095 -0.024
(0.145) (0.157) (0.181) (0.199)
Leicester -0.045 -0.012 -0.078 -0.020 -0.177 -0.044 -0.250 -0.060
(0.124) (0.132) (0.159) (0.171)
Liverpool -0.078 -0.020 -0.017 -0.004 -0.178 -0.044 -0.125 -0.032
(0.130) (0.139) (0.163) (0.174)
Manchester 0.138 0.039 0.140 0.039 0.110 0.031 0.136 0.038
(0.118) (0.125) (0.143) (0.153)
Newcastle -0.019 -0.005 -0.033 -0.009 -0.137 -0.035 -0.125 -0.032
(0.137) (0.146) (0.168) (0.180)
Norwich 0.033 0.009 0.005 0.001 -0.252 -0.061 -0.261 -0.062
(0.135) (0.142) (0.177) (0.186)
Nottingham 0.179 0.051 0.218* 0.063* 0.020 0.006 0.029 0.008
(0.114) (0.125) (0.138) (0.149)
Oxford -0.169 -0.042 -0.117 -0.029 -0.324 -0.075 -0.265 -0.063
(0.159) (0.168) (0.207) (0.219)
Peninsula 0.003 0.001 0.026 0.007 -0.191 -0.047 -0.145 -0.036
(0.138) (0.148) (0.165) (0.176)
Queen’s -0.066 -0.017 -0.058 -0.015 -0.190 -0.047 -0.128 -0.032
(0.197) (0.221) (0.257) (0.287)
Sheffield -0.157 -0.039 -0.178 -0.044 -0.394** -0.088** -0.419* -0.092*
(0.151) (0.165) (0.193) (0.214)
Southampton 0.171 0.048 0.184 0.052 -0.060 -0.016 -0.082 -0.021
(0.123) (0.132) (0.156) (0.169)
St George’s -0.081 -0.021 -0.052 -0.014 -0.185 -0.046 -0.168 -0.042
(0.122) (0.138) (0.148) (0.168)
UCL 0.056 0.015 0.099 0.027 -0.143 -0.036 -0.095 -0.024
(0.129) (0.139) (0.158) (0.170)
Warwick -0.182 -0.045 -0.138 -0.034 -0.455** -0.099** -0.530** -0.111**
(0.137) (0.156) (0.179) (0.206)
Constant -0.014 -0.320 0.217 -0.060 -0.408 0.238
(0.227) (0.255) (0.377) (0.287) (0.329) (0.472)
N 7,553 7,553 6,441 5,335 5,335 4,576
Foundation School NO YES YES NO YES YES
R2 0.027 0.038 0.040 0.023 0.040 0.044
Log-likelihood -3709.750 -3667.713 -3110.213 -2381.299 -2340.442 -1986.752
Pr(y = 1) 0.203 0.203 0.202 0.173 0.172 0.171
a Base outcomes: Gender: Man, Ethnicity:White, School: State, POLAR3:Other neighbourhood, Year Medical School: 2007, Year Process: 2015, Medical School: Birmingham, Foundation School: Birmingham
b SE: Standard Errors; AME: Average Marginal Effect
c P-values: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.9: Probit estimation results variable PrimaryC
Sample 1: All Doctors Sample 2: Single Application Only
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME
Woman 0.468*** 0.179*** 0.473*** 0.178*** 0.471*** 0.176*** 0.494*** 0.187*** 0.503*** 0.186*** 0.511*** 0.188***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.036) (0.037) (0.040)
Age Process 0.028*** 0.011*** 0.028*** 0.011*** 0.029*** 0.011*** 0.031*** 0.012*** 0.030*** 0.011*** 0.034*** 0.013***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Time Elapsed 0.071 0.027 0.024 0.009 0.068 0.025 0.102 0.039 0.030 0.011 0.069 0.025
(0.054) (0.056) (0.064) (0.063) (0.066) (0.076)
BME 0.167*** 0.064*** 0.145*** 0.055*** 0.143*** 0.054*** 0.127*** 0.048*** 0.109** 0.041** 0.109** 0.040**
(0.033) (0.036) (0.039) (0.040) (0.043) (0.047)
Parent Doctor -0.140*** -0.053*** -0.138*** -0.052*** -0.123** -0.046** -0.129** -0.049** -0.126** -0.047** -0.114* -0.042*
(0.048) (0.048) (0.051) (0.056) (0.057) (0.060)
POLAR3: Low participation -0.093 -0.035 -0.094 -0.035 -0.085 -0.032 -0.046 -0.017 -0.050 -0.019 -0.040 -0.015
(0.074) (0.075) (0.083) (0.087) (0.090) (0.098)
POLAR3: Non-UK -0.308*** -0.118*** -0.300*** -0.113*** -0.288*** -0.108*** -0.460*** -0.167*** -0.461*** -0.165*** -0.429*** -0.153***
(0.070) (0.071) (0.082) (0.093) (0.095) (0.109)
School: Independent -0.066* -0.025* -0.030 -0.011 -0.034 -0.013 -0.090** -0.034** -0.060 -0.022 -0.063 -0.023
(0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.044) (0.046) (0.048)
School:Unknown -0.019 -0.007 -0.001 -0.000 0.006 0.002 -0.052 -0.020 -0.040 -0.015 -0.030 -0.011
(0.059) (0.059) (0.070) (0.073) (0.074) (0.087)
Graduate -0.090* -0.034* -0.039 -0.015 -0.088 -0.033 -0.102* -0.038* -0.031 -0.012 -0.106 -0.039
(0.050) (0.054) (0.063) (0.061) (0.066) (0.077)
Year Process: 2012 0.046 0.018 -0.061 -0.023 -1.139* -0.360* -0.266 -0.096 -0.435 -0.152 -0.991 -0.297
(0.191) (0.193) (0.666) (0.282) (0.281) (0.747)
Year Process: 2013 0.324*** 0.123*** 0.249*** 0.093*** 0.272** 0.101** 0.340*** 0.129*** 0.249*** 0.093*** 0.226* 0.084*
(0.072) (0.077) (0.108) (0.086) (0.093) (0.126)
Year Process: 2014 0.182*** 0.070*** 0.125*** 0.047*** 0.175*** 0.066*** 0.191*** 0.072*** 0.119** 0.044** 0.161*** 0.060***
(0.037) (0.039) (0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.052)
Year Medical School: 2008 0.127*** 0.049*** 0.066* 0.025* 0.119*** 0.045*** 0.097** 0.037** 0.028 0.010 0.071 0.026
(0.036) (0.039) (0.044) (0.043) (0.047) (0.052)
Top5 Uni -0.179*** -0.068*** -0.157*** -0.060***
(0.045) (0.055)
UKCAT Score -0.041*** -0.015*** -0.042*** -0.016***
(0.008) (0.010)
Aberdeen 0.166 0.063 -0.020 -0.007 0.198 0.074 0.015 0.005
(0.136) (0.145) (0.158) (0.169)
Barts 0.245** 0.093** 0.252** 0.094** 0.345*** 0.129*** 0.367*** 0.136***
(0.102) (0.109) (0.124) (0.133)
Brighton and Sussex 0.114 0.043 0.095 0.036 0.062 0.023 0.017 0.006
(0.132) (0.139) (0.156) (0.165)
Bristol 0.113 0.043 0.120 0.045 0.158 0.059 0.152 0.056
(0.118) (0.132) (0.139) (0.155)
Cambridge -0.292** -0.109** -0.228 -0.085 -0.192 -0.069 -0.084 -0.031
(0.141) (0.158) (0.173) (0.192)
Cardiff 0.159 0.060 0.174 0.065 0.221* 0.082* 0.231 0.086
(0.107) (0.126) (0.129) (0.152)
Dundee 0.098 0.037 -0.026 -0.010 0.145 0.054 -0.035 -0.013
(0.148) (0.156) (0.180) (0.188)
Edinburgh -0.178 -0.067 -0.196 -0.073 -0.127 -0.046 -0.169 -0.061
(0.133) (0.142) (0.160) (0.171)
Glasgow -0.012 -0.005 -0.080 -0.030 -0.051 -0.019 -0.144 -0.052
(0.131) (0.142) (0.159) (0.172)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.9 – continued from previous page
Sample 1: All Doctors Sample 2: Single Application Only
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME
Hull York 0.375*** 0.140*** 0.361*** 0.134*** 0.348** 0.130** 0.326* 0.121*
(0.131) (0.139) (0.161) (0.171)
Imperial -0.025 -0.009 0.014 0.005 -0.130 -0.047 -0.063 -0.023
(0.113) (0.123) (0.142) (0.153)
Keele 0.009 0.003 -0.028 -0.010 0.090 0.033 0.035 0.013
(0.122) (0.128) (0.147) (0.154)
King’s 0.004 0.001 0.031 0.012 0.012 0.004 0.049 0.018
(0.108) (0.118) (0.131) (0.142)
Lancaster 0.081 0.031 0.010 0.004 0.077 0.028 -0.033 -0.012
(0.189) (0.210) (0.216) (0.243)
Leeds 0.117 0.045 0.117 0.044 0.172 0.064 0.198 0.073
(0.127) (0.137) (0.153) (0.166)
Leicester 0.285*** 0.107*** 0.238** 0.089** 0.276** 0.103** 0.231* 0.085*
(0.108) (0.115) (0.131) (0.139)
Liverpool 0.216* 0.082* 0.130 0.049 0.199 0.074 0.132 0.049
(0.111) (0.121) (0.135) (0.146)
Manchester 0.183* 0.069* 0.196* 0.074* 0.234* 0.087* 0.224* 0.083*
(0.105) (0.113) (0.126) (0.136)
Newcastle 0.272** 0.103** 0.330*** 0.122*** 0.257* 0.096* 0.303** 0.113**
(0.116) (0.124) (0.141) (0.150)
Norwich 0.038 0.015 0.021 0.008 0.119 0.044 0.109 0.040
(0.118) (0.125) (0.144) (0.153)
Nottingham 0.106 0.040 0.105 0.039 0.214* 0.080* 0.208 0.077
(0.102) (0.113) (0.119) (0.130)
Oxford -0.093 -0.035 0.079 0.030 -0.333* -0.116* -0.156 -0.056
(0.141) (0.150) (0.187) (0.198)
Peninsula 0.264** 0.100** 0.281** 0.105** 0.390*** 0.146*** 0.406*** 0.150***
(0.121) (0.133) (0.143) (0.156)
Queen’s 0.034 0.013 -0.098 -0.037 0.091 0.034 -0.004 -0.001
(0.165) (0.180) (0.205) (0.222)
Sheffield 0.378*** 0.141*** 0.351** 0.130** 0.362** 0.135** 0.385** 0.143**
(0.134) (0.144) (0.157) (0.169)
Southampton 0.122 0.046 0.054 0.020 0.122 0.045 0.050 0.018
(0.110) (0.119) (0.131) (0.142)
St George’s 0.127 0.048 0.022 0.008 0.185 0.069 0.086 0.032
(0.105) (0.120) (0.125) (0.143)
UCL -0.148 -0.056 -0.074 -0.028 -0.124 -0.045 -0.060 -0.022
(0.118) (0.130) (0.143) (0.157)
Warwick 0.086 0.033 0.057 0.022 0.097 0.036 0.065 0.024
(0.118) (0.136) (0.143) (0.164)
Constant -1.206*** -1.016*** -0.177 -1.503*** -1.329*** -0.524
(0.197) (0.222) (0.333) (0.235) (0.265) (0.399)
N 7,553 7,553 6,441 5,335 5,335 4,576
R2 0.038 0.050 0.055 0.043 0.061 0.066
Log-likelihood -5025.496 -4960.539 -4208.379 -3520.399 -3454.999 -2950.198
Pr(y = 1) 0.529 0.529 0.528 0.458 0.457 0.459
a Base outcomes: Gender: Man, Ethnicity:White, School: State, POLAR3:Other neighbourhood, Year Medical School: 2007, Year Process: 2015, Medical School: Birmingham, Foundation School: Birmingham
b SE: Standard Errors; AME: Average Marginal Effect
c P-values: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.12: Variables included in each Specification of the selection stage analysis
Specification (1) Woman, BME, Age Process, Time Elapsed, AppliMore, Parent Doctor, POLAR3, School,
Graduate, Top 5 Uni, Year Start and Year Process
Specification (2) (1) + Medical School, Foundation School and Specialty fixed effects
Specification (3) (2) + Shortlisting Score
Specification (4) (3) + UKCAT Score
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Chapter 4
Why are there so few female surgeons? An
empirical analysis for the Spanish resident market
4.1 Introduction
Over the past several decades the medical profession in most developed countries has
experienced a steady increase in the number of female physicians. The mean share
of female doctors in the OECD countries incrementally increased from 37.9% in year
2000 to 44.5% in 2013 (OECD Indicators 2015). Spain, in particular, has experienced
this phenomenon in more of an extreme, as the share of female doctors has risen
from 36.8% in 2000 to 50.2% in 2013. With regard to junior doctors, already in
1991, the percentage of males and females allocated to specialty training had reached
equality at: 49.48% and 50.53%, respectively. Twenty-four years later, in 2015, those
percentages were 34.31% and 65.69%. These figures illustrate the clear process of the
feminization of the Spanish medical workforce.
If ability, skills and preferences were identically distributed between sexes, male and
female doctors would be evenly distributed across specialties leading to an egalitarian
allocation of individuals. The latter is a priority goal of most societies, especially
in activities fully funded by taxpayers. Nonetheless, in the Spanish resident market
the large increase in the number of women has not been translated to an equal
representation of them in each specialty. Whilst specialties like internal medicine,
general practice and psychiatry consistently show an equal representation of both
sexes over time, some others have not, and have become either female-dominated
or male-dominated specialties. A good example is surgical training posts, that are
always in high demand among medical students, and have persistently shown an
over-representation of male junior doctors.23 The gender gap has not vanished, and
23In this chapter we often use the term male-dominated surgical specialties and it should be noted that
we refer to the group of surgical and medical-surgical specialties that over the years have shown an
over-representation of male doctors. See Tables 4.1 and 4.2 for a more detailed classification of the
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in some cases, such as plastic surgery, has even widened with the feminisation of the
more recent cohorts of medical trainees.
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of first year male doctors in training across
specialties, for the years 1991 and 2014, relative to the total proportion of men
choosing a specialty in the given year.24 Gender balanced specialties are those that
lie on (or near) the value one represented by a horizontal red line. We would have
expected a more gender balanced distribution of doctors across specialties in 2014
than in 1991, due to the feminization of the profession; however, the two graphs
look quite similar and we even observe a greater dispersion in 2014. For example,
the proportion of men entering plastic surgery in 1991, dot number 14 in Figure 4.1,
was approximately 1.7 times larger than the proportion of men choosing specialty
that year. That proportion increases to 2.4 times in 2014. Figure A2.1, in Appendix
Section 6.2, shows the distribution of first-year doctors across the 47 specialties for
the period 1991 to 2014. There are 47 figures, one for each specialty, and each of
them consists of two lines for each gender. The blue solid (red dashed) line represents
the percentage of men (women) from the total selecting a specialty that given year,
whilst the green dotted (yellow dashed) line shows the percentage of men (women)
choosing that particular specialty. Internal medicine, subfigure (aa), and psychiatry,
subfigure (ar), are good examples of gender balanced specialties where we observe
that the two described lines overlap for both men and women.
This chapter aims to disentangle the origin and causes of the persistent gender gap
in surgical specialties in the Spanish resident market. In Chapter 2 we establish that
gender occupational segregation is present for the new cohorts of UK junior doctors in
specialty training and discuss some of the possible drivers of the observed segregation.
In this chapter we explore two of them. First we analyse the role of social interactions
in shaping doctors’ decisions to specialize. According to Manski (1993a) a person
can emulate someone with a similar history or use role models to forecast his or her
specialties.
24Each dot results from the quotient of the proportion of male doctors choosing specialty j in year
t by the proportion of doctors choosing a specialty in year t. For example in 2014, 32.1% of the
total number doctors choosing specialty were men whilst 67.9% were women. A ratio equal to one
indicates that specialty j is gender balanced, whilst a ratio smaller (larger) that one indicates that
male doctors are under-represented (over-represented) with respect to their representation in the
population of doctors choosing specialty in year t.
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own future behaviour conditional on choosing a given action today. Following that
argument, in this chapter, we test whether being exposed to female role models, i.e.
female junior doctors in surgical male-dominated specialties, increases the probability
of females choosing a male-dominated surgical specialty, other things equal. The
second question addresses the role of the current Spanish specialty allocation system
in perpetuating the observed unbalanced specialty outcomes. For that purpose, we
quantify the effect of a change in the allocation system that took place in the year
2010, which increased the competitiveness of the process, and test whether it has
affected men and women differently, specifically whether it has disadvantaged women.
There are several undesired consequences associated with occupational segregation.
These include earnings disparity, shortages of specialists, lower quality of care and a
lower quality of working experience. The following paragraphs set those out in detail.
Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2005) found, for the United States medical market, that
the large male-female gap in physician earnings is due in large part to specialty choice,
since women are more likely to choose low paying specialties such as general practice.
On average, according to OECD Indicators (2015), in Spain a general practitioner
with 20 years experience has a salary25 of e56,495, whilst a specialist with the same
experience earns approximately e8000 more.26 In 2015 the percentage of women
choosing a post in general practice was 73%, approximately 7.31% more than the total
percentage of women choosing a specialty that year, 65.69%. Spanish doctors seem
to form fairly accurate income expectations before choosing a specialty. Harris et al.
(2014) shows the estimated valuation of seven different attributes of all specialties
extracted from a survey administered to 978 final-year medical students in Spain.
Students attributed a mean annual remuneration of e105,375 and e97,160 to male-
dominated and non male-dominated surgical specialties, respectively.27 The figure is
e56,000 for general practice. The discrepancies between OECD figures and doctors’
valuations are linked to the fact that in the national Spanish health system private
practice income is considered a superior proxy for earnings (Harris et al. 2013) and
25In Spain, doctors’ salary is a function of seniority in the job, region of practice and number of days the
doctor is on duty.
26The reported figures do not include any private practice income.
27See Table 4.2 for the classification of surgical and medical-surgical specialties into male-dominated
and gender-balanced.
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although there is no published national representative data by region and specialty on
the earnings of Spanish doctors, medical students may have incorporated the private
practice earnings into their income expectations. Harris et al. (2014) show medical
students’ estimated joint valuations of lifestyle and working hours; on a scale of one
to ten, where ten represents the highest valuation, those are 5.71, 6.51 and 7.76
for male-dominated, non-male-dominated surgical specialties, and general practice,
respectively. Medical students perceive a trade-off between income and the ability to
reconcile work with family and leisure, and it seems that women in particular are less
likely to choose specialties with a less favourable valuation of the attribute lifestyle
and working hours (Harris et al. 2014).
In addition, Arrizabalaga et al. (2015) found evidence of the existence of the leaky
pipeline phenomenon. The authors analysed data from a top hospital in Spain over
a 13-year period, finding that despite the achievement of a 50% representation of
female doctors in training, women showed a lower probability of internal promotion
and that, in comparison to male doctors with similar years of experience, they tended
to progress later into promoted posts. According to Bettinger and Long (2005),
under-representation of women in certain areas may contribute to future shortages in
critical fields. This seems a plausible scenario in the highly feminized Spanish medical
workforce.
Both under-representation and unequal distribution across specialties and hierarchal
positions might be problematic as there is evidence of dissimilarities in the way that
men and women practice medicine. Bloor et al. (2008) find that male doctors in
the UK have significantly higher activity rates than females, even after accounting
for patients’ case mix. By contrast, several papers in the medical literature have
found that female doctors provide higher quality care than men. Tsugawa, Jena,
Figueroa et al. (2017) found for the United States that differences in practice patterns
between male and female internists lead to lower readmission and mortality rates of
the patients treated by the latter group. Wallis et al. (2017) find similar mortality
results on elective procedures performed by female surgeons in Canada. Baumha¨kel
et al. (2009) found that females are more likely to adhere to clinical guidelines and
Lurie et al. (1993) show that female doctors provide preventive care more often than
male doctors. Irrespective of the causes of the differences in patient outcomes and
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of male junior doctors across specializations for years 1991
and 2014
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1 Allergy; 2 Clinical Analysis; 3 Anatomical Pathology; 4 Anaesthetics; 5 Vascular Surgery; 6 Gastroenterology; 7
Clinical Biochemistry; 8 Cardiology; 9 Cardiovascular Surgery; 10 General Surgery; 11 Oral Surgery; 12 Ortho-
paedic Surgery; 13 Paediatric Surgery; 14 Plastic Surgery; 15 Thoracic Surgery; 16 Dermatological Surgery; 17
Endocrinology & Diabetes; 18 Pharmaceutical Medicine; 19 Geriatric; 20 Haematology; 21 Medical Hydrology; 22
Immunology; 23 Occupational Medicine; 24 Sport and Exercise Medicine ; 25 General Practice; 26 Rehabilitation
Medicine; 27 Intensive Care Medicine; 28 General Internal Medicine; 29 Legal and Forensic Medicine; 30 Nuclear
Medicine; 31 Public Health; 32 Microbiology; 33 Renal medicine; 34 Respiratory; 35 Neurosurgery; 36 Clinical
Neurophysiology; 37 Neurology; 38 Obstetrics & Gynaecology; 39 Ophthalmology; 40 Medical Oncology; 41 Clinical
Oncology; 42 Otolaryngology; 43 Paediatrics; 44 Psychiatry; 45 Radiology; 46 Rheumatology; 47 Genito-Urinary
Medicine
style of practice, these results suggest that there might be potential gains in increasing
the representativeness of females in some specialties. A gender balanced workforce
might lead to positive externalities since both men and women could learn from
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each other. Finally, male-dominated specialties, as shown by Harris et al. (2014), are
associated with a worse work-leisure balance than the other specialties. Increasing
the proportion of female doctors could lead to the creation of lobbies and unions to
appeal for better policies to aim at achieving a better work-leisure-family balance.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes in detail
the operation of the Spanish allocation system. Section 4.3 addresses estimation of the
role model effect on the doctors’ decisions to specialize. Section 4.4 covers the analysis
of the change in the allocation system and tests whether the change has affected male
and female doctors differently. Section 4.5 jointly discusses the findings of the two
research questions and draws a conclusion. Tables are in Section 4.6.
4.2 The Spanish medical specialty allocation process
The Spanish Health System (Sistema Nacional de Salud) is dominated by the public
sector, which accounts for 70% of total expenditure on health care, and is mainly
funded through taxation. Undergraduate medical education in Spain is offered by 31
public universities and 9 private universities and has a duration of 6 years. During
that time, medical students take modules in basic, social and clinical sciences, and
in the fundamental principles of medicine. In the third year medical students start
their clinical training in university hospitals and primary care centres. For three years
students rotate in different services, including surgeries, medical specialties, and
general practice. During the rotations medical students are under the supervision
of consultants and junior doctors. From this contact students can learn about the
characteristics of the specialties, such as the type of work involved, workload, the
doctor-patient relationship and form income expectations. Medical students can also
arrange informal clerkships if they are interested in gaining further experience in a
specialty. Experiences, mentors and colleagues that students have during the clinical
training period will influence their preferences for the various specialties (Coleman
1966; Arcidiacono and Nicholson 2005).
After completion of undergraduate medical studies, newly graduated doctors need
to gain access to one of the 47 postgraduate specialties available in the Spanish Health
System. Following Torres et al. (2008) we classify these in four core groups: medical,
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laboratory, surgical and medical-surgical. The duration of training is different, for
most medical and laboratory specialties it lasts four years, whilst for surgical and
medical-surgical it lasts five years. Table 4.1 sets out the detailed classification.
The allocation process of specialist training positions in Spain is widely known as
MIR (‘Me´dico Interno Residente’) and literally means ‘resident medical intern’. It is
organized and regulated centrally by the Ministry of Health (Harris et al. 2017). It is a
one-sided sequential allocation mechanism, where individuals self-select themselves
into specialties and the latter play a passive role (Harris et al. 2014). The number of
available training positions varies from year to year and since 2006 is between 6,000
and 7,000, from which one quarter belong to general practice.
All doctors who hold an undergraduate medical degree and who have successfully
completed the MIR state examination in a given year can take part in the allocation
process for that year. The MIR examination is a multiple-choice test and takes place at a
national level on the same day and at the same time in different locations across Spain.
The multiple-choice test rewards correct answers with three points and penalizes
incorrect answers with minus one point. Since the allocation process is sequential,
doctors choose their preferred training programme according to their position in
a pre-established ranking. The ranking order is a function of doctors’ grade point
average in their medical undergraduate studies (GPA) that has a contribution of 10%
to the total score and their score on the MIR examination, which constitutes 90% of
the total score. Doctors for whom there is no suitable alternative can opt out of the
process that year and opt for a position in future calls, for which they will need to
re-take the state examination.
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4.3 Question 1: Do female role models affect doctors’
decisions to specialize?
A standard explanation from economic theory for the occupational gender gap is the
existence of intrinsic differences in preferences between men and women. From a
traditional economics perspective preferences are not affected by the social envir-
onment and there is scepticism about the estimation of social interactions, mainly
due to the difficulty of separately measuring the social effect from other confounders
(Arcidiacono and Nicholson 2005). Nonetheless, the lack of surgical role models has
been highlighted as a detractor in recruiting more women to the field and the fact that
surgical specialties have been seen as a man’s job for a long time has been perceived
as an entry barrier by some women (Fitzgerald et al. 2013). It is therefore possible
that observed differences in preferences might be due to the existence of information
phenomena such as emulation, mentoring or role model effects (Manski 1993a; Chung
2000).
Manski (1993b) and Manski (2000) classify social interactions in three categories:
endogenous, exogenous and correlated effects. Endogenous effects refer to the propensity
of medical students to vary their behaviour towards specialty choices with the beha-
viour of the group; exogenous effects refer to the variance in behaviour that responds
to exogenous characteristics of the group (e.g. quality of medical schools, degree of
accessibility to mentors, degree of commitment of faculty); and correlated effects refer
to the situation where similar medical students behave similarly because they share
similar characteristics or face the same institutional framework. The specialty choice
decisions in the Spanish resident market may be influenced by a mix of these three
effects.
The identification of endogenous social effects is challenging and leads to what has
been termed the reflection problem. Manski (1993b) describes it as the problem that
arises when, following the observation of the distribution of behaviour in a population,
a researcher tries to infer whether the average behaviour in some group influences
the behaviour of the individuals that comprise the group. We, therefore, focus on
the identification of exogenous effects and from within the wide range of these we
estimate the effect of informational role models in shaping medical students specialty
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choices. According to Manski (1993a), individuals obtain much of their information by
observing the decisions and the outcomes realized by others. In reality, the definition
of others varies from individual to individual: it can be from one person, a very
enthusiastic lecturer, to a combination of people and situations, as when attending a
medical school where the majority of students have an interest in surgical specialties.
Examples of influential figures can be lecturers at medical school, medical consultants
and junior doctors in university hospitals, alumni and even classmates.
We develop a framework for evaluating the effect of close female role models
in doctors’ decisions to specialize. In particular, and justified by the occupational
segregation described in the introduction, we focus our analysis on surgical and
medical-surgical specialties and we test whether female junior doctors in training
in those specialties are seen as role models by (female) medical students. We test
whether being exposed to a larger proportion of female doctors in an otherwise male
dominated specialty increases the probability of a female doctor choosing that specialty.
For that purpose, we use information from a cross-sectional survey (the MIR Survey)
where students have been asked about their preferred specialty, i.e. stated preferences,
if all the specialties were available in their choice set.28
The MIR Survey has been previously used by Harris et al. (2013) to measure the
impact of the Great Recession that started in 2008 on the specialty choices of doctors
and by Harris et al. (2014), in a paper that simulates the outcomes of different
specialty allocation systems, to evaluate alternative policies to the current system.
This second paper aims to address the shortage in general practice in the Spanish
resident market. A further paper, Harris et al. (2017) seeks to analyse medical student
preferences on residency programmes under two different choice scenarios: one being
the actual specialty chosen and the other being the programme the student would
have chosen if all residency programmes were available, defining the latter as the
counterfactual choice. The authors find that preferences are not intrinsically stable but
depend on the context of the choice being made,29 contradicting the traditional view
28As described in Section 4.2 the specialty allocation process is sequential and therefore only the doctor
ranked in the first position will have all training posts in her choice set. The analysis of revealed
choices from the allocation process will fail to capture the effect of female role models, as most of the
bottom ranked doctors do not have the highly competitive surgical specialties in their choice set.
29Harris et al. (2017) find that doctors’ preferences depend not only on the choice set available, but also
on the choices made by others, in particular of those at the top of the ranking.
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on intrinsic preferences. In this chapter, as in Harris et al. (2017), we test the role of
social interactions on the counterfactual specialty choices instead of the actual choices,
since the latter are constrained by the choice set available at the moment the student
makes her choice.
The existing literature analysing role model effect on occupational choices is not
extensive and has found mixed results. Bettinger and Long (2005) estimated how
having a female faculty member in a course affects the likelihood that a female student
would take additional credit hours in a particular subject. Their results support the
role-model effect for some disciplines such as geology, mathematics and statistics, but
they fail to find positive and significant effects in some male dominated fields such as
engineering and physics. Rothstein (1995) studied whether the percentage of female
faculty had an influence on female student’ post-graduate educational and labour
market outcomes; finding that a higher percentage of female faculty increases the
probability of attaining a higher degree, however it has no impact on the labour market
earnings. Neumark and Gardecki (1996) studied whether female Ph.D. students having
female dissertation chairs resulted in more successful outcomes for them. They found
that there was no effect on labour market outcomes, however with respect to time
and completion rate, they found beneficial effects of the presence of female faculty
members. For medical students, Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2005) estimated the
impact of peer effects in medical school on the achievement and specialty choices of
medical students. They found evidence of a positive peer effect for female students
in examination scores, however no effect was found in terms of specialty preferences
after controlling for medical school fixed effects.
4.3.1 Data
We use two different data sources: the MIR Registry that contains the information we
use to create the role model variable and MIR Survey that we use to test the existence
of the role model effect. In the sections below and in Table 4.3, we describe the
particularities of both datasets.
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4.3.1.1 MIR Registry
The MIR Registry is a cross-sectional dataset for the years 2003 to 2015 (N= 73,787)
and comes from doctors’ administrative records held by the Spanish Ministry of Health.
The MIR Registry includes a record of doctors’ actual choices of specialty and training
hospital. Table 4.1 shows the list of specialties classified in the four core groups and
Table 4.2 classifies surgical and medical surgical specialties into male-dominated and
gender-balanced. The latter classification is based on historical ratios. We classify
specialties for which the intake of female residents has been smaller than 50% for all
the years since 1991 as male-dominated or as gender-balanced otherwise (see Figure
A2.1).
The MIR Registry includes the doctor’s original Ranking Position in the MIR process,
the Specialty Chosen, the Training Location and the Year the doctor participates in the
allocation process. The variable Women takes value one if the doctor is female and
zero otherwise. The variable Spanish takes value one when the doctors’ nationality is
Spanish and zero otherwise. The variable Age, defined as an integer, indicates the age
of the doctor during the specialty allocation process. The Medical School attended is
also available and we include a dummy indicator for each of the 34 Spanish medical
schools.30 The MIR Registry also includes the Grade Point Average, GPA, of medical
undergraduate studies that is continuous and ranges from 1 to 5, and is only available
for the most recent years. The variable Exam Score (ES) provides the results of the
state examination. This variable takes only integers and has an upper limit equal to
675. We utilise the variables Specialty Chosen, Training Location and Women from
the MIR Registry to construct the role model variable. Section 4.3.2 describes the
construction of the role model variable in detail.
4.3.1.2 MIR Survey
The second data source we employ is a cross-sectional survey, MIR Survey, that is
sent to doctors every year after the specialty allocation process has taken place. In
this chapter, we analyse three waves of the MIR Survey for the years 2013, 2014 and
30In section 2, 40 medical schools are mentioned; however, those of recent creation are not included in
our data as it would take more than six years for the first cohort of doctors to take part in the MIR
process
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2015 (N= 8,739). The response rate of the MIR Survey is similar across years and is
approximately 50% of the total number of doctors choosing specialties in a given year
(Harris et al. 2014). More detailed information about the survey design can be also
found in Harris et al. (2014).
The survey includes information on stated preferences of a doctor’s decision to
specialize. Doctors are asked about their preferred specialty and that information is
captured by the variable Preferred Specialty; these preferences are unconditional to
their ranking position and therefore might be different from the revealed preferences,
given by variable Specialty Chosen, that comes from the MIR Registry. We classify the
Preferred Specialty into the four core groups described in Table 4.1: medical, laboratory,
surgical and medical-surgical. The two latter constitute our groups of interest and
therefore we further classify the specialties from those two groups into male-dominated
and gender balanced (see Table 4.2).
The MIR Survey includes the same demographic and academic variables present in
the MIR Registry and we use them as control variables. It also includes the variable
First MIR, that takes value one if the doctor is participating in the MIR allocation
process for the first time and zero otherwise.
4.3.2 The role model effect
In this section, we present the construction of the role model variable. Then we
describe the model, the assumptions, the estimation technique and the limitations of
our approach.
4.3.2.1 The role model variable
To construct the treatment variable that captures the magnitude of the social interac-
tion of interest we focus on the three-year period during which undergraduate medical
students complete their clinical training (see section 4.2). Medical schools in Spain
have agreements with university hospitals that provide undergraduate clinical training
and postgraduate specialty training. Medical schools can have agreements with one
or more hospitals. We define role models as female junior doctors in postgraduate
training in university hospitals. We assume that all undergraduate students who
attended the same medical school at the same time are exposed to the same group
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of junior doctors. Using the variables Specialty Chosen, Training Location, Year and
Women from the MIR Registry, we identify female junior doctors across specialties,
university hospitals and years. Table 4.4 illustrates, with an example, how we connect
undergraduate medical students and female role models for those students who started
medical school in the academic year 2006/07.
To construct the role mode variable, we need to define the notation for the frame-
work to be analysed. We have doctors choosing specialties represented by i ∈ I ={
i ∈ N : 1 ≤ i ≤ I¯}, a set of specialties represented by j ∈ J = {j ∈ N : 1 ≤ j ≤ J¯},
training hospitals by h ∈ H = {h ∈ N : 1 ≤ h ≤ H¯} and years represented by t ∈ T ={
t ∈ N : 1 ≤ t ≤ T¯}.
The first step in the construction of the role model variable is the creation of a
dummy indicator, womanyeshtj , that takes value zero if there is no female junior
doctor in postgraduate training in hospital h, year t and specialty j. The variable
takes value one if there is at least one female doctor in training in hospital h, year t
and specialty j. The idea behind this extreme classification it is to identify medical
students who were exposed to no or very few females during their undergraduate
clinical training. Secondly, for each training hospital, h, we take average of the variable
womanyeshjt for the group of specialties classified as male-dominated (see Table 4.2
for the full list), as given by expression (4.1).
womenyesh,t =
∑J
j=1womenyeshtj
J
(4.1)
Then for each medical student i we compute the role model treatment variable,
denoted by RM1, by calculating the average of the variable womenyesh,t over the
number of the years of undergraduate clinical training, as given by (4.2).
RM1i =
∑T
t=1womenyesh,t
T
(4.2)
The resulting variable RM1i ∈ [0, 1] captures the exposure of medical students
to female role models in male dominated surgical specialties during the years of
undergraduate clinical training. The variable ranges from zero, indicating that the
medical student has not been exposed to a role model in any of the clinical training
years, to 1, indicating that every year there was at least one female role model present.
131
The treatment variable can also be interpreted as the probability of being exposed to
at least one female junior doctor over the years of clinical training.
Figure 4.2: Distribution of role model variable by university
Red line indicates average value of the role model variable (RM1 = 0.653)
The role model treatment variable has a number of limitations. First, whilst we
have information about female role models for each university hospital h, where there
is more than one h associated with a medical school we need to take averages of the
RM1 for all of them,31 as we do not know which one the student completed their
undergraduate clinical training in, and we are not able to link medical students to
unique training hospitals. Nonetheless, in the majority of cases, medical students rotate
in the different training hospitals to receive clinical training for different specialties
and therefore can be directly or indirectly exposed to female role models from all the
training hospitals associated with a medical school. Second, we can only compute
the role model variable for those students for which we know the year they finished
their medical studies. Third, there is no information in our data for those doctors who
31In that case the role model variable will be given by:
RM1i =
∑H
h=1
∑T
t=1 womenyesh,t
T
H
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completed their medical undergraduate studies outside of Spain. In 2013, 2014 and
2015 foreign qualified doctors constituted 25%, 19% and 13% respectively of the total
number of doctors taking part in the MIR process. Due to the mentioned limitations
we can only compute the role model treatment variable for 71.6% of the respondents
of the MIR Survey, which translates to a sample size of N=6,261. Figure 4.2 shows
the distribution of RM1 by medical school, where each dot represents the value of
RM1 for doctors who carry out their specialty training at different time periods.
4.3.2.2 Econometric model and estimation strategy
We define three outcome variables denoted by yn where n = 1, 2, 3. Table 4.5 sets out
these in detail. These variables result from three different groupings of the Preferred
Specialty that is extracted from the MIR Survey. Although, ideally we would like to
estimate the role model effect for each specialty separately, i.e. to compute a role
model treatment variable for each specialty, the survey exhibits a small sample size
that impedes this approach. Hence, we need to group similar specialties together and
we show the estimates for three different groupings. The variable y1 is a dummy that
takes value one if the individual indicates a preference for any male-dominated surgical
or medical-surgical specialty32 and value zero if the individual indicates a desire for
any other option, i.e. any medical, gender-balanced medical-surgical and surgical, or
laboratory specialty. Variable y2, takes value one if the doctor chooses any surgical
option, both male-dominated and gender-balanced, and zero if the individual has
chosen any other specialty, i.e. medical or laboratory. For variable y3, we restrict the
analysis to the subsample of doctors that have a declared interest in surgery and test
whether a greater exposure to the treatment variable, RM1, increases their probability
of choosing a male-dominated surgical specialty relative to a gender-balanced surgical
specialty.33 Hence, y3 takes value one if an individual chooses a male-dominated
surgical or medical-surgical specialty and zero if a gender-balanced surgical specialty is
chosen instead.
For each medical student i we observe yni = 1 or yni = 0, mutually exclusive binary
32See Table 4.2
33Another justification of the sample restriction is the difference in length of training between (1) medical
and laboratory and (2) surgical and medical-surgical specialties. The majority of specialties in the first
group require four years of training compared with five years for the second group.
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outcomes, and we estimate the effect and significance of the role model variable on
the probability of observing yni = 1 by means of a Probit regression. For that purpose,
we define an underlying continuous latent variable y∗n, that satisfies equation (4.3)
and is related to the outcome variable yn through equation (4.4).
y∗ni = βn0 + βn1RM1i +X
′
iβn + εni n = 1, 2, 3 (4.3)
yni =
 1 if y
∗
ni > 0
0 if y∗ni < 0
(4.4)
In equation (4.3) the role model treatment effect is represented by RM1. The vector
X
′
encompasses the group of control variables that we classify as demographic, such
as Women, Age and Spanish and academic covariates that include GPA, First MIR and
Medical School dummies. When we include the medical school fixed effects, since
individuals that attended the same medical school during the same period have the
same values of RM1, we need to rely on the time variation of the treatment variable
to ensure identification.
In expression (4.3), εi refers to the error term that we assume is identically distrib-
uted following a normal distribution. However, we relax the usual requirement that
observations need to be independent by clustering the standard errors and allowing
for intra-group correlation. The group choice corresponds to the year doctors made
their specialty choices and responded to the MIR Survey (i.e. 2013, 2014 or 2015).
Survey respondents from different years are extracted from different populations, as
they sat a different MIR examination and might have faced a different social context.34
pni ≡ Pr(yni = 1|X) = Φ(βn0 + βn1RM1i +X ′iβn) n = 1, 2, 3 (4.5)
Expression (4.5) shows the regression model that is formed by parametrizing pni
to depend on an index function Φ(βn0 + βn1RM1i + X ′iβn) where β is a vector of
unknown parameters and Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the Probit
distribution and ensures that 0 ≤ pni ≤ 1. Given a correct specification of the Φ(.) the
34Harris et al. (2013) found evidence of medical students in Spain changing their preferred specialty to
specialties with more certain job prospects after the start of the Great Recession in 2008.
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maximum likelihood estimators of expression (4.5) produce consistent estimators.
The estimated parameters from the Probit model do not have a straightforward
interpretation as, unlike the linear regression model, its estimates are not equivalent
to the marginal effect of a covariate in the estimated probability. The marginal effect
in the Probit model is given by (4.6) where φi(X
′
iβn) is the probability distribution
function associated with Φ(.). As the marginal effect of one covariate depends on all
the parameters and on the actual values of the vector of covariates we compute instead
the average marginal effect (AME). The AME is computed for the average value of all
the explanatory variables (X¯i) including Xk.
∂P [yni|Xi]
∂Xki
=
∂Φ(X ′iβn)
∂Xki
= φi(X
′
iβn) ∗ βnk (4.6)
4.3.3 Results
4.3.3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.6 shows descriptive statistics for the complete MIR Survey and the reduced
sample for which we can compute the role model variable RM1. The two samples
exhibit differences, as the role model sample presents a higher proportion of females
(71.8% vs. 67.8%), Spanish (98.7% vs. 86%) and younger doctors (mean age 25.35
years vs. 27.04). The doctors from the role model sample also present on average a
higher GPA ( 1.96 vs. 1.94) and MIR Exam score (404.92 vs. 390.53). The reported
Preferred Specialty classified in the four core groups present similar means for the two
samples. The percentages for complete MIR survey and reduced role model sample
are 6.4% vs. 4.6% for laboratory, 25.7% vs. 25.7% for medical-surgical, 57.8% vs.
60% for medical and 10% vs. 9.8% for surgical specialties. The role model sample
over-samples female and younger doctors as the majority of foreign qualified doctors
are men and older than the Spanish qualified doctors. Female doctors are the target
group of the analysis, therefore a greater representation of them provides further
validation of role model estimation results.
Table 4.6 also shows a comparison between Preferred Specialty and Specialty Chosen.
In some cases, especially for those individuals at the top of the ranking distribution,
the chosen specialty and the desired one coincide, however in the majority of cases the
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two differ. We observe how surgical and medical-surgical specialties are oversubscribed
as the percentage of doctors declaring preference for those options is considerably
larger than the percentage of doctors who actually choose them. The percentages
are 9.8 versus 6.5 for surgical specialties and 25.7 versus 16.6 for medical-surgical
specialties in the role model sample. Finally, the descriptive statistics for the role model
sample show that 20.3% of doctors indicated a male-dominated surgical specialty as
their preferred choice (variable y1) whilst 35.4% indicated a preference for any type
of surgical specialty (variable y2). In the reduced sample of doctors who expressed an
interest for a surgical specialty 43.7% of them indicated a male-dominated surgical
specialty as their preferred choice with respect any other gender-balanced surgical
specialty (variable y3).
4.3.3.2 Estimation results
Table 4.7, Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 display the estimation results for y1, y2 and y3
respectively. In each table we report the results for four different specifications
that differ from each other in the number of covariates included in the estimation.
Specifications (1) and (2) present the estimation results for the complete sample being
the only difference that (1) does not include the treatment variable RM1 and (2)
does. Specifications (3) and (4) include all the covariates but differ in the sample
used, (3) presents the estimation results for the sample that includes only men and (4)
for the sample that includes only women. For each specification, (1)-(4) we present
two columns of results: the Probit estimates of the vector of unknown parameters
represented by β in equation (4.3) and the average marginal effects (AME) of each
explicative covariate.
Estimation results for y1
Table 4.7 shows the estimation results for the dependent variable y1. The estimates
associated with RM1 in specifications (2) with N=6,181, (3) with N=1,745 and
(4) with N=4,438 are all positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence
level. The role model effect seems to be larger for the men-only sample than for the
female-only sample. A standard deviation increase in the treatment variable RM1
(0.161) augments the probability of choosing a male-dominated surgical specialty by
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0.034, 0.059 and 0.026 for the complete, male and female sample respectively.
The observed estimates for the variables Women and Age exhibit the expected sign as
both are negative and significant at the 99% confidence level. Looking at the estimates
of specification (2) the associated marginal effect indicates that,other things equal,
being a female doctor decreases the probability of choosing a male-dominated surgical
specialty by 0.093, with respect to any other specialty. Similarly, for each year older
a doctor is, the probability of y1 = 1 decreases by 0.005. The variable First MIR is
also negative and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. This implies
that doctors taking the examination for the first time are less likely to choose a highly
competitive male-dominated surgical specialty and the marginal effect is -0.054. No
significant effects were found for the variables Spanish or GPA. The results for Medical
School, where Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona35 is the omitted category, are
mixed and most of them non-significant. The comparison of specifications (1) and
(2) show that estimates for Medical School present little variation after the inclusion
of RM1 with the exception of some like Castilla La Mancha or Murcia that are the
medical schools with less observations in our sample. In addition the estimates for
specifications (3) and (4), in some cases, present different signs and magnitudes for
men and women, a result that can be partially explained by the differences in sample
sizes.
Estimation results for y2
Table 4.8 shows the estimation results for y2, where y2 = 1 indicates the individual
chose a surgical specialty whilst y2 = 0 indicates the election of any other non-surgical
specialty. For y2, the estimates of RM1 are positive for all specifications, however only
statistically significant at the 90% confidence level for specification (3). A standard
deviation increase in RM1 (0.161) augments the probability of choosing a surgical
specialty by 0.083, but only for male doctors. No significant results were found for the
female sample.
The estimates for the complete sample (N=6,183), including the role model variable,
35The choice of omitted category is arbitrary. However, for interpretability purposes it should be noticed
that Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona is often classified as one of the top universities in the
country in the field of Medicine (Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona 2017)
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are shown by specification (2). Results for the variable Women exhibit a similar sign to
those observed in Table 4.7, however of a smaller magnitude (-0.037 vs. -0.093) and
only significant at the 95% confidence level, whereas, the magnitude of the effect for
Age is larger and implies that being a year older decreases the probability of choosing
a surgical specialty by 0.011 (significant at the 99% confidence level). The variable
GPA is statistically significant for the general and men only samples, specifications (2)
and (3), suggesting that (male) doctors with a higher GPA are more likely to choose a
surgical specialty over any other non-surgical option. As for y1, the variable First MIR
presents negative and significant coefficients, the magnitude of the effect being larger
for men than women (-0.148 vs. -0.116). Finally, the effects of Medical School are less
relevant, i.e. fewer medical school indicators are significant, in the estimation of y2
than they were for y1.
Estimation results for y3
Table 4.9 shows the results for y3 where y3 = 1 indicates that the doctor’s preferred
option is a male-dominated specialty and y3 = 0 that it is a gender-balanced surgical
specialty (see Table 4.2). In this case, the sample size is reduced to N= 2,186 as we
restrict the sample to the individuals who expressed an interest for surgical specialties
only.
The estimates of the role model variable, RM1, for the different specifications
display mixed results and we only find significant estimates for specification (4), the
women only sample. We observe that an increase of one standard deviation in the
exposure to female role models increases the probability of choosing a male-dominated
surgical specialty by approximately 0.050 for female doctors.
Specifications (1) and (2) show the results for the complete sample, the only
difference between the two being the inclusion of the variable RM1. We observe a
negative and statistically significant effect of the variables Women and First MIR, both
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. Being a female doctor decreases
the probability of choosing a male-dominated surgical specialty by -0.231, ceteris
paribus. Similarly, doctors taking the MIR examination for the first time are less
likely to choose a male-dominated surgical specialty than a gender-balanced surgical
specialty, this AME is equal to -0.028. As for y1 and y2, the estimates associated with
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Medical School dummies are mixed, in some cases they present different signs for men
and women and larger standard errors due to the significant reduction of the sample
size with respect to y1 and y2 .
4.3.4 Discussion
The aim of the first part of the chapter has been the analysis of whether social inter-
actions can serve as a vehicle for tackling the gender imbalance in male-dominated
surgical specialties. The estimation results for the effect of female role models are
positive and statistically significant for both male and female doctors. Unexpectedly,
the effect seems to be of a larger magnitude for male doctors and suggest that female
surgeons are also perceived as positive role models by male doctors. However, it also
signals that RM1 might be capturing other elements from the undergraduate clinical
training environment. If clinical environments with larger values of RM1 are per-
ceived as more attractive, then they will attract a larger proportion of females as well
as a larger proportion of males. Therefore, RM1 will not only be capturing the effect
of informational role models but also some other exogenous characteristics affecting
all medical students that participated in the same clinical training programme.
The results for the reduced sample of doctors who only expressed an interest for
a surgical specialty, outcome variable y3, show a positive and statistically significant
effect of RM1 for female doctors on the probability of choosing a male-dominated
specialty. The effect for the sample of men only is negative, however not statistically
significant. Therefore, in this reduced group of doctors, a higher exposure to female
role models increases the probability of women choosing a male-dominated instead
of gender-balanced surgical specialty. This sample is more homogeneous as it only
includes doctors with stated preferences for surgical or medical surgical specialties
and within that group; female role models have a positive attraction effect for women
whilst the effect is not statistically significant for men.
In general and for the three outcome variables, we find that male and younger
doctors are more likely to choose a male-dominated surgical specialty. These results
are consistent with the findings of Chapter 3 regarding the application patterns of the
UK with respect to surgical specialties. We also find that individuals participating in
the MIR process for the first time are less likely to declare male-dominated surgical
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specialties as their preferred choice. Doctors opting for (and finally getting into) a
highly competitive male-dominated specialty are more likely to need to re-take the
MIR examination. The latter has some high opportunity costs associated with it; these
include monetary costs, such as the lost earnings connected to the one-year delayed
entry to the job market and the costs of examination preparation, and non-pecuniary
costs, such as the possible health problems associated with the stress and anxiety
caused by the examination preparation. Although, we do not have data on doctors’
socioeconomic backgrounds, we conjecture that those from privileged backgrounds
will be more likely to re-take the examination as they are also more likely to be able to
afford the opportunity cost of re-taking it.
Our focus on surgical specialties does not imply that there are not other significant
gender imbalances in the Spanish resident market. As Figure A2.1 shows, other spe-
cialties, such as obstetrics and gynaecology (subfigure (al)) or paediatrics (subfigure
(aq)), display an over-representation of female doctors. The main difference between
the latter and the group of specialties we analysed in this chapter is that in the past
all specialties showed an over-representation of male doctors. For that reason, we
postulate that the drift in the gender composition of past male-dominated specialties
towards becoming female-dominated specialties might be mostly due to a shift in
doctors’ preferences and not due to male doctors suffering from a lack of same-sex
mentors. Notwithstanding, female-dominated specialties are equally worrisome from
a policy perspective, since the current gender imbalances will deprive future genera-
tions of male doctors of same-sex mentors and perpetuate the current occupational
segregation.
Our role model identification strategy, similar to the one used in Canes and Rosen
(1995), is defined by Neumark and Gardecki (1996) as a black box since the role
model effect is something that might or might not occur when female doctors are
better represented among surgical specialties. Nonetheless, we find that the increased
presence of female role models in male-dominated specialties seems to make these
more attractive to both male and female doctors. With the data available it is very
difficult to disentangle what proportion of the effect is due to informational role
models or other exogenous or correlated effects. From a policy maker perspective,
it is worth performing a careful examination of which attributes associated with the
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training hospitals with a higher proportion of female doctors are different from the
attributes from other training hospitals. Increasing the representativeness of female
doctors seems to make male-dominated surgical specialties more attractive, would
reduce the gender pay gap and help in the creation of lobbies aim at achieving a better
work-family balance. Further research can follow Neumark and Gardecki (1996)
suggestion of looking inside the black box and disentangling what specific forms of
mentoring might be the most productive.
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4.4 Question 2: Does the Spanish specialty allocation
system favour male doctors?
The second part of this paper focuses on the analysis of the potential role of the
specialty allocation system in the observed occupational segregation. For this purpose,
we analyse the effect of a change in the ranking system that is used to allocate doctors
to specialty training positions in Spain and test whether it has affected men and
women differently.
In August 2010, the Spanish Ministry of Health published a list of modifications to
the specialty allocation process in the Official State Gazette (Boletin Oficial del Estado
2010). The main change was the increase of the importance of the results in the MIR
State Exam to the detriment of the weight given to the grade point average (GPA).
Specifically, the weight given to the MIR score increased from 75% to 90% and as
a result the contribution of the GPA decreased from 25% to 10%. The justification,
provided in the official document, was to ensure the objectivity of the process in
the face of an increasing number of non-Spanish medical graduates taking part in
it. The results from the MIR examination were viewed as more objective than the
GPA, as all candidates take the same test at the same date. The GPA is considered
to be more prone to biases associated with idiosyncrasies from the university (or
country) issuing the postgraduate medical certificate. Therefore, the institutional aim
of the new ranking system is the enhancement of the prospects of Spanish-graduate
doctors. Nonetheless, we conjecture that the change might have had some unintended
consequences in terms of gender balance, as male and female doctors might have
reacted differently to the increased importance of the MIR examination.
According to Da´vila-Quintana et al. (2015) the outcomes of the MIR exam are
the result of a relatively short but very intense period of preparation, defined by the
authors as Sprint Effort, whilst doctor GPAs are the result of a Long Term Effort. Those
definitions reflect the different nature of the two measures of student performance:
the MIR examination being a one shot test in a highly competitive setting, whilst
the GPA is the average of a student’s performance during undergraduate studies and
therefore gives more weight to long term effort and perseverance. Previous literature
suggests that female doctors might be worse off with the new ranking system as
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it has increased the importance of the highly competitive MIR examination. In an
economic experiment, Gneezy et al. (2003) found that females may be less effective
than men in competitive environments, even if they are able to perform similarly in
non-competitive ones. The authors observe that increasing the level of competition
improves the performance of men whilst more risk averse women do not react in same
way to the introduction of uncertain payments in the tournament analysed. Similarly,
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Niederle and Vesterlund (2010) found in another
experiment that women are uncomfortable performing in highly competitive settings
and as a result choose not to compete and thereby exert less effort than men.
Empirical studies corroborate most of the findings from experimental evidence. Ors
et al. (2013) analysed the performance of men and women in a highly competitive
entry exam to a French business school and found that the distribution of exam scores
for men had higher means and fatter tails than the distribution for women. However,
when analysing long-term measures of performance, defined by the authors as less
stressful environments, women presented better results. Jurajda and Munich (2008)
found similar results analysing admission to university in the Czech Republic. The
authors compared the admission outcomes of equally able men and women, finding
that both groups perform similarly well when competition to admission is less intense.
However, women perform substantially worse when analysing the entry outcomes
of highly selective universities. If the female doctors’ reaction to the increase in the
competitiveness of the MIR process is similar to the observed behaviour of women in
this literature, then their ranking outcomes will be lower than the hypothetical ones
achieved if the change had not happened.
Worse ranking outcomes for female doctors connect with observed occupational
segregation, since most of the male-dominated surgical specialties are in high demand
and thus can only be selected by the highest ranking applicants. The combination of
high attractiveness and a small supply of training posts leads to a situation where only
top ranked students have male-dominated surgical specialties in their choice set. The
case of plastic surgery is an extreme example as often this specialty is only available in
the choice set of the very top ranked doctors in a given year36 leaving students who
36In the specialty allocation process in 2015 the last training position was given to a student with the
rank number 1,047 out of 6,348 and in 2014 the last student held position number 886 out of 6,015.
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rank below that threshold with no options. Moreover, taking into account that doctors
not only choose their specialty but also location, even marginal changes in the ranking
position may put doctors at risk of losing their desired training post. In general, the
new weights penalise individuals with a good GPA and reward good performers on
the MIR examination.
We test the differences in the ranking position achieved by doctors that result from
the introduction of the new weights by means of a test of equality of means and a
non-parametric approach, the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test. We find statistically significant
differences between male and female doctors, as the latter are on average worse off
than men after the change. The differences are more pronounced in the top half
of the ranking distribution, meaning that female doctors on average have reduced
their probability of accessing the most demanded specialties. Our results confirm
that the policy change, whose primarily aim was to reduce biases and to favour
Spanish qualified doctors, have had, at least for the studied cohorts, an unintended
consequence of reducing the ranking position achieved by female doctors and hence
have lowered their probabilities of accessing the most desired specialties.
4.4.1 Data
We use the information on doctors included in the MIR Registry, database described in
detail in section 4.3.1. We analyse the outcomes of the specialty allocation process for
the years 2013 and 2015, where 6,348 and 6,015 doctors chose a specialty training
post, respectively. From the MIR Registry we use the variables GPA, the grade point
average, and the variable ES, that refers to MIR examination score, to compute
doctors’ pre and post-change ranking positions, given by the variables RankOld and
RankNew, respectively. Section 4.4.2 describes in detail the construction of the
variables RankOld, RankNew and RankDif . The latter is our main interest and
captures, for each doctor, the difference in the ranking position that resulted from the
introduction of the new weights. The variable ES is only available for years 2013 and
2015; both years are from the period post-change in weights, and therefore we are
not able to test how the change would have modified the ranking of the doctors who
Similar results are found for previous years.
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chose a specialty before the change was implemented.
The MIR Registry includes a variable that indicates doctors’ original ranking position,
Original Rank. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of Original Rank for the years 2013
and 2015. We observe how beyond the Original Rank position 3,500 the number
of doctors who opt out of the process increases dramatically.37 Although, the total
number of training positions available was equal to 6,348 in 2013 and 6,015 in 2015,
doctors who originally ranked below those thresholds could opt to one of the remaining
training posts. The last doctor who chose a specialty in 2013 had an Original Rank
position equal to 9,182 and this position was equal to 8,533 in 2015.
For most doctors the Original Rank does not coincide with the actual order in which
they made their specialty choices (captured by variable RankNew). Notwithstanding,
for most doctors the discrepancy between the original and the actual ranking is
minimal and the results we obtain comparing RankOld and RankNew should be very
similar to those we would obtain using Original Rank. However, we cannot use the
latter as we do not observe the characteristics of the individuals who drop out of the
process, i.e. their GPA, ES and gender.38 In order to test differences in the distribution
of RankDif across groups we employ two other variables from the MIR Registry:
Women and Spanish that have been previously described in Section 4.3.1.
4.4.2 Methodology
The ideal assessment of the effect of the change in the ranking system requires
knowledge of how the same individual would behave in the pre and post-weights
change periods. We would require a counterfactual observation for each individual
indicating what the outcome would have been if the change would have not taken
place. However, as described in the previous section, our data comes from doctors
who participated in the specialty allocation process after the introduction of the new
weights and, therefore, to assess the effect of the change we need to assume that
the new weights have neither affected medical students’ GPAs nor MIR examination
37Doctors for whom there is no suitable alternative left at the moment of the choice can opt out of the
process that year and opt for a position in future calls.
38A direct comparison between the original and actual ranking position shows that in 2013 (2015) the
average difference between the two measures for the first 3,500 top ranked doctors was 20 (16).For
the first 5,000 doctors the difference increases to 100 (101) positions, whilst when comparing the
average difference for the complete sample the number goes as high as 858 (297).
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of doctors according to their original ranking position
(a) MIR cohort 2013
(b) MIR cohort 2015
scores. This is quite a restrictive assumption, especially for the results of the MIR
examination. It is likely that a medical student in the face of the increased importance
of the MIR examination would respond to the change by exerting more effort in the
exam preparation. It is well-known that students adapt their exam preparation effort
to their desired specialty (Arcidiacono and Nicholson 2005) and that the increase in
competition could have increased the effort in preparation for all doctors but that the
effect might be larger for men than women (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; Niederle
and Vesterlund 2010).
However, the change in weights may not have affected the GPA, or if so only very
mildly. The GPA is a long-term measure that combines the effort of the student from
the first to the sixth year of medical undergraduate studies. The change in the weights
took place in 2010 when most students from the 2013 data cohort were at least in
their fourth year of medical studies and those from the 2015 cohort were at least
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in their second year. It seems unlikely that students would modify their long term
strategy half-way through their bachelor’s degree. Most students do not decide what
specialties they would like to practise until the final stage of their medical studies
(Goldacre et al. 2010) and, therefore, GPA may be a fair representation of their
best effort in order to keep all options open. All things considered, by failing to
include a counterfactual observation in the analysis we could be underestimating or
overestimating the effect of the change in the weights, therefore underestimating
or overestimating the magnitude of the rank differences between men and women.
We expect that the change has modified both female and male doctors’ strategies in
the current circumstances however, as literature suggests, it might have increased
competition and effort disproportionately between men and women.
The variable RankDif quantifies the difference in the actual ranking position
caused by the change in weights. It results from the subtraction of the ranking position
achieved with the new weights, represented by the RankNew, from the position
that the individual would have achieved with the pre-change weights represented
by variable RankOld and this relationship is shown by expression (4.7) where I ={
i ∈ N : 1 ≤ i ≤ I¯} represents the set of doctors.
RankDifi = RankOldi −RankNewi
RankDifi = F (TotalScoreold,i)− F (TotalScorenew,i)
(4.7)
Both RankOld and RankNew result from applying the ranking function to the
weighted combination of ES and GPA, as reflected in expression (4.8). ES and
GPA are weighted by fixed values represented by α and β, as reflected in expres-
sion (4.9); α corresponds to the average scores of the top ten MIR examinations,{
ESi(k) : i(k) ∈ I, : 1 ≤ k ≤ 10
}
, whilst β to the average of the top ten GPAs of the
cohort,
{
GPAi(k) : i(k) ∈ I, : 1 ≤ k ≤ 10
}
. For each doctor, represented by i, we com-
pute the variable RankDif , that equals zero if the doctor keeps the same ranking
order with the two different set of weights, i.e. RankNewi = RankOldi. It is smaller
than zero if the doctor is worse off with the new weights, i.e. RankNewi < RankOldi,
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and greater than zero if the doctor is better off, i.e. RankNewi > RankOldi.
TotalScoreold,i =
75
α
ESi +
25
β
GPAi
TotalScorenew,i =
90
α
ESi +
10
β
GPAi
(4.8)
where α =
∑10
k=1ESi(k)
10
and β =
∑10
k=1GPAi(k)
10
(4.9)
To test if the change in weights affect men and women differently, we perform a test
of equality of means to the variable RankDif . We assume a common variance for the
individuals of the same gender but allow the variance to be different between men (m)
and women (w). The test for equality of means is given by expression (4.10), where µ
represents the mean and s the standard deviation of the variable RankDif , Nm and
Nw the number of male and female doctors, and t follows a Student’s t distribution.
t =
µm − µw√
s2m
Nm
+
s2w
Nw
(4.10)
Moreover, as RankDif only takes integers and its distribution might cast doubt
on its normality (see Figure 4.4), we also apply a non-parametric approach, the
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test (Wilcoxon 1945; Mann and Whitney 1947) that tests null
the hypothesis that two samples (i.e. RankDif for male and female doctors) are
from populations with the same distribution. The construction of Wilcoxon statistic T
involves jointly ranking the values of RankDifi from smallest to largest of both men
and women, whose sample sizes are given by nm and nw, respectively. The smallest
RankDifi is given the value 1 whilst the largest is given the value n = nm + nw. The
second step is to sum the ranking numbers associated with the observations of the
group that we denote as first, in this case the one comprised of male doctors, as given
by (4.11).
T =
nm∑
i=1
R1i (4.11)
As the sample size is sufficiently large, we can use the normal approximation given
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of the differences in ranking represented by the variable
RankDif
(a) MIR cohort 2013
(b) MIR cohort 2015
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by expression (4.12)
z =
T − E[T ]√
V ar(T )
(4.12)
where E[T ] =
nm(n+ 1)
2
, V ar[T ] =
nmnw
n
s2 and s is the standard deviation
of the combined ranking. Finally, we compute the probability of observing that
RankDifMen > RankDifWomen for any two random observations, and this is given
by expression (4.13).
Pr(RankDifMen > RankDifWomen) =
2T − nm(nm + 1)
2nmnw
(4.13)
We sort individuals according to their actual ranking position (RankNew) and divide
them into 13 groups. The top group encompasses the top 499 achievers and the bottom
group the doctors who chose a specialty training post in the position 6,000 or below. We
present the differences in means between men and women for the variable RankDif ,
represented by ∆RankDif where ∆RankDif = RankDifmen−RankDifwomen, and
its statistical significance is given by the results of the t-test and Wilcoxon test for
the aggregated total and for each of the 13 groups. The objective is to analyse if the
change in weights affects top, middle and bottom ranked students differently. We also
present the results of the RankDif for the reduced sample of students who graduated
from a Spanish university to check whether the gender gap in RankDif is also present
in the more homogeneous group of Spanish graduates and to test whether the policy
fulfils its original purpose.
4.4.3 Results
4.4.3.1 Results MIR 2013
Table 4.10 shows the descriptive statistics for the variable RankDif by gender, reports
the differences in means represented by ∆RankDif , the results of the t-test and the
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test for the population of doctors who chose their specialty in
the year 2013. There were 6,348 doctors and from those 2,106 were men and 4,242
women. On average, male doctors gain 11.4 positions whilst female doctors lose 5.7
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positions. Therefore, ∆RankDif indicates a difference of 17.1 positions between the
two groups and this is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. The results
from the Wilcoxon test are also statistically significant and show that the probability
of observing RankDifMen > RankDifWomen is 0.53, suggesting that the distribution
of the variable RankDif is different for men and women.
We also show the descriptive statistics and the differences in means for male and
female doctors grouped according to their ranking position. An equal distribution of
them across groups would require an equal share of men and women, with respect to
the total number of men and women, in each group. However, the distribution we
observe is far from being equal and the largest difference can be found in the group
of top achievers (< 500), where the share of male doctors is 10% whilst the share of
female doctors is only 6.8%. In addition, ∆RankDif for the group of top achievers
is positive, equalling 31.3 and being statistically significant at the 99% confidence
level. The breakdown of RankDif for that group suggests that both male (36.5) and
female (5.2) doctors gain positions with the introduction of new weights, but that the
improvement is bigger for male doctors.
In general we observe a clear gender gap in the distribution of the RankDif , as
Figure 4.5 shows. All the statistically significant ∆RankDif are positive, and for all
groups at the top end of the ranking, i.e. those doctors who ranked in the first 3,000
positions, differences are always positive, meaning that a typical top achieving male
doctor gains, on average, more positions than the equivalent top achieving female
doctor. The results of the non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test are similar to the
results observed for the test of equality of means.
4.4.3.2 Results MIR 2013. Spanish sample
Table 4.11 shows the descriptive statistics, the t-test and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test for
the sample of doctors who graduated from a Spanish university and chose a specialty
in the year 2013. The sample size is 4,762, among which 1,335 are men and 3,427
are women. In this sample, as in Table 4.10, we observe that male doctors are over-
represented in the two top groups of high achievers (< 500) and [500, 1000). The
∆RankDif for the entire sample is positive, equalling 17.8 and being statistically
significant at the 99% confidence level. In the Spanish sample, both male and female
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Figure 4.5: Average RankDif by gender. MIR 2013
(a) All Doctors
(b) Spanish Sample
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doctors are better off with the introduction of the new weights, however the magnitude
of the gain is greater for men, who gain on average 31 positions, than for women,
who only gain 13.2. The Wilcoxon test confirms the previous result and shows that
the probability of observing RankDifMen > RankDifWomen is 0.53 and statistically
significant at the 99% confidence level. That result suggests that the distribution of
the variable RankDif is also different between men and women for the restricted
sample who graduated in Spain. In general, the results are very similar to the ones
in Table 4.10, however the magnitude of the variable ∆RankDif is smaller for the
top achievers and larger for doctors situated in the central positions of the ranking
distribution as Figure 4.5 shows.
4.4.3.3 Results MIR 2015
Table 4.12 shows the descriptive statistics, the results from the t-test and the Wilcoxon
Rank-Sum test for the sample of doctors who took part in the MIR in 2015. In
this case, the total number of doctors equals 6,015, of which 2,064 are male and
3,951 female. On average, male doctors gained 10.4 positions whilst female doctors
lost 5.4 positions. Therefore, this indicates a difference of 15.7 positions between
the two groups that is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. The
results from the Wilcoxon test are also statistically significant at the 99% confidence
level and show that the probability of observing RankDifM > RankDifW is 0.52,
indicating that the distribution of the variable RankDif is different for men and
women. In 2015, ∆RankDif for the group of top achievers is negative, meaning that
the women from the top group gained, on average, more positions than men with
the introduction of the new weights. However, the negative difference fails to be
statistically significant. ∆RankDif is statistically significant for the groups [500, 1000)
and [1500, 2000) and equal to 43.2 and 64.8, respectively. There is another statistically
significant ∆RankDif at the 90% confidence level for the group [5000, 5500), it is
negative and equal to -29.9, indicating that women at the bottom of the ranking
distribution are better off than men, after the change in weights. Figure 4.6 shows the
distribution of RankDif for the MIR 2015.
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Figure 4.6: Average RankDif by gender. MIR 2015.
(a) All Doctors
(b) Spanish Sample
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4.4.3.4 Results MIR 2015. Spanish sample
Table 4.13 does likewise for the reduced sample that only included those doctors
who graduated from a Spanish university. The overall ∆RankDif is again positive,
equal to 19.2, and it is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. In this
case, both male and female doctors are better off with the introduction of the new
weights, however the magnitude of the gain is greater for men who gain on average
29.5 positions, whilst women gain 10.3. The discrepancy between the distribution
of RankDif for male and female doctors is confirmed by the Wilcoxon test, as the
probability of observing RankDifMen > RankDifWomen is 0.53 and statistically
significant at the 99% confidence level. The breakdown of ∆RankDif by ranking
group present similar results to those observed in Table 4.12 for the complete sample.
4.4.4 Discussion
Our results show that the policy change that increased the weight of the MIR exam-
ination, to the detriment of the weight associated with the grade point average, has
overall favoured male doctors. On average, female doctors lose ranking positions, with
respect to the position they would have achieved with the old weights, whilst male
doctors gain positions. The differences are statistically significant. The results for the
reduced sample of Spanish graduates specifically show that, on average, both male
and female doctors are better off after the change, however the magnitude of the gain
is substantially smaller for the female doctors. Similarly, the breakdown of the ranking
differences by ranking position shows that top achievers, both men and women, are
better off than bottom achievers after the change; however, the magnitude of the gain
is again smaller for female top achievers than for male top achievers.
The results from the bottom half of the ranking distribution need to be interpreted
with caution, as the number of doctors opting out of the MIR process increases dra-
matically when the number of training positions reduces. Hence, the discrepancies
between the original ranking and the actual choice order are larger here than among
the top achievers. We expect the proportion of male doctors dropping out of the
process to be larger than the proportion of females, as historically male doctors have
shown stronger preference for the most demanded specialties and, therefore, bottom
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achieving female doctors who historically have shown preference for the less deman-
ded specialties such as general practice, might be over-represented at the bottom of
the ranking distribution. If the latter is confirmed and we only observe fewer and/or
worse-achiever males, it would (partially) explain the observed change in trends at
the bottom half of the ranking distribution.
Our results corroborate the well-known gender gap in competitiveness (Frick 2011).
Croson and Gneezy (2009) summarize the findings from experimental economics
concluding that women are more reluctant to engage in competitive interactions and
as the competitiveness of an environment increases, the performance and participation
of men increase relative to women. Frick (2011) suggests that the reluctance is usually
explained by women’s higher levels of risk aversion and also with an excess entry in
the competition level of men due to their overconfidence. These differences in risk
and confidence are consistent with the observed strategies taken by female and male
doctors on the MIR examination. Romeo-Ladrero (2014) constructed a measure of
risk taken in the MIR examination39 finding that males take greater risk than female
doctors, and that translates to better results for the top achievers and worse results
for the male doctors at the bottom end of the ranking distribution. The observed
behaviour by Romeo-Ladrero (2014) is very similar to our results for the distribution
of ∆RankDif . The differences in ranking are, on average, positive, favouring male
doctors in the top half of the ranking distribution; specifically, male top achievers who
might have taken more risk and where their behaviour entails an increase in their MIR
score. By contrast, male doctors in the bottom half of the ranking distribution might
also have taken more risk in responding to the test, however that group presents a
lower success rate, as they are more likely to have incorrect answers, and for them the
extra risk taken translates to a negative ∆RankDif .
The original design of the MIR allocation system and the posterior change in weights
were motivated to ensure the reliability and transparency of the process, and to avoid
favouritism (Aranda 2016). The Spanish specialty allocation system is based on the
principle of vertical equity, as it permits the most productive candidates to have the
39The author defines it as the ratio of the total answered questions by the total number of questions in
the multiple choice test. The test rewards correct answers with three points and penalizes incorrect
answers with the subtraction of one point.
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highest priority in choosing a training programme, using ranking position as a proxy
for doctors’ productivity (Harris et al. 2014). Nonetheless, our findings suggest that
ranking position might not be a fair proxy of productivity, as there is a clear differential
in attainment on the MIR examination results between male and female doctors. The
MIR examination only evaluates medical knowledge, by means of a restrictive multiple
choice test, does not value other important aspects such as communication, empathy
or professionalism (Aranda 2016), and neglects the importance of having real vocation
for the chosen specialty (Lorusso and Gonza´lez Lo´pez-Valca´rcel 2013). For those
other non-valued aspects there is evidence of females outperforming male doctors.
Using data from the United Kingdom, Dewhurst et al. (2007) and Woolf et al. (2011)
found that women were more likely to outperform men in clinical skill examinations
that take place during the specialty training residency. Moreover, Baumha¨kel et al.
(2009) found that females are more likely to adhere to clinical guidelines and Lurie
et al. (1993) shows that female doctors provide preventive care more often than male
doctors.
Da´vila-Quintana et al. (2015) describe the two criteria the MIR allocation process
should meet: vertical equity and social efficiency. Although the design of the system
was made to ensure the first criteria, the results of our analysis suggest that the equity
criteria is being violated. The social efficiency described as the capacity of the cohort
of specialist doctors to maximise the number QALYs40 of a given population is also
neglected (Da´vila-Quintana et al. 2015). Therefore, there is a need for an in depth
revision of the functioning of the process in order to adapt it to the socio-demographic
composition of new cohorts of doctors, to the actual role of doctors in society, and
to make it accountable for the other competences that are valued in the practise of
medicine in the XXI century (Torres et al. 2008; Lorusso and Gonza´lez Lo´pez-Valca´rcel
2013).
4.5 Conclusion
This paper extensively explores two of the sources of the occupational gender segreg-
ation in the Spanish medical workforce. First, we analysed whether the presence of
40Quality-Adjusted Life Year
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female role models in male-dominated specialties affects the career choices of female
doctors. Our results suggest that an increased presence of females in those specialties
is an attractor for both male and female doctors. For the reduced sample of female
doctors with an interest in surgical specialties, the effect is stronger, as being exposed
to a larger proportion of female role models makes them more likely to choose a
male-dominated surgical specialty, with respect to a gender-balanced surgical option.
Notwithstanding, the estimation of social effects is challenging and we cannot discard
the presence of other elements correlated with a larger proportion of female role
models that might also influence doctors’ specialty choices.
Second, we analysed the functioning of the specialty allocation system and tested
whether a policy change, aimed at increasing the vertical equity of the process, had
the unintended consequence of reducing the probability of female doctors accessing
high demand specialties. We find that the increase of the competitiveness of the
process, which results from the greater weight associated with the MIR examination
score, has made female doctors, on average, worse off. However, the breakdown
of the differences in the ranking position shows that although top achiever female
doctors gain positions with the introduction of the new weights, the magnitude of
those gains is always smaller than the gains displayed by male doctors. The gender gap
in competitiveness is poorly understood (see Frick (2011) for classification of the main
theories addressing the issue), however the aim of this paper is not disentangling why
the two groups present different levels of competitiveness. Our results are the evidence
that those differences also exist in the Spanish medical market and, in consequence,
lower the probability for female doctors to access the most demanded specialties.
Overall, our findings confirm that the observed gender gap in surgical specialties
is not only due to differences in intrinsic preferences between men and women. Al-
though, in this chapter we only explore two of the possible sources that give rise and
help in perpetuating occupational segregation and its undesired consequences, we
conjecture that there are many other elements which also contribute, and that require
a careful examination. This is an unexplored area where further research is required.
The Spanish specialty allocation process dates from the late nineteen seventies when
the medical workforce composition was very different from the actual workforce com-
position. There is a need for policy makers to better understand the mechanisms that
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give rise to the allocation of new cohort of doctors to specialties. This exercise gains
importance with the feminization of the medical workforce and further understanding
of how gender influences doctors’ careers choices becomes required. Arrizabalaga
et al. (2015) suggest that the recognition of gender inequalities by medical institutions
is the first step in helping women to advance in their careers.
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4.6 Tables
Table 4.1: List of specialties in the Spanish Health System
Laboratory Clinical Analysis, Anatomical Pathology, Clinical Biochemistry, Pharmaceut-
ical Medicine, Immunology, Nuclear Medicine, Microbiology, Clinical Neuro-
physiology, Radiology
Medical Allergy, Anaesthetists, Cardiology, Gastroenterology, Endocrinology and Dia-
betes, Geriatric, Haematology, Medical Hydrology, Occupational Medicine,
Sport and Exercise Medicine, General Practice, Rehabilitation Medicine, In-
tensive Care Medicine, General Internal Medicine, Legal and Forensic Medi-
cine, Public Health, Renal Medicine, Respiratory, Haematology, Neurology,
Medical Oncology, Clinical Oncology, Paediatrics & Rheumatology.
Surgical Cardiovascular Surgery, General Surgery, Oral Surgery, Paediatric Surgery,
Plastic Surgery & Thoracic Surgery, Neurosurgery
Medical-Surgical Vascular Surgery, Dermatologic Surgery, Obstetrics & Gynaecology, Ophthal-
mology, Otorhinolaryngology, Genito-Urinary Medicine & Orthopaedic Sur-
gery.
Table 4.2: Classification of surgical and medical-surgical into male-dominated and
gender-balanced specialties
Male dominated surgical and
medical-surgical specialities
Vascular Surgery, Cardiovascular Surgery, Oral Surgery, Ortho-
paedic Surgery, Plastic Surgery, Thoracic Surgery, Neurosurgery
and Urology
Gender balanced surgical and
medical-surgical specializations
General Surgery, Dermatology, Obstetrics & Gynaecology, Oph-
thalmology, and Otorhinolaryngology
The classification of specialties into male-dominated or gender balanced respond to historical ratios.
The specializations for which the intake of female residents has been less than 50% for most years in
the period 1991- 2014 are classified as male-dominated.
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Table 4.3: Variables in the MIR Registry and MIR Survey datasets
MIR Registry
Specialty Chosen Categorical variable indicating individual’s chosen specialty
(47 specialties)
Ranking Position This variable indicates the order in which the individual made
the specialty choice
Training Location Categorical variable indicating the university hospital where
the individual carries out the specialty training
Women Equals 1 if the individual is female and 0 otherwise
Age The variable indicates individual’s age during the specialty
allocation process
Spanish Equals 1 if the individual’s nationality is Spanish and 0 other-
wise
GPA Grade Point Average (GPA) of medical undergraduate studies,
that is continuous and ranges from 1 to 5
Exam Score (ES) Numerical variable that provides the results of the MIR state
examination
Medical School Categorical variable: 34 Spanish medical schools
Year The variable indicates the year in which the individual parti-
cipated in the specialty allocation process
MIR Survey
Preferred Specialty Categorical variable indicating individuals’ preferred specialty
(47 specialties)
First MIR Equals 1 if the doctor is participating in the MIR allocation
process for the first time and 0 otherwise
a The MIR Survey also includes all the variables from the MIR Registry.
Table 4.4: Example of role model exposure for a doctor who started medical school in
the academic year 2006/07
Academic Year Did the student attend
clinical training at a uni-
versity hospital?
Who are the role models? All female junior doctors who
chose specialization from year:
1st2006/7 No
2nd2007/8 No
3rd2008/9 Yes 2003 (5st year residents) to 2008 (1th year residents)
4th2009/10 Yes 2004 (5st year residents) to 2009 (1th year residents)
5th2010/11 Yes 2005 (5st year residents) to 2010 (1th year residents)
6th2011/12 Yes 2006 (5st year residents) to 2011 (1th year residents)
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Table 4.5: Description of the dependent variables y1, y2 and y3
Dependent Variables Values Sample size
y1
1 if doctor’s Preferred Speciality is a male-dominated
surgical or medical-surgical specialty
All respondents to the MIR Survey N= 6,183
0 if 1 if doctor’s Preferred Speciality is any other op-
tion (laboratory, medical, gender-balanced surgical
and gender-balanced medical-surgical)
y2
1 if doctor’s Preferred Speciality is a surgical or
medical-surgical specialty (all male-dominated and
gender balanced specializations)
All respondents to the MIR Survey N= 6,183
0 if 1 if doctor’s Preferred Speciality is any other
option (laboratory or medical)
y3
1 if doctor’s Preferred Speciality is a male-dominated
surgical or medical-surgical specialty
Only doctors for whom the variable Preferred Speciality is a
surgical o medical-surgical N=2,183
0 if doctor’s Preferred Speciality is a gender-balanced
surgical or medical-surgical specialty
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Table 4.6: Descriptive statistics MIR Survey
All respondents to the MIR Survey Role Model Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Women 8,739 0.678 0.467 0 1 6,261 0.718 0.450 0 1
Age 8,656 27.04 4.563 22 51 6,209 25.352 2.298 22 51
Spanish 8,347 0.860 0.347 0 1 6,235 0.987 0.112 0 1
Year MIR
2013 8,739 0.351 0.477 0 1 6,261 0.296 0.457 0 1
2014 8,739 0.259 0.438 0 1 6,261 0.254 0.435 0 1
2015 8,739 0.390 0.488 0 1 6,261 0.450 0.498 0 1
GPA 8,739 1.945 0.484 1 4.3 6,261 1.963 0.468 1 4.2
MIR Exam Score (ES) 8,739 390.53 79.59 174 591 6,261 404.92 74.52 177 591
Ranking Position 8,739 3204.17 2194.13 1 9176 6,261 2839.39 2078.52 1 9108
First MIR 8,692 0.776 0.417 0 1 6,221 0.926 0.262 0 1
Year finish studies 3,408 2012.982 3.099 1980 2014 2,820 2013.70 0.999 2007 2014
RM1 6,261 0.653 0.161 0 1 6,261 0.653 0.161 0 1
Dependent Variables
y1 8,738 0.206 0.405 0 1 6,261 0.203 0.402 0 1
y2 8,739 0.357 0.479 0 1 6,261 0.354 0.478 0 1
y3 4,091 0.436 0.496 0 1 2,891 0.437 0.496 0 1
Preferred Specialty
Laboratory 8,739 0.064 0.245 0 1 6,261 0.046 0.208 0 1
Medical 8,739 0.578 0.494 0 1 6,261 0.600 0.490 0 1
Medical-surgical 8,739 0.257 0.437 0 1 6,261 0.257 0.437 0 1
Surgical 8,739 0.100 0.300 0 1 6,261 0.098 0.297 0 1
Chosen Specialty
Laboratory 8,739 0.075 0.264 0 1 6,260 0.053 0.223 0 1
Medical 8,739 0.720 0.449 0 1 6,260 0.725 0.446 0 1
Medical-surgical 8,739 0.152 0.359 0 1 6,260 0.166 0.372 0 1
Surgical 8,739 0.059 0.235 0 1 6,260 0.065 0.246 0 1
University
AU Barcelona 8,680 0.049 0.216 0 1 6,261 0.063 0.242 0 1
AU Madrid 8,680 0.036 0.186 0 1 6,261 0.045 0.207 0 1
Alcala 8,680 0.022 0.146 0 1 6,261 0.027 0.161 0 1
Alicante 8,680 0.023 0.149 0 1 6,261 0.029 0.167 0 1
Badajoz 8,680 0.017 0.128 0 1 6,261 0.020 0.139 0 1
CEU 8,680 0.005 0.070 0 1 6,261 0.002 0.042 0 1
Castilla -Mancha 8,680 0.015 0.122 0 1 6,261 0.021 0.142 0 1
Cadiz 8,680 0.023 0.149 0 1 6,261 0.027 0.163 0 1
Cantabria 8,680 0.012 0.109 0 1 6,261 0.015 0.121 0 1
Catolica StVicente 8,680 0.003 0.051 0 1 6,261 0.004 0.061 0 1
Complutense Madrid 8,680 0.065 0.246 0 1 6,261 0.078 0.268 0 1
Cordoba 8,680 0.022 0.146 0 1 6,261 0.026 0.160 0 1
Europea Cees 8,680 0.002 0.043 0 1 6,261 0.003 0.050 0 1
Gerona 8,680 0.003 0.059 0 1 6,261 0.005 0.069 0 1
Granada 8,680 0.045 0.208 0 1 6,261 0.054 0.227 0 1
Int Catalua 8,680 0.003 0.058 0 1 6,261 0.005 0.068 0 1
Laguna 8,680 0.020 0.141 0 1 6,261 0.026 0.158 0 1
Lleida 8,680 0.009 0.097 0 1 6,261 0.007 0.085 0 1
Malaga 8,680 0.028 0.164 0 1 6,261 0.033 0.180 0 1
Murcia 8,680 0.029 0.169 0 1 6,261 0.038 0.192 0 1
Navarra 8,680 0.026 0.160 0 1 6,261 0.033 0.178 0 1
Oviedo 8,680 0.018 0.132 0 1 6,261 0.021 0.143 0 1
Pais Vasco 8,680 0.034 0.182 0 1 6,261 0.044 0.205 0 1
Rey JC 8,680 0.004 0.066 0 1 6,261 0.006 0.078 0 1
Salamanca 8,680 0.022 0.148 0 1 6,261 0.028 0.164 0 1
Santiago 8,680 0.041 0.198 0 1 6,261 0.051 0.221 0 1
Sevilla 8,680 0.049 0.215 0 1 6,261 0.058 0.234 0 1
Tarragona 8,680 0.016 0.125 0 1 6,261 0.020 0.140 0 1
UB BCN 8,680 0.044 0.206 0 1 6,261 0.058 0.235 0 1
ULPGC 8,680 0.012 0.107 0 1 6,261 0.015 0.120 0 1
Valencia 8,680 0.046 0.209 0 1 6,261 0.056 0.230 0 1
Valladolid 8,680 0.027 0.163 0 1 6,261 0.034 0.181 0 1
Zaragoza 8,680 0.041 0.197 0 1 6,261 0.050 0.218 0 1
European 8,680 0.088 0.284 0 1
Latin America 8,680 0.090 0.286 0 1
Other International 8,680 0.010 0.101 0 1
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Table 4.7: Estimation results variable y1
(1) All Sample (2) All Sample (3) Only Men (4) Only Women
β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME
Women -0.460*** -0.093*** -0.459*** -0.093***
(0.048) (0.049)
Age -0.026*** -0.005*** -0.026*** -0.005*** -0.029*** -0.008*** -0.022** -0.004**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011)
Spanish -0.109 -0.022 -0.107 -0.022 -0.175 -0.048 -0.080 -0.014
(0.203) (0.203) (0.243) (0.218)
Role Model (RM1) 1.062*** 0.214*** 1.354*** 0.370*** 0.933*** 0.162***
(0.214) (0.359) (0.221)
GPA -0.008 -0.002 -0.008 -0.002 0.033 0.009 -0.029 -0.005
(0.070) (0.070) (0.041) (0.091)
First Mir -0.267*** -0.054*** -0.273*** -0.055*** -0.488*** -0.133*** -0.137*** -0.024***
(0.067) (0.064) (0.089) (0.049)
AUMadrid 0.166 0.035 0.124 0.024 -0.045 -0.014 0.256 0.036
(0.171) (0.164) (0.131) (0.215)
Alcala -0.184 -0.032 -0.245 -0.038 -0.552* -0.139* -0.015 -0.002
(0.230) (0.218) (0.327) (0.209)
Alicante -0.009 -0.002 0.082 0.016 0.030 0.009 0.147 0.019
(0.150) (0.160) (0.057) (0.220)
Badajoz 0.314*** 0.072*** 0.586*** 0.144*** 0.235* 0.078* 0.848*** 0.174***
(0.119) (0.153) (0.139) (0.253)
CEU 0.347*** 0.080*** 0.301*** 0.065*** 0.142* 0.046* 0.435*** 0.069***
(0.093) (0.091) (0.073) (0.115)
CMancha 0.029 0.006 0.703*** 0.182*** 0.387 0.133 0.946** 0.204**
(0.184) (0.264) (0.391) (0.382)
Cadiz -0.110 -0.020 0.006 0.001 -0.253*** -0.072*** 0.216 0.029
(0.102) (0.115) (0.027) (0.146)
Cantabria 0.239* 0.052* 0.358*** 0.079*** 0.243 0.081 0.429 0.067
(0.124) (0.122) (0.200) (0.403)
CatolicaStVic 0.518*** 0.130*** 0.438*** 0.101*** 0.270 0.091 0.266 0.037
(0.072) (0.075) (0.245) (0.742)
Complu Mad 0.127*** 0.026*** 0.010 0.002 -0.276* -0.078* 0.221** 0.030**
(0.048) (0.037) (0.145) (0.103)
Cordoba -0.152 -0.027 -0.108 -0.018 -0.637*** -0.154*** 0.247** 0.034**
(0.149) (0.146) (0.209) (0.126)
EuropeaCees -0.461*** -0.067*** -0.419*** -0.059*** -0.477*** -0.124*** 0.000 0.000
(0.099) (0.104) (0.057) (.)
Gerona 0.101 0.021 0.214* 0.044* 0.182*** 0.060*** 0.290* 0.041*
(0.111) (0.127) (0.043) (0.160)
Granada -0.005 -0.001 0.030 0.005 -0.537** -0.136** 0.363 0.055
(0.126) (0.117) (0.220) (0.231)
Int Cat 0.046 0.009 0.053 0.010 0.219*** 0.073*** 0.000 0.000
(0.094) (0.094) (0.063) (.)
Laguna 0.150 0.031 0.236** 0.049** -0.302 -0.084 0.562** 0.097**
(0.104) (0.100) (0.498) (0.263)
Lleida -0.890*** -0.098*** -0.140 -0.023 0.150 0.049 0.000 0.000
(0.099) (0.231) (0.212) (.)
Malaga 0.051 0.010 0.150 0.030 -0.171 -0.050 0.368*** 0.055***
(0.182) (0.186) (0.398) (0.112)
Murcia -0.028 -0.005 0.358** 0.079** 0.112 0.036 0.565*** 0.098***
(0.094) (0.167) (0.124) (0.126)
Navarra 0.118 0.024 0.177 0.036 -0.046 -0.014 0.335 0.049
(0.124) (0.126) (0.176) (0.234)
Oviedo -0.257 -0.042 -0.204 -0.033 -0.454** -0.119** -0.013 -0.002
(0.244) (0.224) (0.189) (0.278)
Pais Vasco 0.018 0.003 -0.082 -0.014 -0.480*** -0.124*** 0.165 0.021
(0.163) (0.172) (0.177) (0.174)
Rey JC -0.412*** -0.062*** -0.299** -0.045** -0.437*** -0.115*** -0.172 -0.017
(0.112) (0.128) (0.045) (0.167)
Salamanca 0.016 0.003 0.257*** 0.054*** -0.159 -0.047 0.562** 0.097**
(0.105) (0.086) (0.208) (0.223)
Santiago 0.039 0.008 0.255 0.053 0.015 0.005 0.442* 0.070*
(0.144) (0.179) (0.156) (0.262)
Sevilla 0.096 0.020 0.024 0.004 -0.246 -0.070 0.221* 0.030*
(0.114) (0.110) (0.284) (0.114)
Tarragona 0.215 0.047 -0.077 -0.013 -0.347 -0.095 0.124 0.016
(0.248) (0.208) (0.216) (0.246)
UB BCN -0.028 -0.005 -0.049 -0.009 -0.114 -0.034 0.046 0.005
(0.060) (0.053) (0.174) (0.034)
ULPGC -0.044 -0.008 0.001 0.000 -0.818** -0.181** 0.448* 0.072*
(0.276) (0.277) (0.318) (0.260)
Valencia 0.240*** 0.053*** 0.195** 0.040** -0.265* -0.075* 0.463*** 0.075***
(0.074) (0.093) (0.142) (0.164)
Valladolid 0.140 0.029 0.153 0.030 -0.224 -0.064 0.392 0.060
(0.131) (0.154) (0.139) (0.273)
Zaragoza -0.040 -0.007 0.116 0.023 -0.056 -0.017 0.268 0.038
(0.126) (0.138) (0.249) (0.201)
Constant 0.158 -0.605 -0.264 -1.379***
(0.299) (0.417) (0.339) (0.464)
N 6,181 6,181 1,745 4,438
R2 0.036 0.036 0.032 0.014
Log-Likelihood -2279.517 -2278.530 -850.775 -1404.595
AIC 4563.034 4561.060 1705.551 2813.190
a Base outcomes: Gender: Men, Nationality:Non-Spanish, Medical School: Univesidad Autonoma de Barcelona
b SE: Standard Errors clustered by MIR year; AME: Average Marginal Effect
c P-values: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 4.8: Estimation results variable y2
(1) All Sample (2) All Sample (3) Only Men (4) Only Women
β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME
Women -0.102** -0.038** -0.101** -0.037**
(0.047) (0.047)
Age -0.031*** -0.011*** -0.030*** -0.011*** -0.027*** -0.010*** -0.032*** -0.012***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005)
Spanish -0.238** -0.088** -0.237** -0.087** -0.155 -0.058 -0.297*** -0.108***
(0.096) (0.094) (0.208) (0.086)
GPA 0.072* 0.026* 0.072* 0.026* 0.113*** 0.042*** 0.051 0.018
(0.040) (0.040) (0.036) (0.048)
First Mir -0.332*** -0.122*** -0.337*** -0.124*** -0.398** -0.148** -0.318*** -0.116***
(0.061) (0.060) (0.194) (0.028)
Role Model (RM1) 0.670 0.247 1.393* 0.517* 0.392 0.143
(0.568) (0.832) (0.526)
AUMadrid -0.036 -0.014 -0.062 -0.023 -0.078 -0.029 -0.066 -0.024
(0.178) (0.154) (0.166) (0.139)
Alcala -0.176 -0.065 -0.214 -0.077 -0.377 -0.136 -0.152 -0.054
(0.234) (0.201) (0.433) (0.144)
Alicante -0.000 -0.000 0.057 0.022 -0.096 -0.036 0.112 0.042
(0.291) (0.328) (0.104) (0.400)
Badajoz -0.087 -0.033 0.085 0.032 0.331 0.128 -0.044 -0.016
(0.157) (0.280) (0.363) (0.286)
CEU -0.203* -0.074* -0.232** -0.083** -0.348** -0.126** -0.186*** -0.065***
(0.114) (0.091) (0.146) (0.069)
CMancha -0.184* -0.068* 0.241 0.093 0.604 0.229 0.109 0.041
(0.102) (0.450) (0.765) (0.372)
Cadiz -0.107 -0.040 -0.034 -0.012 -0.166 -0.062 0.023 0.008
(0.104) (0.153) (0.334) (0.064)
Cantabria -0.050 -0.019 0.025 0.009 0.187 0.072 -0.105 -0.038
(0.099) (0.149) (0.325) (0.096)
CatolicaStVic 0.212** 0.082** 0.160*** 0.061*** -0.035 -0.013 0.245 0.093
(0.095) (0.059) (0.198) (0.320)
Complu Mad -0.068 -0.026 -0.142*** -0.052*** -0.422*** -0.151*** -0.031 -0.011
(0.098) (0.042) (0.088) (0.064)
Cordoba -0.234*** -0.085*** -0.206*** -0.074*** -0.502* -0.177* -0.075 -0.027
(0.030) (0.023) (0.304) (0.127)
EuropeaCees 0.005 0.002 0.032 0.012 0.096 0.037 -0.160 -0.057
(0.109) (0.133) (0.186) (0.119)
Gerona -0.121 -0.045 -0.049 -0.018 -0.342 -0.125 0.042 0.015
(0.106) (0.168) (0.253) (0.135)
Granada -0.137 -0.051 -0.114 -0.042 -0.401*** -0.144*** -0.007 -0.002
(0.088) (0.093) (0.098) (0.102)
Int Cat 0.147 0.057 0.152 0.058 0.577*** 0.219*** -0.247*** -0.086***
(0.106) (0.111) (0.175) (0.089)
Laguna 0.019 0.007 0.074 0.028 -0.002 -0.001 0.103*** 0.039***
(0.050) (0.094) (0.357) (0.030)
Lleida -0.372*** -0.131*** 0.101 0.038 0.826 0.303 -0.196 -0.069
(0.106) (0.508) (0.711) (0.452)
Malaga -0.197 -0.072 -0.134 -0.049 -0.191 -0.071 -0.116 -0.041
(0.178) (0.230) (0.415) (0.208)
Murcia -0.024 -0.009 0.222 0.085 0.388 0.149 0.144 0.054
(0.129) (0.317) (0.362) (0.302)
Navarra -0.032 -0.012 0.005 0.002 -0.029 -0.011 0.011 0.004
(0.103) (0.131) (0.204) (0.126)
Oviedo -0.338** -0.120** -0.302* -0.106* -0.554 -0.193 -0.204* -0.072*
(0.151) (0.168) (0.357) (0.122)
Pais Vasco -0.059 -0.022 -0.122 -0.044 -0.501*** -0.176*** 0.001 0.000
(0.152) (0.118) (0.059) (0.145)
Rey JC -0.169 -0.062 -0.097 -0.036 -0.172 -0.064 -0.071 -0.026
(0.106) (0.168) (0.246) (0.136)
Salamanca -0.104** -0.039** 0.049 0.018 -0.039 -0.015 0.101 0.038
(0.049) (0.149) (0.126) (0.186)
Santiago -0.202* -0.074* -0.066 -0.024 -0.050 -0.019 -0.074 -0.027
(0.115) (0.232) (0.227) (0.229)
Sevilla -0.060 -0.023 -0.106* -0.039* -0.164 -0.061 -0.090*** -0.033***
(0.099) (0.059) (0.179) (0.017)
Tarragona 0.018 0.007 -0.164** -0.059** -0.304*** -0.111*** -0.112* -0.040*
(0.142) (0.080) (0.100) (0.067)
UB BCN 0.012 0.004 -0.001 -0.000 0.104 0.040 -0.021 -0.008
(0.109) (0.095) (0.242) (0.041)
ULPGC -0.269 -0.097 -0.241 -0.086 -0.656 -0.222 -0.070 -0.025
(0.301) (0.313) (0.472) (0.233)
Valencia -0.022 -0.008 -0.050 -0.019 -0.335*** -0.122*** 0.045 0.017
(0.110) (0.092) (0.088) (0.093)
Valladolid 0.035 0.013 0.043 0.016 -0.271 -0.100 0.152 0.057
(0.169) (0.184) (0.246) (0.171)
Zaragoza -0.097 -0.036 0.002 0.001 -0.036 -0.014 0.016 0.006
(0.098) (0.173) (0.406) (0.086)
Constant 0.959*** 0.477 -0.111 0.659
(0.275) (0.655) (0.714) (0.564)
N 6,183 6,183 1,745 4,438
R2 0.009 0.009 0.025 0.007
Log-Likelihood -3980.402 -3979.754 -1131.163 -2831.942
AIC 7964.804 7963.508 2266.325 5667.884
a Base outcomes: Gender: Men, Nationality:Non-Spanish, Medical School: Univesidad Autonoma de Barcelona
b SE: Standard Errors clustered by MIR year; AME: Average Marginal Effect
c P-values: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 4.9: Estimation results variable y3
(1) All Sample (2) All Sample (3) Only Men (4) Only Women
β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME β (SE) AME
Women -0.660*** -0.232*** -0.658*** -0.231***
(0.046) (0.048)
Age -0.011 -0.004 -0.010 -0.004 -0.019** -0.007** -0.008 -0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.019)
Spanish 0.048 0.017 0.051 0.018 -0.096 -0.037 0.215 0.072
(0.217) (0.221) (0.265) (0.237)
GPA -0.098 -0.035 -0.099 -0.035 -0.104* -0.040* -0.099 -0.033
(0.103) (0.103) (0.053) (0.135)
First Mir -0.077*** -0.027*** -0.079*** -0.028*** -0.372*** -0.142*** 0.074 0.025
(0.013) (0.013) (0.091) (0.065)
Role Model (RM1) 0.730 0.257 -0.202 -0.077 0.928** 0.309**
(0.595) (1.541) (0.370)
AUMadrid 0.288*** 0.102*** 0.256** 0.089** 0.076 0.029 0.416** 0.123**
(0.085) (0.105) (0.139) (0.194)
Alcala -0.121 -0.039 -0.166 -0.052 -0.483*** -0.189*** 0.076 0.019
(0.170) (0.163) (0.150) (0.315)
Alicante 0.018 0.006 0.078 0.026 0.152 0.057 0.100 0.026
(0.259) (0.250) (0.180) (0.291)
Badajoz 0.586*** 0.215*** 0.771*** 0.282*** -0.215 -0.084 1.366*** 0.484***
(0.131) (0.219) (0.658) (0.364)
CEU 0.977*** 0.359*** 0.944*** 0.345*** 0.000 0.000 0.880*** 0.296***
(0.044) (0.061) (.) (0.126)
CMancha 0.234 0.082 0.694*** 0.253*** -0.641 -0.249 1.237*** 0.435***
(0.194) (0.171) (1.157) (0.239)
Cadiz -0.042 -0.014 0.035 0.011 -0.333 -0.131 0.261* 0.073*
(0.091) (0.044) (0.353) (0.142)
Cantabria 0.423*** 0.153*** 0.506*** 0.182*** 0.134 0.050 0.698 0.225
(0.054) (0.046) (0.726) (0.607)
CatolicaStVic 0.666*** 0.245*** 0.612*** 0.222*** 0.739*** 0.238*** 0.188 0.051
(0.071) (0.083) (0.114) (0.788)
Complu Mad 0.294*** 0.104*** 0.213*** 0.073*** 0.163 0.061 0.335*** 0.096***
(0.037) (0.046) (0.235) (0.094)
Cordoba 0.036 0.012 0.067 0.022 -0.599*** -0.233*** 0.389 0.114
(0.238) (0.218) (0.015) (0.272)
EuropeaCees -0.738*** -0.192*** -0.709*** -0.182*** -0.890*** -0.336*** 0.000 0.000
(0.049) (0.049) (0.174) (.)
Gerona 0.345*** 0.123*** 0.422*** 0.150*** 0.000 0.000 0.344*** 0.099***
(0.056) (0.057) (.) (0.107)
Granada 0.168 0.058 0.193* 0.066* -0.502 -0.197 0.525** 0.161**
(0.130) (0.104) (0.416) (0.256)
Int Cat -0.186*** -0.059*** -0.182*** -0.056*** -0.222* -0.087* 0.000 0.000
(0.048) (0.043) (0.135) (.)
Laguna 0.211 0.074 0.270 0.094 -0.537 -0.210 0.701* 0.226*
(0.241) (0.285) (0.664) (0.426)
Lleida -1.027*** -0.237*** -0.511 -0.142 -1.190 -0.423 0.000 0.000
(0.069) (0.436) (1.213) (.)
Malaga 0.274** 0.097** 0.340*** 0.120*** -0.216 -0.084 0.625*** 0.197***
(0.114) (0.086) (0.194) (0.093)
Murcia -0.023 -0.008 0.244 0.084 -0.556 -0.217 0.648*** 0.206***
(0.031) (0.263) (0.625) (0.122)
Navarra 0.202*** 0.071*** 0.242*** 0.084*** -0.122 -0.047 0.439* 0.131*
(0.076) (0.045) (0.300) (0.224)
Oviedo -0.016 -0.005 0.020 0.007 -0.070 -0.027 0.125 0.033
(0.274) (0.248) (0.247) (0.323)
Pais Vasco 0.123 0.042 0.053 0.018 -0.131 -0.051 0.223 0.061
(0.120) (0.182) (0.371) (0.178)
Rey JC -0.426*** -0.125*** -0.349*** -0.103*** -0.657** -0.255** -0.177 -0.040
(0.075) (0.078) (0.266) (0.157)
Salamanca 0.147 0.051 0.315*** 0.110*** -0.436 -0.171 0.684*** 0.220***
(0.208) (0.118) (0.477) (0.210)
Santiago 0.281 0.100 0.426 0.152 -0.074 -0.028 0.680** 0.218**
(0.206) (0.293) (0.525) (0.327)
Sevilla 0.200*** 0.070*** 0.150 0.051 -0.180 -0.070 0.394*** 0.115***
(0.066) (0.108) (0.356) (0.150)
Tarragona 0.293 0.104 0.089 0.030 0.005 0.002 0.270 0.075
(0.285) (0.394) (0.505) (0.409)
UB BCN -0.072** -0.024** -0.086** -0.028** -0.298** -0.117** 0.070 0.018
(0.032) (0.038) (0.145) (0.065)
ULPGC 0.266 0.094 0.295 0.103 -0.652* -0.253* 0.699** 0.225**
(0.288) (0.310) (0.374) (0.318)
Valencia 0.428*** 0.155*** 0.397*** 0.141*** -0.005 -0.002 0.631*** 0.199***
(0.064) (0.092) (0.326) (0.169)
Valladolid 0.214** 0.075** 0.222* 0.077* -0.090 -0.035 0.414* 0.122*
(0.105) (0.120) (0.517) (0.249)
Zaragoza 0.050 0.017 0.159** 0.054** -0.161 -0.063 0.343 0.099
(0.067) (0.069) (0.450) (0.261)
Constant 0.416 -0.113 1.526 -1.482
(0.535) (0.962) (1.644) (0.923)
N 2,186 2,186 664 1522
R2 0.058 0.058 0.034 0.025
Log-Likelihood -1348.335 -1348.072 -442.753 -885.185
AIC 2700.670 2700.143 889.505 1774.370
a Base outcomes: Gender: Men, Nationality:Non-Spanish, Medical School: Univesidad Autonoma de Barcelona
b SE: Standard Errors clustered by MIR year; AME: Average Marginal Effect
c P-values: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 4.10: Differences in ranking position by gender: MIR 2013
MIR 2013 Men Women Student’s t-test Wilcoxon Rank-Sum
Ranking N Share RankDifM SD Min Max N Share RankDifW SD Min Max ∆RankDif 95% CI t PRa z
< 500 211 10.0% 36.5 103.7 -303 451 288 6.8% 5.2 104.1 -362 313 31.29*** 12.79 49.78 3.32 0.582*** 3.15
[500, 1000) 166 7.9% 50.8 195.5 -454 528 334 7.9% 23.7 173.6 -599 568 27.08 -8.15 62.32 1.51 0.536 1.315
[1000, 1500) 162 7.7% 5.4 235.4 -753 534 338 8.0% 8.8 220.8 -762 585 -3.38 -46.77 40.01 -0.15 0.502 0.059
[1500, 2000) 168 8.0% 50.0 278.2 -703 770 332 7.8% 12.9 256.5 -691 628 37.09 -13.41 87.59 1.45 0.541 1.498
[2000, 2500) 149 7.1% 42.4 337.2 -1277 744 351 8.3% -6.3 268.3 -978 612 48.76 -12.54 110.06 1.57 0.565** 2.31
[2500, 3000) 150 7.1% 75.9 290.8 -857 775 350 8.3% -14.3 317.7 -1194 718 90.20*** 32.76 147.64 3.09 0.579*** 2.799
[3000, 3500) 173 8.2% -15.2 341.7 -1329 614 327 7.7% -5.2 295.2 -1327 713 -10.01 -70.38 50.37 -0.33 0.503 0.105
[3500, 4000) 154 7.3% 16.2 290.5 -897 562 346 8.2% -48.3 294.8 -1390 481 64.52** 8.89 120.14 2.28 0.575*** 2.674
[4000, 4500) 165 7.8% -42.7 287.8 -1024 349 335 7.9% -14.3 241.6 -1390 392 -28.43 -79.62 22.75 -1.09 0.489 -0.413
[4500, 5000) 170 8.1% -21.2 246.8 -1238 359 330 7.8% -12.7 201.2 -1161 355 -8.51 -51.67 34.66 -0.39 0.52 0.751
[5000, 5500) 154 7.3% -22.1 160.1 -671 272 346 8.2% -8.5 151.1 -750 261 -13.58 -43.59 16.42 -0.89 0.48 -0.72
[5500, 6000) 160 7.6% -3.7 129.2 -431 184 340 8.0% 1.0 121.2 -581 199 -4.71 -28.62 19.20 -0.39 0.496 -0.158
≥ 6000 124 5.9% -34.8 117.7 -651 122 225 5.3% -15.4 85.3 -350 127 -19.44 -43.12 4.24 -1.62 0.468 -0.982
Total 2,106 100% 11.4 246.3 -1329 775 4,242 100% -5.7 227.1 -1390 718 17.06*** 4.51 29.61 2.67 0.526*** 3.394
a PR = Pr(RankDifM > RankDifW )
b P-values: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 4.11: Differences in ranking position by gender: MIR 2013-Spanish sample
MIR 2013 Men Women Student’s t-test Wilcoxon Rank-Sum
Ranking N Share RankDifM SD Min Max N Share RankDifW SD Min Max ∆RankDif 95% CI t PRa z
< 500 184 13.8% 31.5 94.2 -303 451 273 8.0% 5.5 101.8 -362 313 26.02*** 7.78 44.27 2.803 0.575*** 2.707
[500, 1000) 134 10.0% 39.2 176.5 -370 494 304 8.9% 23.2 174.2 -599 568 15.92 -19.98 51.82 0.873 0.521 0.699
[1000, 1500) 115 8.6% 29.4 203.8 -543 375 293 8.5% 11.6 210.3 -762 585 17.77 -26.83 62.38 0.785 0.529 0.921
[1500, 2000) 109 8.2% 19.2 255.1 -649 664 288 8.4% 17.1 241.3 -648 526 2.11* -53.66 57.88 0.075 0.507 0.21
[2000, 2500) 96 7.2% 18.9 322.5 -1277 588 294 8.6% 4.1 251.1 -978 612 14.76 -56.48 86.01 0.410 0.525 0.741
[2500, 3000) 93 7.0% 73.0 243.7 -697 483 271 7.9% -18.4 279.0 -1096 571 91.42*** 31.38 151.46 3.005 0.594*** 2.706
[3000, 3500) 90 6.7% 30.0 268.6 -1260 589 260 7.6% 25.8 245.5 -722 560 4.19 -59.35 67.73 0.131 0.516 0.444
[3500, 4000) 99 7.4% 76.5 225.8 -838 485 275 8.0% 0.4 248.0 -1144 481 76.05*** 22.44 129.67 2.798 0.6*** 2.937
[4000, 4500) 95 7.1% 10.5 255.6 -1024 320 263 7.7% 32.1 171.1 -807 346 -21.60 -77.55 34.34 -0.764 0.516 0.457
[4500, 5000) 88 6.6% 17.6 201.4 -684 324 252 7.4% 9.3 156.8 -798 324 8.24 -38.54 55.02 0.349 0.555 1.536
[5000, 5500) 81 6.1% 21.3 112.0 -328 225 275 8.0% 22.0 102.8 -312 233 -0.76 -28.28 26.75 -0.055 0.509 0.256
[5500, 6000) 88 6.6% 22.3 99.6 -291 169 241 7.0% 29.6 84.0 -538 166 -7.32 -30.89 16.25 -0.614 0.489 -0.299
≥ 6000 63 4.7% -4.3 68.9 -320 75 138 4.0% 8.9 56.5 -316 115 -13.16 -32.85 6.53 -1.326 0.442 -1.321
Total 1,335 100.0% 31.0 206.1 -1277 664 3,427 100% 13.2 197.1 -1144 612 17.80*** 4.92 30.68 2.709 0.53*** 3.268
a PR = Pr(RankDifM > RankDifW )
b P-values: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 4.12: Differences in ranking position by gender: MIR 2015
MIR 2015 Men Women Student’s t-test Wilcoxon Rank-Sum
Ranking N Share RankDifM SD Min Max N Share RankDifW SD Min Max ∆RankDif 95% CI t PRa z
< 500 234 11.3% 18.2 88.2 -240 292 265 6.7% 23.4 98.6 -231 555 -5.18 -21.61 11.25 -0.619 0.509 0.354
[500, 1000) 203 9.8% 71.4 220.1 -538 658 297 7.5% 28.3 192.9 -482 670 43.15** 5.65 80.64 2.262 0.56** 2.264
[1000, 1500) 188 9.1% 51.2 280.9 -610 947 312 7.9% 10.9 258.5 -1043 764 40.30 -9.22 89.81 1.600 0.542 1.556
[1500, 2000) 158 7.7% 51.2 297.9 -885 732 342 8.7% -13.6 289.0 -1121 615 64.77** 8.90 120.63 2.282 0.563** 2.26
[2000, 2500) 188 9.1% 7.7 300.6 -827 647 312 7.9% -22.1 289.8 -1198 757 29.75 -24.08 83.59 1.087 0.536 1.345
[2500, 3000) 164 7.9% 42.9 308.0 -1119 772 336 8.5% 11.4 301.9 -1177 625 31.48 -25.88 88.84 1.080 0.532 1.162
[3000, 3500) 163 7.9% -21.6 376.0 -2188 715 337 8.5% -17.2 324.7 -1367 633 -4.35 -71.97 63.27 -0.127 0.511 0.405
[3500, 4000) 146 7.1% -22.3 288.2 -1015 482 354 9.0% -38.8 259.4 -1088 472 16.51 -37.75 70.78 0.599 0.526 0.916
[4000, 4500) 132 6.4% -19.9 260.8 -1344 343 368 9.3% -17.7 215.6 -1391 472 -2.22 -52.17 47.73 -0.088 0.528 0.956
[4500, 5000) 154 7.5% -32.5 222.7 -1165 367 346 8.8% -5.3 173.1 -819 337 -27.22 -67.04 12.61 -1.346 0.468 -1.134
[5000, 5500) 140 6.8% -33.8 176.3 -905 246 360 9.1% -3.9 132.2 -720 262 -29.92* -62.36 2.51 -1.819 0.457 -1.483
[5500, 6000) 186 9.0% -23.1 130.4 -999 170 314 7.9% -8.1 94.7 -574 160 -15.01 -36.57 6.54 -1.371 0.481 -0.729
≥ 6000 8 0.4% -3.8 5.9 -11 3 8 0.2% -0.3 6.3 -11 8 -3.50 -10.06 3.06 -1.145 0.336 -1.113
Total 2,064 100.0% 10.4 255.1 -2188 947 3,951 100.0% -5.4 234.1 -1391 764 15.86** 2.65 29.07 2.353 0.522*** 2.847
a PR = Pr(RankDifM > RankDifW )
b P-values: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 4.13: Differences in ranking position by gender: MIR 2015-Spanish sample
MIR 2015 Men Women Student’s t-test Wilcoxon Rank-Sum
Ranking N Share RankDifM SD Min Max N Share RankDifW SD Min Max ∆RankDif 95% CI t PRa z
< 500 224 13.5% 18.9 89.0 -240 292 259 7.3% 23.8 98.4 -231 555 -4.99 -21.74 11.77 -0.585 0.510 0.388
[500, 1000) 177 10.6% 76.6 211.5 -538 658 278 7.8% 32.3 189.7 -482 670 44.32** 5.88 82.77 2.268 0.564** 2.316
[1000, 1500) 160 9.6% 55.8 261.0 -610 660 294 8.2% 17.0 258.2 -1043 764 38.82 -11.44 89.09 1.520 0.545 1.583
[1500, 2000) 131 7.9% 48.3 277.9 -677 732 317 8.9% -4.7 281.6 -1121 615 52.99* -4.09 110.07 1.829 0.543 1.446
[2000, 2500) 144 8.7% 48.1 261.2 -667 647 280 7.8% -14.4 265.5 -987 597 62.43** 9.41 115.44 2.318 0.567** 2.254
[2500, 3000) 129 7.8% 36.3 297.2 -1119 618 308 8.6% 34.3 279.9 -1177 625 2.00 -58.38 62.38 0.065 0.513 0.414
[3000, 3500) 123 7.4% 27.6 363.0 -2188 715 301 8.4% 15.1 294.3 -1367 633 12.42 -60.29 85.14 0.337 0.535 1.144
[3500, 4000) 112 6.7% 8.2 261.0 -765 387 317 8.9% -10.6 234.7 -1088 472 18.84 -36.34 74.02 0.674 0.533 1.038
[4000, 4500) 109 6.6% 3.2 245.8 -1344 311 336 9.4% -1.7 183.3 -1120 472 4.94 -45.60 55.47 0.193 0.546 1.447
[4500, 5000) 129 7.8% -18.2 218.5 -1165 274 313 8.8% 9.0 149.2 -819 288 -27.20 -68.66 14.25 -1.295 0.475 -0.815
[5000, 5500) 101 6.1% 12.9 93.3 -281 246 319 8.9% 16.1 101.7 -517 262 -3.21 -24.70 18.28 -0.295 0.477 -0.707
[5500, 6000) 118 7.1% 7.7 73.4 -369 170 244 6.8% 13.2 72.1 -574 160 -5.55 -21.68 10.58 -0.678 0.481 -0.574
≥ 6000 7 0.4% -4.7 5.6 -11 3 6 0.2% -2.7 5.2 -11 3 -2.05 -8.71 4.61 -0.678 0.393 -0.649
Total 1,664 100% 29.5 233.3 -2188 732 3,572 100.0% 10.3 216.7 -1367 764 19.18*** 5.90 32.45 2.832 0.528*** 3.278
a PR = Pr(RankDifM > RankDifW )
b P-values: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis has presented analysis of the influence of doctors’ sociodemographic
characteristics on their medical specialty allocation outcomes. The findings identify
and quantify disparities across specialties and locations in the UK and the Spanish
health systems. We also explore the channels through which those differences arise
and are transmitted. These findings can assist policy makers and regulators to better
design and target workforce planning and recruitment strategies and hence make
better use of resources to improve access to care and the efficiency in health service
delivery.
The priorities regarding health workforce have shifted from broad concerns about
widespread shortages to more specific issues such as the existence of large imbalances
across specialties and/or locations (OECD 2016). Examples of those imbalances are the
over-subscription of some specialties, the increasing recruitment problems in others,
especially in general practice, and the under-supply of doctors in rural areas. Such
imbalances are closely linked to the major changes observed in the composition of
the medical workforce in the last two decades: the feminization of the profession, the
increased representation of ethnic minority doctors and those coming from deprived
socioeconomic backgrounds, and the increased reliance on foreign-graduated doctors.
The influence of these factors is explored throughout this thesis.
The findings from Chapter 2, that constitutes a descriptive exercise of the socio-
demographic composition of the new cohorts of doctors in the UK, show that incumbent
groups in the profession (i.e. young, white, male, and from a socioeconomic privileged
background doctors) are still overrepresented in the most demanded specialties. The
latter have been historically associated with larger earnings and other non-pecuniary
attributes such as prestige or peer recognition. Female doctors, who are now the largest
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group of doctors in training, are more likely to be allocated to primary care specialties
that are characterized by being in low demand and more poorly remunerated than
high-demand specialties. Similarly, we find that foreign-graduated doctors, who in
most cases are the best doctors from their country of origin (Tsugawa, Jena, Orav et al.
2017), are crowded into the less popular specialties and locations. The latter comes at
the risk of creating an underclass of doctors within the health system as it might entail
a lower quality of training and working experience for those doctors.
The achievement of an equal distribution of doctors across specialties is desirable
not only from an equity perspective. There are economic aspects associated with the
unequal sorting such as earning disparities between groups, one example being the
gender wage gap. 41 Unequal sorting of doctors can also lead to large differences in
productivity across specialties as there is evidence that females have lower activity rates
than male doctors (Bloor et al. 2008) and they tend to work fewer hours than males
(Simoens and Hurst 2006). Similarly, unequal sorting can lead to large differences in
quality of care across specialties as there are documented differences between male
and female doctors in communication styles (Cooper-Patrick et al. 1999), compliance
with guidelines (Baumha¨kel et al. 2009) and mortality and readmission rates (Wallis
et al. 2017; Tsugawa, Jena, Figueroa et al. 2017). A more equal distribution of doctors
might equalise those differences across specialties and heighten the quality of care in
the system as a whole.
We also find geographical imbalances in the distribution of doctors since female
doctors and doctors from better-off socioeconomic backgrounds have higher degrees of
aversion to geographical mobility to low-demand locations. One major policy concern
is filling training positions in general practice in rural areas, because females who are
more likely to be training in general practice are also less likely to choose a rural area.
Therefore, encouraging a more equal distribution of doctors in general practice with
respect to gender could mitigate geographical shortages.
Chapter 2 also sets out several potential reasons for observed differential attain-
ment and disentangling between those motivates the analysis of Chapters 3 and
41The gender wage gap has grown over the past decade in the UK (Rimmer 2017) and those differences
are likely to be explained by the different specialty choices between the two groups (Arcidiacono and
Nicholson 2005)
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4. A traditional explanation is that occupational segregation reflects differences in
intrinsic preferences between groups regarding different specialties’ pecuniary and
non-pecuniary attributes. If that were the sole reason, then there would be little scope
for policy action. Alternatively, differential attainment may arise from information
asymmetries. Stereotypes and preconceptions associated with specific groups can
affect doctors’ self-assessments of their perceived probabilities of success (i.e. gaining
access to their preferred training post), lead them to wrong judgements and negat-
ively affect their skill investments. A lower level of skill investments would diminish
their real probabilities of success and as a consequence lead them to a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
The conceptual framework in Chapter 3, that analyses the functioning of the two-
sided allocation process in the UK and establishes the channels by which doctors’
characteristics influence their choices and selectors’ valuations, accounts for doctors’
own perceptions and beliefs as a determinant of their application behaviour. The
Probit estimation results show that the observed specialty allocation outcomes in
Chapter 2 are largely driven by doctor application choices, even after controlling for
educational background and attainment. Nevertheless, the UKMED data utilised does
not allow us to identify whether those choices are driven by intrinsic differences in
preferences between groups, or arise from differences in the perceived probability
of gaining access to the most-demanded specialties. We conjecture that the latter is
likely to play an important role in the decision-making process of many individuals,
as Goldacre et al. (2010) finds large mismatches between early specialty choices and
eventual career destinations of UK doctors and Soethout et al. (2004) in a literature
review of European studies find that self-appraisal of skills constitutes one of the main
factors associated with specialty choice.
The analysis of the factors influencing the total number of applications sheds light on
doctors’ perception of success. The results show that BME and older doctors are more
likely to submit multiple applications even after controlling for specialty fixed effects.
We conjecture that individuals who make a unique application might be reflecting a
higher degree of self-confidence, will devote more time and resources to prepare the
application and interview processes and as a result will have a higher probability of
receiving an offer. The estimates from the selection stage confirm the latter, as making
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more than one application has a negative effect on interview scores.
Information asymmetries might be also present in the selection process when
selectors have imperfect information about the candidates they need to evaluate. In
that instance, they may rely on historical rates of success from the socio-demographic
group the candidate belongs to, and hence they would use group identity as proxy for
unobserved characteristics. Alternatively, selectors can simply suffer from unconscious
biases that are based on stereotypes and preconceptions. In Chapter 3, we also
analyse the determinants of selectors’ valuations of candidates and focus on identifying
whether the source of differences in interview scores between groups can be explained
by their differences in endowments, or by contrast remain unexplained and can be
associated to discrimination. Our findings for UKMED doctors corroborates past
evidence on differential attainment of ethnic minority doctors and male doctors. We
find strong evidence of BME doctors scoring less highly than white doctors in the
interview that is pivotal in giving access to a speciality training position. We also find
that female doctors score more highly than male doctors. The results show that on
average two thirds of the gap in interview score between white and ethnic minority
doctors remains unexplained. With respect to gender, the gap in the interview score is
smaller, favouring females, however with the special feature that the explained effect
favours male doctors whilst the unexplained is negative for male doctors. Therefore,
it seems that despite all the measures implemented to ensure a fair and transparent
recruitment process (General Medical Council 2010), the interview process might be
prone to some bias.
Entry barriers to high demand specialties are another source of differential attain-
ment, and those might be more pronounced for doctors who belong to historically
deprived groups. Entry barriers can be real such as financial constraints (oversub-
scribed specialties often require of higher skills investments), limited access to profes-
sional networks, nepotism, incompatibilities between specialty training schedules and
doctors’ personal schedules, etc. The results from the application stage in Chapter 3
show that female doctors self-select into low-income specialties and away from high-
income specialties, whilst younger and ethnic minority doctors42 and those coming
42Ethnic minority doctors in our sample come from wealthier backgrounds than the average doctor. That
can partially explain their leaning toward high-income specialties.
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from better-off socioeconomic backgrounds are more likely to apply to high-income
specialties. This situation is likely to exacerbate the gender wage gap in the profession
and perpetuate inequities in the distribution of wealth among socioeconomic groups.
Moreover, females and older doctors are more likely to select themselves into run-
through/primary care specialities, that on average have shorter training periods and
only require going through the specialty allocation process once. It might be easier
to work on a part-time basis when training for a run-through specialty and therefore
these might be preferred by doctors looking for a better work-leisure-family balance.
Entry barriers can also be perceived and therefore closely related to the role of
stereotypes and preconceptions affecting doctors’ skills investments, as described
above, or to the lack of role models from the same demographic group. In Chapter 4,
that focuses on the Spanish resident physician market, we analyse the role of social
interactions in shaping doctors’ decisions to specialize. We analyse whether the lack of
same sex role models is perceived as an entry barrier by female doctors. We find that
being exposed to female role models, who are female junior doctors training in surgical
male-dominated specialties, increases the probability of choosing a male-dominated
surgical specialty, with respect to any other specialization, of both men and women.
When the analysis is restricted to the sample of doctors with an interest in surgical
specialties the role model effect is only statistically significant for female doctors.
Nonetheless, our findings suggest that the role model variable might be capturing
other elements affecting decisions to specialize. Moreover, the estimation of social
interactions is very challenging and it is something that might or might not occur when
females are better represented among surgical specialties (Neumark and Gardecki
1996).
Finally, the differential attainment might also come from the design of the specialty
allocation process as its features might favour one group over the others. Results from
Chapter 4 show the effect of policy change that increased the competitiveness of the
Spanish specialty allocation process. The objective of the change was to ensure the
objectivity of the process by increasing the weight of an examination score in detriment
to the weight associated with previous attainment in medical undergraduate studies,
as regulators see the latter as more prone to biases. We find that the policy change
had the unintended consequence of reducing the ranking scores from female doctors
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and hence lowering their probability of accessing the most demanded specialties.
We conjecture that the well-documented gender gap in competitiveness (Frick 2011)
might be the main driver of the differences.
The findings from this thesis provide evidence of the occupational segregation of
the new cohorts of doctors in training in UK and Spain and discriminate between
competing explanations for those differences. Therefore, the findings can be taken as
a road map for policy makers to address the current policy concerns.
To tackle imbalances, the main objective should be promoting a balanced represent-
ation of female doctors across specialties. Our evidence shows that female doctors’
differential attainment takes place in the application stage, as they self-select them-
selves into low-income specialties and away from high-income specialties that have
associated lower levels of non-pecuniary benefits.43 It is unclear whether this sorting
is driven by differences in intrinsic preferences with respect to income between the
two groups or whether the lower levels of non-pecuniary benefits constitute a real
entry barrier for some women. In the latter case, policies which aim to make male-
dominated specialties more attractive should focus on improving the non-pecuniary
benefits associated with them. In addition, policies should focus on eliminating per-
ceived entry barriers in those specialties where females are underrepresented. Our
findings regarding the female role model effect are not conclusive but, they do suggest
that increasing the number of visible figures constitutes an attractor factor. Therefore,
if the objective is to lessen the specialty gender segregation, incentivising mentoring
programmes and giving more visibility to role models might meet the goal.
Other policy concerns are ensuring balance in the profession with respect to doctors’
ethnicity, as well as ensuring a fair and transparent recruitment process (General
Medical Council 2010). To improve representation and tackle imbalances, the aim
should be to improve the attainment in the specialty process of ethnic minority doctors.
They show differential attainment in the selection stage, partly due to their less
effective application strategies and partly to their worse interview outcomes that
cannot be fully explained by differences in observable characteristics between them
and white doctors. A policy action could be to provide more guidance on how to tackle
43Example of non-pecuniary benefits are flexibility to work part time, working hours that are more
compatible with family life or that allow for a work-leisure balance
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the application stage.44 Moreover, the selection stage needs to be examined carefully
to identify the elements that are driving the unexplained differences in interview scores.
The findings from this thesis also shed light on how to tackle the current recruitment
crisis in general practice.45 For example, around 18% of training places in England
were unfilled after two rounds of recruitment (Pulse Today 2017) and the recruitment
problem is even more pronounced in low-demand areas, such as the North East, East
Midlands and Yorkshire, where over a third of the posts remained unfilled (Rimmer
2015). One policy remedy to the crisis can be increasing the number of male general
practitioners. Our findings show that male doctors are more likely to apply to high-
income specialties, then financial incentives might attract them to the field and help
mitigating the shortages in rural areas as, they are also more likely than females to be
training in the low-demand locations.
Increasing the medical school intake is seen as one of the main policy remedies to
the GP shortage according NHS Forward View Plan (NHS England 2014). Nonetheless,
our findings show that doctors from privileged socioeconomic backgrounds, who are
the largest group in the profession, are less likely to apply to general practice. Then,
the objective should not only be to increase the school intake, but also to democratise
the medical profession by giving access to students from less socioeconomic-privileged
backgrounds. Moreover, it will be worth investigating whether doctors from privileged
socioeconomic backgrounds specialising in the most profitable specialties are more
likely to work for the private sector and therefore reduce their effort in the public
sector. 46 The exodus of that group to the private sector might lead to shortages of
doctors, longer waiting lists and to an overall a reduction in the productivity of the
NHS.
In addition, not only is an increase in the intake of medical students needed, but also
a better understanding of the role of medical schools in shaping doctors preferences
44If in reality making more applications, implies producing lower quality applications, BME doctors
should be encouraged to apply wisely and focus their efforts on one option.
45The ageing of the general population and the increasing number of general practitioners close to
retirement age put pressure on the health care system and there is the need to increase the number
of general practitioners. In particular in the UK, the objective is to increase the number of GPs by
5000 by 2020 (NHS England 2014).
46Doctors from privileged socioeconomic backgrounds might have better professional networks, be more
likely to be able to afford the costs of opening a surgery or, in general, may feel less identification
with the values of the NHS with respect to those coming from worse-off socioeconomic backgrounds.
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is required. Goldacre et al. (2004) found significant differences in specialty choices
between doctors from different medical schools whilst our findings show that the
‘medical school effect’ has significant influence in doctors’ application strategies. There
are some medical schools, such as Birmingham, whose students are more likely to
choose general practice as their career choice. From a policy perspective, isolating the
medical school effect in specialty choice from other elements, such as each doctor’s
ability, role of networks, etc., can be highly informative to the design of a medical
curriculum that emphasises the importance and attractiveness of general practice.
In synthesis, the main goal of policy makers should not be to ensure an exact
distribution of the different socioeconomic groups of doctors across specialties, but to
examine the allocation process and work towards the elimination of any entry barriers,
perceived or real, in order to ensure the equity of access to an activity funded with
taxpayers’ money. Achieving the latter would offer, productivity and quality gains and
therefore optimise the resources from the Health System.
5.1 Limitations and further research
Whilst the strengths from this thesis have been explained in detail in the introductory
chapter, this research is also subject to a number of limitations.
Chapter 2 examines the distribution of doctors across specialty and locations separ-
ately, whilst Chapter 3 focus on the impact of doctors’ sociodemographic characteristics
in their specialty application patterns, but does not study how those characteristics
affect location. Nonetheless, these two elements are interdependent and the analysis
of the trade-off existing between doctors’ desired specialty and desired location consti-
tutes a promising avenue for future research. The latter can be done by comparing
doctors’ desired specialty and location with their actual choices as in Harris et al.
(2017). Alternatively, that trade-off can be examined through a discrete choice experi-
ment. The latter would also allow exploring how specialty attributes, such as expected
hours of work or expected income, are related to doctors’ personal characteristics.
That knowledge could lead to better recruitment strategies as it will provide a better
understanding of the mechanisms leading to the current geographical and specialty
imbalances.
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In Chapter 2, we observe that foreign graduated doctors are more likely to be
training in low-demand specialties and locations. However, as UKMED data only
includes information from doctors who graduated in the UK, we were not able to
analyse their application strategies or their attainment in the selection stage. Given
that over one quarter of doctors in training graduated overseas, further research
should analyse whether crowding them into the less demanded training posts means
that they receive a poorer quality of training and examine the possible consequences
of the latter on patient outcomes.
One of the most important elements from the conceptual framework in Chapter 3 is
the distinction between the intrinsic benefit associated to the practice of a specialty
and the perceived probability of entering that specialty. However, UKMED data does
not allow the identification of both effect separately. Further research could focus
on identifying information asymmetries between the sociodemographic groups and
disentangling the effect of perceived probability and net benefit in specialty choices by
comparing the divergences between doctors’ stated preferences and actual application
choices. The identification of those divergences will help in the design of targeted
policy actions aim to redress them.
Another avenue of research is identifying the sources of the unexplained differences
in interview scores between demographic groups. As a first step, the analysis of
inequities should go beyond the mean, following the work of Firpo et al. (2009) and
Chernozhukov et al. (2013), by testing whether the gap in interview score is greater or
smaller in other parts of the interview score distribution. Moreover, further research
should have access to further releases of UKMED data leading to larger sample sizes
that will test the generalisability of our findings.
The estimation results on how female role models affect female doctors’ decisions to
specialise in Chapter 4 are not conclusive. The estimation of social interactions is very
challenging and further research should have access to better data and look into see
what forms of mentoring might be the most productive. Moreover, social interactions
have an important role in specialty choice decisions and can take multiple forms. A
further promising and challenging avenue of research can be the identification of
endogenous effects, such as the propensity of medical students to vary their behaviour
towards specialty choices with the behaviour of their peers.
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Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the determinants of sociodemographic occupational
segregation in the medical workforce for two countries with very different specialty
allocation systems. The findings show that both systems have flaws and we conjecture
that a hybrid specialty allocation system, that combines a test like the MIR examination
and an interview process, could reduce the ethnic (and gender) biases observed for
the UK system and be more accountable of the skills that are required of modern
doctors in the Spanish system. Future research could focus on an analysis of different
types of specialty allocation systems. The analysis should include the estimation of
operational47 costs as well as doctors’ private48 costs associated with each of the
allocation systems, and compare the efficiency and equity of the resulting allocation
of doctors across specialties and locations.
47In the UK, those are the logistic costs of organizing interviews, shortlisting and initial screening
processes. In the case of Spain those cost are associated to setting a centralised exam.
48Those are private opportunity costs borne by doctors who take part in the specialty allocation process.
Those are likely to be larger in Spain than in the UK as the typical medical student needs at least
six-months of full-time preparation for the MIR examination. Nonetheless, getting access to highly-
demanded specialties in the UK requires skill investments that need to be made long before the
moment of specialty allocation and might be also associated with high opportunity costs.
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Chapter 6
Appendices
6.1 Appendix to Chapter 2
Results location
Chapter 2 focuses on the distribution of doctors across specialties. Nonetheless, we
also explore the relationship between doctors’ sociodemographic characteristics and
the geographical location they are training for. The NTS includes the variable trust
name that informs about the Location where doctors carry out the specialty training.
We associate each trust to the corresponding Local Education and Training Board
(LETB) and group those into six categories, taking into account those LETBs that are
close enough and might be perceived as substitutes by doctors. The resulting locations
are:
• East of England, East and West Midlands (MID)
• London (LON)
• Thames Valley and Kent Surrey and Sussex (TVKSS)
• South West Peninsula, South West Severn and Wessex (SOU)
• North East, North West Mersey, North West North Western and Yorkshire and
the Humber (NOR)
• North Ireland, Scotland, Wales and Military (OTH)
There were 147 observations for which trust name was unspecified and therefore
the General sample and the UK sample include less observations with respect to the
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analysis for specialty, 27,383 and 19,290 respectively.
For interpretation purposes, we classify the six alternatives into high-demand and
low-demand as Table 2.3 sets out. The classification is based on average competition
ratios, given by the number of applications divided by the number of training posts,
from the different specialties/locations for the years 2012-2015. Each year, on average,
the number of applications submitted by doctors is double the number of training posts.
Therefore, we define alternatives with historical competition ratios lower than two as
low-demand and those with a competition ration greater than two as high-demand.
6.1.1 Descriptive statistics
General sample
Table A2.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the General sample regarding the geo-
graphical distribution of doctors in training. The descriptive statistics suggest that the
distribution of doctors across locations is highly unequal. The percentage of male and
female doctors in the General sample is 45.54% and 54.46%, respectively. However,
women are underrepresented in MID (50.02%) and NOR (51.31%) and overrepresen-
ted in LON (60.72%). With respect to ethnicity there are also large disparities, the
overall percentage of BME doctors is 41.17% whilst the lowest percentage corresponds
to SOU (19.35%) and the largest to MID (58.39%). The overall percentage of Mature
doctors in the General sample is 5%, the smallest representation of them is found for
SOU (3.27%) and the largest for LON (6.83%). Finally, regarding the place of medical
qualification, 24.41% of doctors qualified in an overseas medical school. The largest
representation of overseas doctors is observed in MID (33.77%) and the smallest in
SOU (13.74%) and LON (17.92%).
UK sample
Table A2.2, concerns the UK sample that includes the additional socioeconomic vari-
ables. In this group the percentage of Women (58.36%) is greater than in the General
sample, suggesting that non-UK educated doctors are more likely to be male. Moreover,
the geographical distribution of female doctors is similar to the observed for the Gen-
eral sample. The percentage of BME doctors is substantially smaller (25.32%) in this
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sample and the distribution of BME doctors across locations is highly unbalanced. The
largest representation can be found in MID (40.52%) and LON (40.08%) whilst the
smallest in SOU (9.75%) and OTH (6.8%). Similarly, the percentage of Mature doctors
is significantly smaller (1.33%) than the one observed for doctors in the General sample
and their distribution across specialties is fairly similar.
The UK sample also includes information on socioeconomic variables. Overall, doc-
tors have attended an Independent school in a larger proportion (35.31%) than the
general UK population (approximately 7%). Moreover with regard to the geograph-
ical distribution, doctors from Independent schools are overrepresented in England
compared to the rest of the UK, represented by the category OTH (23.65%); within
England, LON is the region with a largest representation of Independent school doctors
(44.92%) whilst NOR shows the smallest (32.11%). We observe the opposite for State
school with the largest representation of doctors in NOR (43.55%) and OTH (43.28%)
and the smallest in LON (32.43%). The other socioeconomic variable present in the
data is Parent uni, and the percentage of doctors with at least one parent with tertiary
education is 65.8%. Doctors in training in NOR show the smallest percentage for
Parent uni (62%), whilst those in LON show the largest (71.76%).
6.1.2 Estimation results
General sample
Table A2.3 shows the mixed logit estimation results for the General sample. For each
alternative the estimate associated with each covariate (MLE) and the corresponding
odds ratio (OR). The omitted alternative is MID as the region is in the centre of the
UK and comprises the largest number of doctors in training.
The variable Men is negative and statistically significant for LON and TVKSS at
the 99% and 90% confidence levels. A male doctor is on average 29% (OR 0.71)
and 12.9% (OR 0.871) less likely to be based in LON and TKVKSS, respectively. By
contrast, a male doctor is 1.62 and 1.66 times more likely than a female doctor to
be located in NOR and OTH with respect to MID. The estimates for the variable BME
are all negative and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. MID is the
region where a BME doctor is more likely to found in specialty training, whilst a
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BME doctor is on average 84.9% (OR 0.15) and 94.3% (OR 0.06) less likely to be
in training in SOU and NOR, respectively. The MLE for the variable Mature is only
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level for LON, where it is 1.273 times
more likely that a Mature doctor is in training with respect to MID. Finally, the variable
UK university is statistically significant for all alternatives with respect to the base
outcome. The estimates are positive for LON, TVKSS and SOU, where doctors who
graduated in the UK are 2.12, 1.34 and 1.43 times more likely to be training there,
with respect to the base outcome. By contrast, UK graduates are less likely to be based
in NOR and OTH.
UK sample
Table A2.4 shows the mixed logit estimation results for the UK sample. As for the
General sample MID is the omitted alternative. For this sample, the effect of the
variable Men is only statistically significant for LON (OR 0.066) and TVKSS (OR 0.83).
Moreover, as for the General sample the estimates associated with the variable BME
are negative for all alternatives and also statistically significant with the exception
of LON. The estimates for the variable Mature are no longer statistically significantly
different from zero.
With regard to the socioeconomic variables, the estimates for Independent school
are positive and statistically significant for LON and TVKSS. We find that doctors
from better-off socioeconomic backgrounds are 1.79 and 1.47 times more likely to be
based in LON and TVKSS than in MID. A negative and statistically significant effect is
found for OTH (OR 0.21). Results for grammar school are all positive and statistically
significant for all alternatives with the exception of NOR. Finally, the estimates for the
variable Parent Uni are all statistically significant and positive, with the exception of
NOR. The largest effects are found for SOU and OTH where doctors who have parents
with tertiary education are 1.74 and 1.83 times more likely to be in specialty training
in those locations, with respect to MID.
6.1.3 Discussion
The results for location show that with respect to doctors’ sociodemographic charac-
teristics there are substantial differences across locations. Doctors training in the most
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demanded locations, i.e. with the greater competition ratios, are more likely to be
female, white, have attended an independent or grammar school, have a parent with
tertiary education and have attended a UK university. By contrast, doctors training in
NOR and MID, the two least demanded locations, are more likely to be male, from an
ethnic minority and have graduated overseas.
England seems to rely on overseas graduate doctors more than the other countries
in the UK. Doctors are also more ethnically diverse, probably reflecting the fact that, at
population level, England has a greater percentage of ethnic minorities in the popula-
tion. By contrast, the percentage of doctors in training from better-off socioeconomic
backgrounds is greater in England than in the rest of the UK and within England those
doctors are overrepresented in the South of England (historically high-demanded
location). According to Health Service Journal (2017), most of the regions at risk of
general practitioner shortage are located in the South of England. The latter connects
with the findings for specialty allocation that show that socioeconomically privileged
doctors, who seem to prefer being based in the South, are less likely to be training
for general practice. In the medium run, making the profession less elitist and more
accessible and attractive to doctors from all socioeconomic stratum might palliate the
shortages in primary care specialties across the UK.
Our analysis is based on final outcomes from the specialty allocation process and
we can only conjecture on the mechanisms giving rise to the observed distribution of
trainees across locations and specialties. A further understanding of how doctors are
sorted across specialties and locations, and the nature of the trade-offs between those
two is required. That exercise can motivate policy interventions aimed at reducing the
gaps between supply and demand, both geographical and regarding specialties and
hence improving medical workforce planning.
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Table A2.1: Characteristics of the doctors in the General sample
ALL MID LON TVKSS SOU NOR OTH
N % N % N % N % N % N % N %
Gender
Man 12,470 45.54 2,914 49.98 2,071 39.28 970 44.31 1,214 43.65 3,097 48.69 2,204 44.52
Woman 14,913 54.46 2,916 50.02 3,201 60.72 1,219 55.69 1,567 56.35 3,263 51.31 2,747 55.48
Ethnicity
BME 11,273 41.17 3,404 58.39 2,440 46.28 973 44.45 538 19.35 2,750 43.24 1,168 23.59
White 16,096 58.78 2,423 41.56 2,832 53.72 1,216 55.55 2,243 80.65 3,603 56.65 3,779 76.33
Missing 14 0.05 3 0.05 7 0.11 4 0.08
Age
40 years old or more 1,400 5.11 398 6.83 263 4.99 110 5.03 91 3.27 339 5.33 199 4.02
Less than 40 years old 25,983 94.89 5,432 93.17 5,009 95.01 2,079 94.97 2,690 96.73 6,021 94.67 4,752 95.98
Place of studies
UK 20,698 75.59 3,861 66.23 4,327 82.08 1,678 76.66 2,399 86.26 4,470 70.28 3,963 80.04
Overseas 6,685 24.41 1,969 33.77 945 17.92 511 23.34 382 13.74 1,890 29.72 988 19.96
a MID: East of England, East and West Midlands; LON: London; TVKSS: Thames Valley and Kent Surrey and Sussex; SOU: South West Peninsula,
South West Severn and Wessex; NOR:North East, North West Mersey, North West North Western and Yorkshire and the Humber; OTH: North Ireland,
Scotland, Wales and Military.
b BME: Black and minority ethnic
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Table A2.2: Characteristics of the doctors in the UK sample
ALL MID LON TVKSS SOU NOR OTH
N % N % N % N % N % N % N %
Gender
Man 8,032 41.64 1,655 46.86 1,493 37.51 657 42.41 925 40.1 1,797 43.38 1,505 39.81
Woman 11,258 58.36 1,877 53.14 2,487 62.49 892 57.59 1,382 59.9 2,345 56.62 2,275 60.19
Ethnicity
BME 4,885 25.32 1,431 40.52 1,595 40.08 512 33.05 225 9.75 865 20.88 257 6.8
White 14,393 74.61 2,098 59.4 2,385 59.92 1,037 66.95 2,082 90.25 3,272 79 3,519 93.1
Missing 12 0.06 3 0.08 5 0.12 4 0.11
Age
40 years old or older 257 1.33 40 1.13 65 1.63 17 1.1 31 1.34 60 1.45 44 1.16
Less than 40 years old 19,033 98.67 3,492 98.87 3,915 98.37 1,532 98.9 2,276 98.66 4,082 98.55 3,736 98.84
School type
State 7,439 38.56 1,465 41.48 1,166 29.3 488 31.5 880 38.14 1,804 43.55 1,636 43.28
Grammar 4,380 22.71 720 20.39 878 22.06 322 20.79 452 19.59 886 21.39 1,122 29.68
Independent 6,811 35.31 1,206 34.14 1,788 44.92 676 43.64 917 39.75 1,330 32.11 894 23.65
Missing 660 3.42 141 3.39 148 3.72 63 4.07 58 2.41 121 2.95 128 3.38
Parental University
Yes 12,692 65.8 2,195 62.15 2,856 71.76 1,082 69.85 1,537 66.62 2,568 62 2,454 64.92
No 5,964 30.92 1,198 33.92 998 25.08 404 26.08 707 30.65 1,443 34.84 1,214 32.12
Missing 434 3.28 139 3.93 126 3.17 63 4.06 63 2.73 131 3.16 112 2.97
a MID: East of England, East and West Midlands; LON: London; TVKSS: Thames Valley and Kent Surrey and Sussex; SOU: South West Peninsula,
South West Severn and Wessex; NOR:North East, North West Mersey, North West North Western and Yorkshire and the Humber; OTH: North Ireland,
Scotland, Wales and Military.
b BME: Black and minority ethnic
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Table A2.3: Mixed Logit regression estimates for the General sample: Location
LON TVKSS SOU NOR OTH
MLE OR MLE OR MLE OR MLE OR MLE OR
Men -0.343*** 0.710 -0.138* 0.871 0.0236 1.024 0.482* 1.619 0.508* 1.662
(-8.65) (-2.25) (0.37) (2.46) (2.52)
BME -0.253*** 0.776 -0.470*** 0.625 -1.889*** 0.151 -2.862*** 0.057 -4.210*** 0.015
(-3.48) (-4.91) (-9.65) (-3.81) (-5.38)
Mature 0.241** 1.273 0.0123 1.012 0.0730 1.076 -0.492 0.611 -0.369 0.691
(2.72) (0.09) (0.52) (-1.68) (-1.17)
UK university 0.753*** 2.123 0.292*** 1.339 0.356** 1.428 -1.471** 0.230 -1.698** 0.183
(14.61) (3.64) (2.70) (-2.86) (-3.23)
Constant -0.333* 0.717 -1.379*** 0.252 -0.149 0.862 1.445*** 4.242 1.097** 2.995
(-2.51) (-3.91) (-0.39) (4.88) (2.69)
N 27369
Log-likelihood -45990.7
a LON: London; TVKSS: Thames Valley and Kent Surrey and Sussex; SOU: South West Peninsula, South West Severn and
Wessex; NOR:North East, North West Mersey, North West North Western and Yorkshire and the Humber; OTH: North Ireland,
Scotland, Wales and Military.
b MLE (mixlogit estimate); OR (odds ratio)
c Man vs. woman; BME vs. non-BME (BME: Black and minority ethnic); Mature vs. non-mature (> 40 vs. < 40 years old); UK
university vs. overseas educated student.
d Z-scores in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 and ∗p < 0.1;
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Table A2.4: Mixed Logit regression estimates for the UK sample: Location
LON TVKSS SOU NOR OTH
MLE OR MLE OR MLE OR MLE OR MLE OR
Men -0.415*** 0.660 -0.182* 0.834 0.0319 1.032 -0.0165 0.984 0.0883 1.092
(-8.12) (-2.06) (0.13) (-0.23) (0.37)
BME -0.177 0.838 -1.845** 0.158 -10.74*** 0.000 -1.069*** 0.343 -11.19*** 0.000
(-0.86) (-2.78) (-3.72) (-5.47) (-3.80)
Mature 0.399 1.490 -0.0243 0.976 -0.0671 0.935 0.202 1.224 -0.326 0.722
(1.84) (-0.06) (-0.07) (0.72) (-0.34)
Independent School 0.584*** 1.793 0.383** 1.467 -0.801 0.449 -0.148 0.862 -1.540** 0.214
(10.20) (3.10) (-1.64) (-1.54) (-3.04)
Grammar School 0.430*** 1.537 0.470*** 1.600 0.816* 2.261 -0.0799 0.923 1.138** 3.121
(5.67) (3.49) (2.14) (-0.80) (2.94)
Parent Uni 0.352*** 1.422 0.420*** 1.522 0.556* 1.744 -0.102 0.903 0.605* 1.831
(5.78) (3.98) (2.11) (-1.22) (2.28)
Constant -0.0222 0.978 -0.379 0.685 -2.695** 0.068 -0.0480 0.953 -2.094* 0.123
(-0.07) (-1.61) (-2.84) (-0.12) (-2.16)
N 18456
Log-likelihood -30814.4
a LON: London; TVKSS: Thames Valley and Kent Surrey and Sussex; SOU: South West Peninsula, South West Severn and Wessex;
NOR:North East, North West Mersey, North West North Western and Yorkshire and the Humber; OTH: North Ireland, Scotland,
Wales and Military.
b MLE (mixlogit estimate); OR (odds ratio)
c Man vs. woman; BME vs. non-BME (BME: Black and minority ethnic); Mature vs. non-mature (> 40 vs. < 40 years old); UK
university vs. overseas educated student.
d Z-scores in parentheses: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 and ∗p < 0.1;
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6.2 Appendix to Chapter 4
Figure A2.1: Proportion of male and female doctors by specialty
(a) Specialty 1: Allergy (b) Specialty 2: Clinical Analysis
(c) Specialty 3: Anatomical Pathology (d) Specialty 4: Anaesthetics
(e) Specialty 5:Vascular Surgery (f) Specialty 6:Gastroenterology
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(g) Specialty 7:Clinical Biochemistry (h) Specialty 8: Cardiology
(i) Specialty 9: Cardiovascular Surgery (j) Specialty 10: General Surgery
(k) Specialty 11: Oral Surgery (l) Specialty 12: Orthopaedic Surgery
(m) Specialty 13: Paediatric Surgery (n) Specialty 14: Plastic Surgery
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(o) Specialty 15: Thoracic Surgery (p) Specialty 16: Dermatologic Surgery
(q) Specialty 17: Endocrinology and Diabetes (r) Specialty 18: Pharmaceutical Medicine
(s) Specialty 19: Geriatric Medicine (t) Specialty 20: Haematology
(u) Specialty 21: Medical Hydrology (v) Specialty 22: Immunology
192
(w) Specialty 23: Occupational Medicine (x) Specialty 24: Sport and Exercise Medicine
(y) Specialty 25: General Practice (z) Specialty 26: Rehabilitation Medicine
(aa) Specialty 27: Intensive Care Medicine (ab) Specialty 28: General Internal Medicine
(ac) Specialty 29: Legal Forensic Medicine (ad) Specialty 30: Nuclear Medicine
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(ae) Specialty 31: Public Health (af) Specialty 32: Microbiology
(ag) Specialty 33: Renal Medicine (ah) Specialty 34: Respiratory Medicine
(ai) Specialty 35: Neurosurgery (aj) Specialty 36: Clinical Neurophysiology
(ak) Specialty 37: Neurology (al) Specialty 38: Obstetrics and Gynaecology
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(am) Specialty 39: Ophthalmology (an) Specialty 40: Medical Oncology
(ao) Specialty 41: Clinical Oncology (ap) Specialty 42: Otolaryngology
(aq) Specialty 43: Paediatrics (ar) Specialty 44: Psychiatry
(as) Specialty 45: Radiology (at) Specialty 46: Rheumatology
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(au) Specialty 47: Genito-Urinary Medicine
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Abbreviations
AME Average Marginal Effect
BME Black and Minority Ethnic
FP Foundation Programme
GMC General Medical Council
GP General Practitioner
GPA Grade Point Average
LETB Local Education and Training Board
MCAT Medical College Admission Test
MIR ‘Me´dico Interno Residente’ (resident medical intern)
NHS National Health System
NTS National Training Survey
OB Oaxaca-Blinder
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
POLAR3 Participation Of Local Areas
UK United Kingdom
UKCAT United Kingdom Clinical Aptitude Test
UKMED United Kingdom Medical Education Data Set
US United States
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